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THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

ISSN 1231-1413

Cena 27,00 zł
(VAT 5%)
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QUARTERLY OF THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
HANS L. ZETTERBERG

Social Theorists in Memoriam

In a postponed departure
announced by loudspeakers
in an air terminal
I meet Andrzej Malewski
The comfort of familiar embraces us
we laugh and we drink
and we talk on new found lands
Only our past is a sure destiny
(through open to interpretation)
Goodbye goodbye to academe
goodbye to wives and kin
At the runway’s point of no return
we are the alumni
the eternal students
(surprise surprise!)
who have found their form
managers of decisive projects
at home in the huge county of the world
worldly members of mankind
Straight through us
the roads are plain and independent:
considérez des faits sociaux comme des choses
Zetterberg and Malewski—Unfinished Collaboration and Friendship

Hans L. Zetterberg (1927–2014) was an outstanding figure among modern sociologists. His main contribution to the social sciences was in the philosophy of science, which Polish sociologists—such as Stefan Nowak and Andrzej Malewski—preferred to call metatheory. Professor Zetterberg did not live in an academic ivory tower but combined theoretical work with research and social engagement. For many years, he was the owner-director of one of the best research agencies in Sweden and editor-in-chief of a major Swedish daily newspaper. For several years, he was also president of the World Association for Public Research (WAPOR). In 1997, the American Sociological Association voted his book, The Many-Splendored Society, to be the “20th century’s most influential book in sociology.”

Andrzej Malewski (1929–1969) belonged to a group of then young Polish sociologists who, after de-Stalinization and the reintroduction of sociology to Polish universities, received American grants to travel to the United States and study recent developments in the social sciences, particularly in sociology, which the communists had previously declared a “bourgeois pseudo-science” and banned from academia. Malewski brought back to Poland current ideas in the philosophy of science, methodology, and social psychology, which was quite a new discipline for Polish psychologists at that time.

Hans L. Zetterberg and Andrzej Malewski met for the first time at Columbia University, where the former was already a renowned sociologist and the latter was a visitor from communist Poland, thirsty for knowledge. They worked together extensively and became good friends. Malewski’s very premature death in 1969 and Zetterberg’s passing in 2014 have been a great loss to sociology, social psychology, and other social sciences.

We had been meeting Hans L. Zetterberg at WAPOR conferences and congresses for several years. We enjoyed each other’s company and talked about papers that had been presented and sociology in general. In July 2010 we met him during the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology in Gothenburg. Seated together at dinner, we started talking about relations between Swedish and Polish sociologists. Hans recalled his meeting with Andrzej Malewski in an airport transit lounge in Zurich or Geneva. One of them was returning home, the other was on his way to the US. They planned several meetings and talks which never occurred because of Andrzej’s tragic death. After this unanticipated meeting Hans wrote a poem; we were honored when he sent it to us. Karin Busch Zetterberg, his wife, kindly agreed to its publication.
Last year, we found two unpublished papers by Andrzej Malewski in his archive in the joint Library of the University of Warsaw’s Institute of Sociology and of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Hanna Malewska-Peyre has kindly given us permission to publish them. The first concerns an interest shared by both Zetterberg and Malewski, namely the role of theory in the behavioral sciences. The second is of an empirical nature on the borderline between sociology and social psychology. It concerns a topic that is still constantly researched and intensely discussed by sociologists, namely, attitudes toward income. Malewski has approached it in a not usual way, from the socio-psychological perspective of defending one’s own position. The *Polish Sociological Review* has decided to make an exception to its rule and to publish both these newly found articles together in their original form, with only minor linguistic corrections. They not only have historical value but, despite the passage of time, are very relevant for current sociology.

