Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Analytical Report

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Executive Summary

In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine – and given the fact that a conflict of this magnitude may have spill over into other parts of the world, NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions conducted a nationally representative survey of 1,241 adult Jordanians to gauge their thoughts on the war. The survey looked to understand Jordanians’ personal views on the war and who they support most; their views on the impact the conflict could have on Jordan; their insights on which side do different regional and international countries support; their perceptions in relation to sovereignty and the refugee crisis; their views on intervention and conflict resolution; and the media outlets they utilize to acquire information.

Attitudes towards the Conflicting Parties

Looking at the results of the survey, Jordanians remained consistent in their foreign support in line with previous surveys conducted by NAMA. Similar to a 2021 Foreign Relations Survey conducted by NAMA for Konrad Adenauer Stiftung which showed that 80% and 79% of Jordanians chose neutrality when it comes to the US-Russian and the US-Chinese rivalries, the findings here showed that 75.1% of Jordanians indicated that they support neither Russia nor Ukraine.

However, of the 21.6% who chose one side or another, 13.6% were in support of Ukraine compared to 8% for Russia. While the former reasoned that Ukraine was the weaker side, Russia is the aggressor here, and that Ukraine has the right of self-defense, the latter demonstrated more hawkish perceptions, as they reasoned their support for Russia by stating that Russia needs to defend itself from NATO and the US and that Russia has the right to take Ukrainian land.

Moreover, when it comes to pointing blame, nearly 43% of Jordanians blame Russia for the war compared to 12.3% who pointed the blame at Ukraine, as 33% were unsure and about 12% indicated other countries or entities such as the United States, NATO, and Israel.

Neutrality was, for the most part, mirrored through Jordanians’ perceptions when asked which side did they think the Jordanian government is supporting. As such, about 45% indicated that the government is not supporting either of the parties whereas 16.5% believe that Jordan supports Ukraine, and 5.5% view that their government is in support of Russia. Additionally, 57% of Jordanians believe that Arab states should remain neutral in the conflict. While about 22% of Jordanians think that Arab states should support Ukraine, only 5.2% think that they should be supporting Russia.

Impact on Jordan

Given the magnitude of the war and the extent to which it can have an impact on other parts of the world, nearly 82% of Jordanians believe that this war will have a negative impact on Jordan, compared to 12% who think there will be no impact at all. Of those who believe it will have a negative impact, about 91.5% referred to some type of economic repercussions, such as price hikes, difficulty in importing goods into Jordan, and scarcity of natural resources and food items.
Nations’ Stances in the Conflict

Jordanians were asked to indicate their views regarding which side they think Germany, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran support in this war. The results show that a median of 46.4% of Jordanians were unsure, across the board, as which side these countries support. For the most part and when it comes to China and Iran, about 45.5% and 42.1% of Jordanians believe that these two countries support Russia. For Germany, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, more Jordanians believe that these countries are in support of Ukraine than Russia. While the same can be said about Jordanians’ perceptions of Jordan’s stance, it is worth noting that 40.6% of Jordanians believe that the country is neutral, which is the highest percentage of neutrality among the 7 countries, followed by Turkey with 17.8%.

Sovereignty

Looking at Jordanians’ level of support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the survey results demonstrate that about 54.3% of Jordanians support Ukraine’s territorial integrity (41.2% fully support and 13.1% somewhat support). On the other hand, 40.7% of Jordanians are indifferent to this particular aspect as they indicated that it does not matter to them. At the same time, nearly 90% of Jordanians believe that it is unacceptable for any country to invade another. However, when the discussion shifts to this particular invasion (i.e., the Russian invasion of Ukraine), 47.8% of Jordanians believe that it is not justified at all, showing a major 42 percentage point decline from the general context to the specific.

Refugee Crisis

When it comes to the refugee crisis induced by the Russia aggression on Ukraine, the survey results show that 54% of Jordanians are very sympathetic towards Ukrainian refugees followed by 22% who are somewhat sympathetic, as 14.1% are not at all sympathetic towards them. The high level of sympathy among Jordanians to the refugees can be attributed by the deeply rooted support for refugees that is engraved in Jordanian history and political culture. In addition to that, the survey finds that 59.4% of Jordanians believe that European countries are doing enough to take care of Ukrainian refugees, compared to about 22% who think they are not doing enough.