*Katarzyna M. Staszyńska
Krzysztof Zagórski*
ANDRZEJ MALEWSKI

Comments Concerning the Position of Theories in the Behavioral Sciences

The Problem

The importance of developing theories has been incessantly expressed in sociological literature. Robert K. Merton has stated repeatedly that the major task of sociologists today is to develop sets of general propositions rather than to engage in either purely descriptive studies unrelated to any theory or in the construction of conceptual schemes for one all-inclusive theory to be developed in the future, from which all other sociological theories might be derived. His suggestion is to put the main emphasis on theories and not on concepts or heuristic directives. 1 Stouffer, 2 Homans, 3 Zetterberg, 4 Neal Gross, 5 and others have expressed similar convictions. Various sociologists and psychologists, who use the term “theory” in different ways, have also emphasized the need for, and importance of, theory. 6

At the same time it has been suggested in several publications that very little has been done to accomplish what is considered by many sociologists to be the major task. In 1947 Stouffer said, “I fear indeed that when we speak of the engineering application of sociological theories we may lie talking largely of the future rather than the past.” He admitted that there must exist some examples of general sociological propositions that could be applied to a program of social action, but he asked “How many examples of this kind can be found? If there are a good many,” he added, “why doesn’t somebody write a book about them?” 7

In 1949 R.K. Merton wrote that “despite the many volumes dealing with the history of sociological theory and despite the plethora of empirical investigations, sociologists (in-

cluding the writer) may discuss the logical criteria of sociological laws without citing a single instance which fully satisfies these criteria.'\(^8\)

In 1960 G. Homans suggested that “there are still good reasons for asking the question: What single general proposition about human behavior have we established?” And, he added, “we shall find ourselves waiting for an answer.”\(^9\)

In 1954 H.L. Zetterberg wrote that the present sociological thinking has little to offer students who want to go beyond descriptive studies. Courses dealing with social theory are mostly concerned with the history of social thought or with defining and classifying human behavior and developing a vocabulary which enables us to talk about social phenomena in a scholarly fashion.\(^10\)

In 1956 the same author stated that “great progress has been made” but “the number of specific topical findings which are not integrated into a sociological theory is very large.”\(^11\)

At the same time some authors still take the position that the quest for invariant relations in sociology is an idle dream.\(^12\)

In my opinion so much has been done in this respect during the last years that what was said concerning the position of theories ten years ago no longer holds, and the problem of the possibility of non-historical propositions in the behavioral sciences is quite obsolete. But there are various factors which make it very difficult to see this change clearly. I will mention two factors which seem to be the most important.

The first one is the enormous ambiguity of the term “theory.” Books and articles which include the term “theory” in the title sometimes contain general propositions\(^13\) but very often do not. The same is true of publications which do present sets of strictly general propositions. Some systems of such propositions are called “theories”; others are not.\(^14\)

The second factor results from the most common type of division of labor within the social sciences. Works analyzing regularities of the same type are often classified under various areas of the social sciences (e.g., psychology of personality, child psychology, so-

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8 Op. cit., p. 96
cial psychology, political sociology, sociology of ethnic relations, social anthropology, etc.) according to the kind of empirical data and the kind of techniques used. As a result, scientists from one area often have a rather limited contact with investigations which aim at testing the same or similar hypotheses by using different types of data or different techniques.

This paper has three aims. First, I hope to clarify various meanings of the term “theory” in order to remove misunderstandings resulting from the existing ambiguities. Second, I hope to show, by discussion of some concrete examples, that the position of theories conceived as systems of universal propositions is not so hopeless as is sometimes supposed. Third, I want to put forth certain problems emerging from a comparison of several theories—problems which in my opinion have some relevance to the codification of theoretical knowledge in the social sciences. The first problem will be discussed in Section II, the last two in Section III.

Three Meanings of the Term “Theory”

Basic Distinctions

The term “theory” is widely used in the contemporary social sciences in at least three different meanings. The first refers to unconfirmed knowledge; the second to knowledge which is not purely descriptive; the third to a system of testable, strictly general propositions.

The denotations of these three concepts overlap. Some theories in the first sense may also be called “theories” in the second and third sense. But not all of them. The same is true of two other concepts which were distinguished above. The relations between these three concepts may be illustrated by the following figure in which denotations are represented by circles.

The main subject of our interest in this paper is theory in the third sense. However, in order to avoid very common misunderstandings it seems desirable to devote the following

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three paragraphs to a more detailed and concrete discussion of the three concepts mentioned above.