Intervention and Conflict Resolution

The next section of the survey focused on nonmilitary and military intervention in the conflict. The survey finds that about 45% of Jordanians believe that sanctioning Russia is justified, compared to 29% who believe it is not justified. On the other hand, about 36.8% of Jordanians believe that NATO (US and allies) should intervene militarily to stop the war, as 43% were against this prospect. This shows a higher support for nonmilitary intervention among Jordanians, albeit the support for sanctions was not unanimous. It is worth noting that of those who oppose military intervention, the vast majority were in support diplomatic negotiations, followed by 18.6% who stated that Ukraine should accept Russian demands.

Media Coverage

Finally, the survey asked Jordanians to indicate the media sources they use to get their information on the war. The results show that 45.2% of Jordanians receive their information on this war from television stations, followed by 40.7% who use social media, and 9.4% who rely on family and
friends through word of mouth. Moreover, the data shows that AlJazeera was ranked first as the most prevalent TV news station, followed by Roya and Almamlaka. It is also worth noting that only 4\%, of those who use the television to get information on this war, indicated that they rely on Jordan TV, which is a major decline in comparison to previous polls conducted by NAMA.

Looking at social media, Facebook was the most widely used site with 87.2\% followed by YouTube and Twitter with 4.2\% and 3.6\%, respectively. In addition to that, the survey finds that 61.9\% of Jordanians believe that television is the most trusted source of news on this conflict, followed by 18.6\% for social media.
1. Research Methodology

1.1 About this Survey

As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine worsens, and it is expected to have repercussions beyond its immediate geopolitical sphere, NAMA conducted a public opinion poll to understand the perceptions of Jordanians towards the crisis. This survey covers different aspects including the following:

- The respondents’ personal views on the war and who they support most
- The conflict’s impact on Jordan
- Jordanians’ view on where different countries stand in the conflict
- Issues of sovereignty and the refugee crisis
- Jordanians’ view on intervention and conflict resolution
- The media outlets Jordanians receive their information from

The first section discusses the stance of the respondents towards Ukraine and Russia as well as the impacts they believe the war would have on Jordan. The study further delves into how Jordanians view the stance of different countries towards the war as well the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and the extent to which the Russian invasion is justified. The penultimate section of the study discusses the perceptions on the upcoming refugee crisis. Then the study discusses how Jordanians view ways of intervention and conflict resolution for the conflict. The final section discusses which media platforms Jordanians mostly use to get information about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

1.2 Sampling and Field Work

This survey was conducted through computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI), conducted nationwide in Jordan, throughout the period between March 7-12, 2022. NAMA contacted a total of 1,637 adult Jordanians, of whom 81.1% (1,328 individuals) accepted to proceed with the interview. Of those who accepted, 93.5% (1,241 respondents) heard about the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, which is the final achieved sample of this survey.

The final completed sample covers all 12 governorates of Jordan, whereby every Jordanian who is 18 years and above was eligible to participate. The sample was also designed to ensure reliable estimates on regional levels (North, Center, and South). Jordan’s regions were grouped from governorates as follows: North (covering Ajloun, Irbid, Jerash, and Mafraq), Central (covering Amman, Balqa, Madaba, and Zarqa), and South (covering Aqaba, Karak, Ma’an, and Tafieleh).

The data was weighted to reflect the actual distribution of the population, the weight used the population size for each stratum and the block size (number of families) as main variables as well as the number of respondents from each block and the total number of block. The data in this report is rounded up to one decimal place.