**Theory as Opposed to Confirmed Knowledge**

In trying to explain the meaning of the term “theory,” S.C. Hall and G. Lindzey state that “the most common conception is that a theory exists in opposition to a fact. A theory is an unsubstantiated hypothesis or a speculation concerning reality which is not yet definitely known to be so. When the theory is confirmed, it becomes a fact.”¹⁷ This meaning is pretty common in the works of psychologists and sociologists. For example, N. Sanford and M. Conover state that controversy and confusion regarding the Ego and the self flourish because of the absence of suitable objective indices, and they conclude that “If there were sufficient methodological access to the Ego and to the inferred self theoretical issues could quickly be turned into empirical questions.”¹⁸ B. Berelson and Steiner in *Introduction to the Behavioral Sciences*¹⁹ and Berelson and Janowitz in *Readings in Public Opinion and Communication*²⁰ also opposed theories to “facts,” that is, to the knowledge confirmed by systematic evidence.

The concept of theory as speculation unconfirmed by empirical data has one undesirable consequence which is quite apparent in the above-quoted book by Hall and Lindzey. The writers agree that a good theory should enable us to derive testable hypotheses. At the same time they admit that when a theory is confirmed, it ceases to be a theory. “In our view,” they write, “theories are never true or false.”²¹ A good theory, when turned into a system of testable hypotheses, is no longer a theory. In this way the concept of theory presented here, often even contrary to the intentions of scholars who use it, has a pejorative connotation.

**Theory as Opposed to Description**

R.K. Merton has noted that the term “sociological theory” has been widely used to label six different types of scientific works: (1) methodology; (2) general sociological orientations; (3) analysis of sociological concepts; (4) post factum sociological interpretations; (5) empirical generalizations, that is, “isolated propositions summarizing observed uniformities of relationships between two or more variables,” and scientific laws which are defined by the author as “statements of invariance derivable from theory.”²²

If we assume that in the contexts described by Merton the term “theory” means “the knowledge which is not purely descriptive,” it will become clear why six different types of scientific works and several others are sometimes called “theories.” The concept of theory, as opposed to description, is, in my opinion, very common. In this sense the sentences

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¹⁷ *Theories of Personality*, op. cit.
¹⁹ B. Berelson and G. Steiner, *Introduction to the Behavioral Sciences*. To be published.
²⁰ See, e.g.,
which describe what happened in a particular time or place are not considered theories. But other products of scientific activity may be called theories. An investigator taking a random sample of voters in order to reveal the political preferences of voters at a given time in a particular country is doing a descriptive study. A researcher concerned with any other kind of scientific activity is, according to this tradition, concerned with theories. This is presumably the meaning of the word “theory” in the writings of the authors who use this term to describe the results of the type of work that was characteristic of the great sociologists of the previous generations. Typical in this tradition is T. Abel’s statement: “the traditional meaning of the term ‘theory’ refers to a category of ideas and substantive contents which we associate with the work of such men as Comte, Spencer, Toennies and Durkheim, Summe, Cooley, Simmel and Max Weber.” Abel’s emphasis is that the term “theory” applies not only to the above-mentioned sociological works but to all works of this kind. However, the works of these sociologists were extremely varied. Probably their only element in common is that they were not limited to description of what happened in a particular time or place.

The results of scientific activity that can be distinguished from description are extremely heterogeneous. I shall distinguish several of them.

First, these results include new concepts. Let us give as examples various forms of mechanisms of defense—overcompensation, substitution, aggression, displacement of aggression, regression, rationalization; or various phenomena important for understanding the process of learning—drive, cue, response, reinforcement, extinction, spontaneous recovery, generalization, discrimination, gradient of generalization, etc.; or various concepts referring to the expectations of others—position, role, role consensus, intra-role conflict, inter-role conflict, a perceived obligation, a perceived pressure, role-set, etc.; or various concepts used in analysis of mutual relationships within small groups—rank, observability, conformity, frequency of interaction, reward power, legitimate power, structural balance; or various concepts used in analysis of social stratification—class, objective and subjective class membership, multidimensional hierarchy, inconsistency of status, relative deprivation, level of aspiration, vertical upward and downward mobility, intergenerational mobility, etc.