A team consisting of 11 enumerators and one supervisor conducted and monitored the interviewing process. A team of analysts and statisticians from NAMA analyzed the data.
2. Attitudes Towards the Conflicting Parties

The first section of the survey looked to gauge Jordanians’ views towards the conflicting parties in this conflict. When looking at the survey results, the vast majority of Jordanians opted to remain neutral in this war. In fact, about 75.1% indicated that they support neither of the parties in the war. A combined 21.6% of Jordanians took sides, whereby 13.6% indicated they support Ukraine and 8% stated they support Russia. This is in line with Jordan’s preference for neutrality when it comes to foreign policy. The Jordanians’ neutral stance in this conflict is also in line with “NAMA” and “Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung’s 2021 Jordan’s foreign affairs survey, which highlighted Jordanian neutrality when it comes to the US-Russia rivalry (80%), and the US-China rivalry (79%).

![Figure 1: In the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, who do you support?](image)

For those who sided with Ukraine (169 Jordanians), nearly a half (52%) reasoned that Ukraine is the weaker side and innocent Ukrainian civilians are being caught up in the conflict as the driver behind their support for Ukraine, this is followed by the fact that Russia is the aggressor (15.7%), Ukraine has the right for freedom (8.4%), and that Muslims live in Ukraine (8.1%).

![Figure 2: Why do you support Ukraine? [N = 169]: (Those who answered “Support Ukraine” in the previous question) - (A respondent can provide more than one answer)](image)
With regards to Jordanians siding with Russia (99 respondents), 23.5% reasoned that Russia needs to defend itself from NATO and the United States, followed by 21% of those who support Russia reasoned that Russia has the right to take Ukrainian land, 12.8% reasoned that Russia is a powerful country, 6.6% reasoned that the president is a Zionist, and 3.6% reasoned that Russia supports Muslims and Arabs. When we compare the responses (Pro-Russia and Pro-Ukraine) perceptions, we can deduce that Jordanian support to Ukraine is based on emotions and the rights of the weak. However, looking at the Pro-Russia justifications leads us to assume that those who support Russia place major emphasis on “Realpolitik” and even demonstrates hawkish views.

![Figure 3: Why do you support Russia? [N = 100]: (Those who answered “Support Russia” in the previous question)- (A respondent can provide more than one answer)](image)

When Jordanians were asked who they think the Jordanian government is supporting, 44.9% of Jordanians think that Jordan is supporting neither side, with 16.5% think that Jordan supports Ukraine, and 5.5% think that Jordan is supporting Russia. It is important to note that a third of Jordanians (33.1%) do not know where the Jordanian Government stands in this conflict. This is important to highlight since, Jordan along with 140 other nations adopted the “General Assembly Resolution 12407” which demands Russia to end the illegal use of force in Ukraine and to withdraw all troops. Moreover, the fact that this resolution was adopted on the second of March, 5 days prior to collecting data for this study means that Jordan’s adoption of GA/12407 has not been adequately disseminated through the press.

However, when we discard the figures from Jordanians who are unsure where the Jordanian government stands, we can see a stark resemblance between Jordanian’s personal stance in this matter and the where they think the government stands. This shows that when it comes to foreign policy, policymakers are perceived in making decisions that are in line with what Jordanians want.
When it comes to Jordanians’ perceptions in relation to who should be blamed for the war, 42.7% of Jordanians hold Russia responsible for the war, compared to 12.3% who blame Ukraine. This shows that more than a quarter of Jordanians (33.2%) do not know who is responsible for the crisis.

Furthermore, 11.8% of Jordanians hold other countries responsible (147 respondents). Of those countries, 73.8% of the respondents blame the United States, followed by both Russia and Ukraine with 5.4%, and NATO with 5.4% as well, then Israel with 4.6%, and the Western camp as a whole (4.5%).
Finally, when it came to asking Jordanians on where should Arab countries stand in this conflict, the majority of Jordanians (57%) believe that Arab states should remain neutral in this conflict. While nearly one fifths of Jordanians (21.9%) believe that Arab states should support Ukraine, with 5.2% believe that Arab states should side with Russia, with 15.9% stayed undecided.
3. Impact on Jordan

The third section of the survey focused on how Jordanians view the ramifications that the conflict might have on Jordan. The overwhelming majority of Jordanians (81.7%) indicated that the conflict will have a negative impact in Jordan, followed by 12% who view that it will not have an impact, and 5.4% were undecided. Moreover, an insignificant number of Jordanians see some benefit from this war on Jordan (0.9%).