The authors who introduce new concepts presumably believe that these concepts suggest some important variables which may disclose new regularities or are useful for better descriptions. These beliefs are not always justified, however. Many conceptual distinctions hinder more than they help an analysis of social reality. But as a matter of fact, a great part of intellectual work in the social sciences consists of introducing new concepts. A. Rappaport is right when he says that “for a social scientist a ‘theory’ is often (in effect) a system of reference that is a multitude of definitions. That is to say the theoretician of social science invites the reader to categorize his observations in a certain way.” This is the way in which the term “theory” is used by Nadel in his book *A Theory of Social Structure.*

---

A second type of work described as theoretical in the sense just discussed consists of giving operational definitions to non-operational concepts. Social scientists who introduce new concepts very often do not make clear how these concepts should be used. Let us take, for example, such concepts as “political consensus” or “status polarization.” Many writers have suggested that some degree of both consensus and conflict is necessary for the maintenance of a stable democratic system. How are these terms to be used? How is one to decide in which of the given countries there is a greater degree of political consensus? This is a problem considered by C. Runciman, who tries to formulate criteria by which degrees of political consensus or conflict can be measured. Concepts such as “social cohesion,” “reference group,” “cognitive dissonance,” “threat to self-esteem,” etc., suggest similar problems.

A third type of scientific work referred to as a theory consists of suggesting heuristic directives which assume that some factors are partially important in explaining various aspects of human behavior or social systems. Let us recall the differences between various theories of personality. A great part of these differences may be conceived as differences in assumptions regarding the relative importance of certain types of variable. Some examples of important differences in the general orientations of psychologists of personality are the emphasis on conscious or unconscious determinants of behavior; the importance of reward as opposed to contiguity in learning; explaining human behavior in terms of early experience as opposed to contemporaneous factors; the emphasis on reality as it is perceived by the individual in contrast to objective reality; explanations in terms of a small number of basic motives or in terms of a large, sometimes limitless, number of motives; and the greater or lesser significance attributed to individual self-perception. These are mostly differences in the kind of heuristic directives and in beliefs concerning the fruitfulness of certain types of variables, rather than differences in systems of empirical propositions.

Similar types of differences can be found in the analysis of cognitive processes. Some tend to look at the processes in question as expressions of needs—expressions which facilitate the adjustment of the organism. Others put an emphasis on the organization of the cognitive field and on the consistency between new and old cognitions. Still others emphasize a kind of physical stimulation. This is the difference in beliefs about what kinds of

26 See, e.g., S. Hall and G. Lindzey, op. cit. and N. Sanford and M. Conover, op. cit.
27 As E.g., K. Lewin, H. J. Eysenck or C. R. Rogers.
28 E.g., S. Freud, K. Horney, H. A. Murray.
29 E.g., J. Dollard and N. E. Miller.
30 E.g., H. S. Sullivan.
31 E.g., S. Freud or A. Alfred.
32 E.g., K. Lewin and some of his students.
33 E.g., K. Lewin or C. R. Rogers.
34 E.g., J. Dollard, N. E. Miller, W. H. Sheldon, H. J. Eysenck, or R. Cattell.
35 E.g., S. Freud, A. Alfred, K. Horney, E. Fromm, P. Lecky.
36 E.g., K. Lewin, G. W. Allport, H. A. Murray and G. Murphy.
37 See, e.g., A. Alfred, K. Horney, C. R. Robers, P. Lecky and G. Goldstein as opposed to N. E. Miller or H. J. Eysenck.
variables are particularly fruitful, as well as the difference in explanatory habits and in the heuristic directives that are accepted and recommended.

P. Selznick gives us another example of a “theory” conceived as a set of heuristic directives. This concerns not individuals but formal organizations. The directives suggest looking at the analysis of organizations mainly to identify the unanticipated consequences of purposive actions and to pay attention to such causes of unanticipated effects as: a desire to defend an organization and the maintenance of unity, order, and discipline; the aspirations and interests of personnel which make certain members opposed to the aims of an organization; institutionalized patterns of behavior which may limit the choice of means; lack of control over the incumbents of power; or compromises with the requirements of the social environment. “The theory of organizational commitments” is a theory, if by “theory” we mean a set of heuristic directives which recommend what kinds of variables are to be taken into account rather than contribute a set of specific propositions.

A fourth type of intellectual work that is frequently referred to as theoretical as opposed to descriptive consists of the construction of models. I mean here a system of mathematical functions, sentences, diagrams, or tables concerning relationships between variables, relationships which have as yet no empirical interpretation. The Levinian interpretations of findings concerning levels of aspiration may be used as one of many available examples of this type of work.  

Levin et al. assumes that, from possible actions, “that action is chosen as a goal for which the sum of attractiveness (positive valence) minus the sum of disagreeableness (negative valence) is a maximum.” In analyzing the level of aspiration it is assumed that “the general character of activity is constant. The choice is determined by the different valences which different degrees of difficulties within the same activity have for the same person.”

The authors propose the following formulae.

First, the valence of each level of activity [Va(a^n)] is equal to the positive valence of success on that level [pos Va(suc A^n)] minus the negative valence that future failure has on that level [neg Va(Fai A^n)].

Symbolically:

(1) \[ Va(A^n) = \text{pos. Va(suc A^n)} - \text{neg. Va(Fai A^n)} \]

Second, with increased difficulty the valence of success also increases.

(2) \[ \text{pos Va(suc A^{high})} \succ \text{pos Va(Suc A low)} \]

Third, with increased difficulty the valence of failure decreases.

---

Neg. Ba(Fai $A^{\text{high}}$) neg. Va(Fai $A^{\text{low}}$).

Fourth, as the positive valence of success increases with difficulty and the negative valence of failure decreases, the total valence on the high level should always be greater than the total valence on the lower level.

\[
\text{Va}(A^{\text{high}}) = \text{Va}(\text{Suc } A^{\text{high}}) + \text{Va}(\text{Fai } A^{\text{high}}),
\]
\[
\text{Va}(\text{Suc } A^{\text{low}}) + \text{Va}(\text{Fai } A^{\text{low}}) = \text{Va}(A^{\text{low}})
\]

Consequently, Lewin says, there is nothing paradoxical in the fact that people reach out for difficult tasks. If they do not always choose the most difficult tasks, it is probably because the choice is determined not by the valence of future success or failure as such, but rather by these valences modified by the subjective probability of the occurrence of these events. The weighted valence of success is the product of the valence and of the probability of success.

\[
^o\text{Va}(\text{suc } A^n) = \text{Va}(\text{suc } A^n) - \text{Prob. } (\text{Suc } A^n)
\]

Similarly weighted valence of failure [$^o\text{Va}(\text{Fai } A^n)$]

\[
^o\text{Va}(\text{Fai } A^n) = \text{Va}(\text{Fai } A^n) \cdot \text{Prob. } (\text{Fai } A^n).
\]

The sum of these valences is called “resultant weighted valence” [$^o\text{Va}(A^n)$]

The authors state that

Level of aspiration $n$ if $^o\text{Va}(A^n) = \text{maximum}$.

Levin at al. discussed several factors determining the values of the scale of probability (such as past successes and failures, numbers of experiences, existence of definite upper and lower limit, wishes and fears) and factors determining the valences of future success or failure, such as group standards and past achievements. In addition, they state that all these coexistent frames of reference underlying the probability scale, the scales of valences of future success and failure, can technically be recombinde to these main scales if one attributes to each of the underlying frame-of-reference scales (uRS) the relative weight of potency with which it influences the individual.\textsuperscript{42}

It is apparent that what is labeled the resultant valence theory is a model in the sense clarified above. It is a set of formulae with supplementary tables and diagrams which describe relationships between variables for which we have no measures.

\textsuperscript{42} Op. cit.
Sometimes a model as conceived here is a first step toward a system of empirical hypotheses. This is the case when the relationships described in a given model receive an empirical interpretation. Models are used in this way by T. French in the paper “A Formal Theory of Social Power,” 43 and by L. Festinger in the paper “An Analysis of Compliant Behavior.” 44 However, models are often presented without any attempt at empirical interpretation. This is a type of scientific work quite different from theories conceived as systems of testable and strictly general propositions.