![Figure 8: In your view, will this crisis have a positive or negative impact on Jordan?](image)

Of the 81.7% who indicated that the conflict will have a negative impact, 46% stated that it will lead to higher prices and a difficulty in importing goods, whereas 32% stated that the conflict affects the economy negatively, 6.9% indicated that it could lead to wheat shortages, and 6.6% view that the prices of natural resources will increase. When it comes to Jordanians who believe there is a positive impact out of the conflict (11 respondents), around a quarter of the respondents indicated that the conflict shows the need for Jordan to become a self-sustaining country that is resilient to external events. However, it is important to note that those should be viewed as insights at best since the figures are extremely insignificant.

![Figure 9: Why negative? [N = 1086]: (Those who answered “Negative impact” in the previous question)- (A respondent can provide more than one answer)](image)
4. Nations’ Stance in the Conflict

The fourth section aims to gauge Jordanians’ perception of where specific nations stand with regards to the war. Respondents were asked to indicate with which party do the 7 selected countries stand. These countries were China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran. The data shows that, generally speaking, most of Jordanians were not quite sure about these country’s foreign policy interests, as an average of 46.4% of Jordanians indicated “don’t know.” This was followed by “neutral” with an average score of 15.5%, then support Ukraine with an average score of 16%, and finally supporting Russia with an average score of 12.9%.

The only country for which more Jordanians indicated supporting one side than those who were not sure was China (45.5% Pro-Russia compared to 40.4% do not know). The case with Iran was somewhat split between not sure and supports Russia (42.1% Pro-Russia compared to 47.3% do not know). The only country that Jordanians were confident that this country would be neutral is Jordan itself (40.6% neutral).

Moreover, (when we exclude undecided and neutral scores) more Jordanians think that all of the remaining sides are supporting Ukraine over Russia (except for China and Iran). Germany scored the highest (32.2% Pro-Ukraine compared to 14.4% Pro-Russia) followed by Turkey (25.5% Pro-Ukraine compared to 10.3% Pro-Russia), followed by Jordan (20.6% Pro-Ukraine compared to 4.3% Pro-Russia), then Egypt (16% Pro-Ukraine compared 12.6% Pro-Russia), and finally Saudi Arabia (15.8% Pro-Ukraine compared to 12.5% Pro-Russia).

However, when we do not take into account undecided respondents and outlier countries such as China and Iran, Jordanians tend to view that countries are more likely to lend their support towards Ukraine than to Russia. It is also interesting to note that Jordanians were not very sure about the stances of Germany (32.2% Pro-Ukraine compared to 45.6% do not know) – even though it is both a NATO and EU member. This could be attributed to the fact that Germany was initially hesitant in overtly supporting Ukraine in order to avoid antagonizing Russia due to its over-dependence on Russian natural gas. However, based on the median “do not know” score of 46.38%, we are more likely to assume that Jordanians’ knowledge in international relations and foreign policy outside the Middle East is lacking.

We can further reiterate that the press is not disseminating the news properly in Jordan. The reasoning behind this is that Turkey has been openly supporting Ukraine by condemning the Russian invasion, and more importantly, supplying the Ukrainian army with the “Bayraktar TB2” drones, and still Turkey was perceived at 25.5% in support of Ukraine when compared to 46.4% who indicated that they were not sure and 17.8% who were neutral.
Furthermore, this also could be seen as Jordanians tend to be neutral and not invested when it comes to conflicts outside of the Middle East. However, we can be certain that Jordanians and in extension, Jordanian foreign policymakers believe in non-alignment and in sovereignty since more Jordanians blame Russia and demonstrate support for the sovereignty of Ukraine.

5. Sovereignty

The fifth section of this survey looks to explore the perceptions of Jordanians regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as recognized internationally. When analyzing the data, we can indicate that Jordanian’s perceptions are highly divided between two main camps. The first camp, adopted by 40.7% of Jordanians, does not find any significance when deciding if the Ukraine is a sovereign nation or not. The reason behind this could be several notions. Jordanian’s probably do not believe that a nation truly has an adequate right to freely exercise its internal and external sovereignty within the political arena. This is most likely due to the fact that there is a sizeable gap in the power dynamics internationally, manifested in more power among western nations and the G7 countries, in specific.

The second camp, represented by 41.2% of Jordanian’s, fully supports Ukraine’s right to full autonomy and upholds its integral claims to its territories. This shows that these respondents believe that the security and authority of Ukraine is under fire and that Ukraine is a responsible and legitimate sovereign nation. Other respondents somewhat support Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 13.1% to be exact.

The capacity of Jordanian’s knowledge on this matter could be limited especially in the case of which country has territorial integrity since the modern Ukraine’s independence rose from the fall of the Soviet Union and land disputes could be plausible in their own eyes.
When it comes to the extent to which it is acceptable for a country to invade another, 89.7% of Jordanians unsurprisingly indicated that it was not acceptable, with 8.5% indicating that it acceptable. The reasoning behind the respondents’ opinion is mainly grounded on the basis of “Ethnocentrism”; which is when one’s mode of understanding of different communities’ actions and intentions are formulated with values, common principles, and historical events existing within the respondent’s culture and experience. This is prevalent in Jordan’s case, where the country and its citizens have strong rejecting views toward invasions, which have engulfed the MENA region historically.

Context is key, however, and when the question of to what extent is invasion justifiable turn to the Russia-Ukraine war, the data shows a significant 42 percentage points decrease. In fact, 47.8% of Jordanians believe that Russia’s military invasion is not justified at all, compared to approximately 90% when the discussion was unprompted.
6. Refugee Crisis

The sixth section of the survey focused on the refugee crises, which came as a result of the Russian invasion. Refugee crises have plagued the MENA region, and Jordan is a place that has always welcomed refugees from neighboring states. Thus, when the enquiry on how Jordanians feel towards the Ukrainian refugee crisis as a product of Russia’s invasion, 76% felt sympathetic. On the other hand, about 20% of Jordanians demonstrated some level of indifferences, as 6% stated they were not too sympathetic to the Ukrainian refugees and 14.1% were not at all sympathetic.

Following that, Jordanians were asked to indicate whether European countries were doing enough to take care of Ukrainian refugees. The results show that 59.4% of Jordanians believe that European countries are doing enough while approximately 22% think they are not doing enough to take care of these refugees.
7. Intervention and Conflict Resolution

The next section sheds a light intervention and conflict resolution, with regards to the Ukrainian-Russian Conflict. By the end of the Second World War, policies of nonviolence were put in place to prevent such wars from happening again. Regardless of their efficacy, the most common of these policies is economic sanctions. Over the past few weeks, many nations and multinational corporations announced sanctions against Russia and its notable oligarchs.

To that end, the survey asked Jordanians to indicate the extent to which they support these sanctions. The results show that Jordanians were somewhat divided, as 44.9% thought that it is greatly and somewhat justified whereas 22.3% believe sanctioning Russia was not justified. These findings could be, perhaps, attributed to the fact Jordanians have seen and assessed the efficacy of sanctions on countries such as Iran and Iraq.
When it comes to asking Jordanians whether NATO should intervene militarily, 42.9% of Jordanians indicated they were against this action while 36.8% stated they were in support of military intervention, as 20.3% of Jordanians were undecided. An all-out military confrontation between NATO and Russia could lead to a major global war, especially in the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Those who oppose the idea of NATO militarily intervening (42.9) were asked to specify their preferences from a list of alternative policies, including diplomatic negotiations for a peaceful agreement, Ukraine to accept Russian demands, and economic sanctions against Russia. The results show that three-fourths were in support of diplomatic negotiations, followed by 18.6% who stated that Ukraine should accept Russian demands, and 4% indicated economic sanctions against Russia. The majority’s approach mirrors the Jordanian foreign policy stance, represented by statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it comes to international conflicts, such as the Russian-Ukrainian since 2014 and the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict.