The fifth type of scientific work that can be distinguished from description consists of formulating and testing general hypotheses. Almost every issue of any sociological and psychological journal brings several new examples of this kind of endeavor. Here are two illustrations.

G. Lenski assumes, following the tradition of Max Weber, that the vertical structure of societies is usually multidimensional, that individual status consists of a series of positions in a series of related vertical hierarchies, and that some of these positions can be much higher than others. Lenski reports several investigations designed to explore some consequences of inconsistency of status. His findings confirm the hypothesis that individuals characterized by a high inconsistency of status are significantly more liberal in their political attitudes and behavior than individuals characterized by a high consistency of status, when status differences in the vertical dimensions are controlled. 45 This hypothesis is used to predict that the more frequently acute status inconsistencies occur within a population the greater the proportion of that population that will be willing to support programs of social change, and that persons with high inconsistencies of status may be an important source from which the leadership of successful revolutionary movements is recruited. 46

As an explanation of the relationship between status inconsistency and liberalism, G. Lenski put forth in another article the hypothesis that persons with a high degree of status inconsistency “are more likely to be subjected to disturbing experiences in the interaction process and have greater difficulty in establishing a rewarding pattern of social interaction than others.” 47 From this hypothesis and from the theorem of psychology of learning which states that unrewarded behavior tends to decline in frequency, Lenski derived the hypotheses that inconsistency of status is followed by low frequency of participation in voluntary relationships, low intensity of such relationships, and low frequency of contacts motivated by a desire for, or expectation of, pleasurable interaction with others. These hypotheses were confirmed by empirical findings.

D. Bramel made an ingenious experiment designed to test a hypothesis concerning the sources and direction of projection. 48 One of his hypotheses was that “when a person is exposed to a self-referent cognition which is dissonant with this self-evaluation and which

he perceives as being of negative valence, there is an increased likelihood that he will then attribute the dissonance trait to other persons."  


His second hypothesis was that “attribution resulting from this state of discomfort is more likely to be directed toward positively valued than negatively valued persons.”  


Brame explained both hypotheses in terms of the theory of cognitive dissonance.  


It is not difficult to show a large number of similar hypotheses. They usually have the form of strictly general hypotheses, i.e., they do not include any proper names, or terms which can be defined only by use of proper names.  


In many cases the hypotheses are derived from some previously accepted theorems or at least are suggested by such theorems. Even if their relationship with previously formularized theories is not clearly stated, it is usually not difficult to ascertain. On the other hand, it is often quite obvious that the presented hypotheses in their full generality do not hold. In the first of our examples, it can be shown that (1) not every kind of status inconsistency resulted in a threat and defensive responses;  

See K. Popper, Logik der Forschung, and K. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery.

(2) the responses analyzed by G. Lenski are not always available to the individual characterized by high inconsistency of status, nor could they always receive social acceptance,  


or be necessarily more efficient than other defensive mechanisms in reducing the feeling of threat. Consequently it seems that the hypotheses in question are generally true only when qualified by various additional conditions.

The importance of social acceptance of the chosen pattern of responses is discussed by A. Cohen, Delinquent Boys, op. cit.
Single hypotheses confirmed by systematic evidence are very seldom described as theories. This is probably due to other connotations associated with the term “theory,” analyzed in II, 2, and according to which theories must be more or less speculative.

The sixth kind of result of scientific work described as “theories” consists of systems of strictly general empirical hypotheses. In spite of frequent complaints to the contrary it should be emphasized that the number of such theories, particularly of theories concerning individual behavior, or mutual relationships within small groups, or the functioning of formal organizations, is quite large and increases with every year. This meaning of the term “theory” is so important that we shall discuss it in a separate part of this paper.