8. Media Coverage

Media plays a vital role in shaping the perceptions of people towards war. As such, it is important to understand what particular mediums and specific channels shape and influence the respondents’ views toward the war. Television ranked as the top outlet Jordanians use as a source of information on the war with 45.2% of Jordanians, followed by Social Media with 40.7%. These two outlets have both been highly used by respondents to gain information about the Ukrainian-Russian conflict as they are easily accessible for the public.
The respondents were asked to specify which TV channels they watched to acquire information on the war. To that end, Al Jazeera (37.8%) was ranked as the top source of news about the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, followed by local TV news outlets such as Roya (24.7%) and Al Mamlaka TV (9.9%). Al Jazeera retains an image of being a renowned news outlet, especially for international news. Whereas Roya and Al Mamlaka surpass other local and regional news channels as well as Al Arabiya (7.9%). Interestingly, only 4% of Jordanians reported receiving their information from the national Jordan TV, owned by the government. This is a significant decline from previous poll conducted by NAMA, which tend to reveal a respectable percentage of respondents who opt for Jordan TV as their main source of news. It is worth noting, however, that Roya and Al Mamlaka have been trending upwards.
Of the 14 respondents who stated that they rely on the radio as a source of information about the crisis, 21.7% listened to Amman FM followed by 19.8% who listened to Hayat FM and Rotana Radio. This small number of respondents can be attributed to the rise in the use of social media as the evolution in technology is changing the people’s culture and where they receive their information from. It can also be attributed to the fact that many employers still utilize a remote work or a hybrid work style, meaning not many individuals are listening to the radio when compared to the pre-pandemic era.

![Figure 20: What news sources are you using to get your information about the crisis? (N = 14): (Those who chose “Radio” in the aforementioned question) - (A respondent can provide more than one answer)](image)

Furthermore, only 7 respondents indicated that they rely on newspapers as their main source of information on the Russian-Ukrainian war. This signifies a major decline in the newspaper industry in Jordan, especially that social media is far more accessible and timelier.

![Figure 21: What news sources are you using to get your information about the crisis? (N = 7): (Those who chose “Newspaper” in the aforementioned question) - (A respondent can provide more than one answer)](image)
It would be safe to assume that the decline in the use of printed newspapers has shifted to consumption of digital content. However, only 55 respondents reported receiving their information from “websites”. As such, Nabd was the most used outlet for news with 28.6% of those who receive their news from news websites, followed by Roya with 19.9% and Al Mamlaka TV with 19.4%.

As for social media, Facebook ranked first with 87.2% of the respondents stating that they use it for news about the conflict. This was followed by YouTube with 4.2% and Twitter with 3.6%.
Despite the prevalence of a much higher consumption of news across social media than from television, trust in the accuracy and verifiability of news illustrated different dynamics. As such, television was reported as the most trustworthy source of information about the crisis, as indicated by 61.9% of the respondents, followed by social media with 18.6%, whereas newspapers were the least trustworthy source of information with only 0.4% of the respondents claiming that it is a trustworthy source of information about the crisis.

Figure 24: What is the most trustworthy source of information on the crisis for you?
9. Demographics

9.1 Gender

[Diagram showing gender distribution with 50.5% Male and 49.5% Female]

9.2 Age

[Bar chart showing age distribution for different age groups: 18-24 (19.1%), 25-34 (31.0%), 35-44 (21.2%), 45-54 (15.9%), 55+ (12.8%)]
### 9.3 Educational Level

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Below secondary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than secondary</td>
<td>42.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 9.4 Educational Level (Broken Down)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic/elementary</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma (2 years)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational/technical training</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters or higher</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.5 Marital Status

- Single: 29.2
- Engaged: 0.9
- Married: 65.6
- Widowed: 2.9
- Divorced: 0.9
- Separated: 0.4

9.6 Governorates

- Amman: 38.6
- Irbid: 19.9
- Zarqa: 13.7
- Balqa: 6.0
- Mafraq: 4.8
- Kerak: 4.1
- Jerash: 2.6
- Ajloun: 2.4
- Madaba: 2.4
- Maan: 2.1
- Aqaba: 2.1
- Tafilah: 1.4