I tried to show that the term “theory” is occasionally used to refer to every kind of scientific work except description. In the discussion of this concept of theory it was shown that six different kinds of results of scientific work can be and are described as theories in the meaning conceived above. Several other kinds of scientific work might be included in that list, for example, post facto explanations, characteristics of a given society, or metatheoretical analysis. Such a broad meaning of the term “theory” hinders communication and produces misunderstandings. The concept of “theory” as opposed to description is not equivalent with “theory” conceived as unconfirmed knowledge. Sets of concepts, heuristic directives, models, and post facto explanations could probably be called theories in both meanings discussed above. However, general hypotheses or systems of general hypotheses supported by systematic evidence would not be considered theories by scholars who oppose theories to empirically confirmed knowledge. At the same time they would be considered theories by writers who use the term “theory” as opposed to description. In fact, both meanings often converge. As a result, single hypotheses confirmed by systematic evidence are seldom referred to as theories.

**A Theory is a System of Interrelated Empirical and Strictly General Hypotheses**

The sociologists who like Merton, Stouffer, Homans, or Zetterberg emphasize the importance of theories and advocate their development use the term in the way in which it has traditionally been used in physics and in the philosophy of science. A theory is conceived here as a system of interrelated empirical propositions which do not include any limitations to a particular time or place. More exactly, a set of propositions is a theory in this sense if and only if

1. they constitute neither definitions nor norms but statements;
2. they are empirical propositions, i.e., do not follow from the accepted definitions of terms and can be subjected to an empirical test;
3. they are in some way mutually related;
4. they are universal propositions. Of course, this does not mean that they will never be disproved or that they describe conditions which exist in any time and place; it only means that their form does not exclude the possibility of their applying even to very remote times and places.

The simplest criterion for deciding whether a given general proposition is a universal one refers to the type of terms used in this proposition. A general proposition is a universal

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56 E.g., D. Bell, *End of Ideology.*
one if it does not include any proper names or any terms which cannot be defined without using proper names. For example, a proposition that “in the United States upwardly mobile people are more likely to be conservative than socially immobile people in the same occupational group”\textsuperscript{57} is not a universal proposition because the term “the United States” is a proper name. Yet the proposition that “physical fear leads to arousal of affiliative tendencies particularly directed toward others in a similar situation”\textsuperscript{58} is a universal proposition because it does not include any proper name or any term that could not be defined without using proper names.

However, doubts are often expressed as to whether the program of constructing theories as conceived here in the social sciences is not an illusion, attractive but not realizable. In addition, even scholars who are convinced that it is the most important task of the social sciences have often expressed the opinion that very little has been achieved in this field, and that speculation about sociological theories has been as a rule purely normative, without reference to any serious example.

We shall try to break with this bad tradition. Within the limits of the available space let us show by discussion of some concrete cases at least three various types of theories which are to be found in the contemporary social sciences and some problems which suggest themselves during the discussion of each type of theory.

**Some Types of Theories**

1. **Drive-reduction Theories**

The first kind of theories which we would like to describe assume the existence of a concrete kind of drive, which, when not satiated, produces a tension and gives rise to activities oriented toward reducing or eliminating this tension. As an example of this kind of theories I shall present the theory of social comparison processes by L. Festinger.\textsuperscript{59} The basic idea of that theory can be presented in the following 13 propositions.

The first proposition assumes the existence of a certain hypothetical drive:

1. In every human organism there exists a drive to evaluate if one’s own opinions are correct and if one’s own abilities are satisfactory. The second proposition describes two alternative ways of satisfying the drive.

2. There exists an inverse correlation between the availability of objective standards and the importance of social standards. The more readily available are objective frames of comparison, the less individuals tend to evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparison with the opinions of others. The third proposition deals with the direction of social comparisons.

3. The greater the perceived differences of opinions or abilities, the weaker is the tendency to evaluate one’s opinions or abilities through comparison.

   (a) When possible, one tends to compare one’s own opinions or abilities with the opinions or abilities of the people considered to be most like oneself.


(b) If one notices that persons having different opinions also differ from oneself in other related characteristics, the tendency to make comparisons diminishes.

The fourth proposition describes the consequences of an absence of relevant comparisons.

(4) If an individual has neither physical nor social comparisons or if he can evaluate his opinions or abilities only by comparison with persons who are very different from himself, his subjective evaluations of his opinions and abilities become unstable.

The fifth proposition deals with the consequences of differences in opinions or abilities in a group.

(5) The existence of different opinions or abilities in a group leads to attempts by the group members to reduce these differences. The pressure toward reducing discrepancy concerning a given opinion or ability increases:
   (a) If the strength of the drive to evaluate that opinion or ability increases, for example, with an increase in the importance of this opinion or ability or with an increase of its relevance to immediate behavior;
   (b) If the importance of a given group as a comparison group for some particular opinion or ability increases, for example, with an increase of the attraction to the group or with an increase of the relevance of this opinion or ability to the group.

The sixth proposition describes various ways in which differences of opinions or abilities in a group are reduced.

(6) If a discrepancy exists with respect to opinions or abilities, tendencies arise:
   (a) To change one’s own position so as to be more similar to others in a group;
   (b) To change others in a group and make them more similar to the majority of the group;
   (c) To reduce the attraction to deviants, to increase interaction with them, or to exclude them from the group and thus to narrow the range of comparison.

Propositions seven to ten describe factors that determine the kind of response to discrepancies in a group.

(7) As opposed to persons who are very different from the majority of a group’s members, those whose opinions or abilities are very similar to the opinions or abilities of the majority exhibit:
   (a) Stronger tendencies to change the positions of others;
   (b) Relatively weaker tendencies to narrow the range of comparison and;
   (c) Much weaker tendencies to change their own positions.

(8) If there is a great difference of opinions or abilities, the attempts to reduce the difference have not been effective, and the group is not attractive for other reasons, persons who deviate will tend to move out of the group. The cessation of comparison with others is accompanied by hostility or derogation to the extent that continued comparison implies unpleasant consequences, e.g., threatens one’s own opinion.

(9) If the group’s attraction for the member is so strong for other reasons that he continues to wish to remain in the group in spite of the fact that he differs markedly from the group in some opinion or ability, and if he has no other comparison group for his opinion or ability, and if the opinion or ability is highly relevant to the group, there will be an increase of uniformity of opinions within the group.
If under the same circumstances the ability of the member is below the abilities of the
others and he cannot change it, the situation will produce deep experiences of failure
and feelings of inadequacy with respect to this ability.

(10) If a person is restrained either physically or psychologically from leaving a group, and
its attraction to him is zero or even negative, but the group employs threats or punish-
ment for noncompliance, public conformity will occur without private conformity.

The eleventh proposition concerns implications of the drive for self-evaluation for the
processes of forming groups. The drive for self-evaluation is an important factor contribut-
ing to making the human being gregarious, and impels persons to belong to groups and
to associate with others. The subjective evaluation of the adequacy of one’s performance
of important abilities is among the satisfactions that persons attain in the course of these
associations with other people.
Consequently

(11) The selective tendency to join groups with similar opinions and abilities and to leave
others, together with the process of influence and competitive activity, produce relative
similarity in the opinions and abilities of persons who associate with one another
(at least those opinions and abilities that are relevant to the association).

The twelfth proposition deals with the effects of segmentation into groups on satisfac-
tion of the drive for self-evaluation.

(12) Segmentation into groups allows a society to maintain a variety of opinions within
it and to accommodate people with a wide range of abilities. When applied to social
stratification it means that (12a) strong status distinctions help the members of the
lower status groups to ignore the differences and compare themselves with their own
group.

The thirteenth proposition describes the behavior of minority groups, which are unable
completely to ignore the opinions of the majority groups.

(13) If members of minority groups are unable completely to eliminate comparison with
the position of the majority, they become less secure in their self-evaluation than the
majority group, seek stronger support within their own group, are less able to tolerate
differences of opinions or abilities that are relevant to the group, and tend to reject
from the group those members who deviate markedly. This accounts for the persistent
splitting of minority groups into smaller and smaller factions.

The outline of the theory of social-comparison processes presented above is not quite
complete. I omitted, for example, the differences between opinions and abilities, and empirical
evidence for the theory. Keeping in mind these simplifications, let us pay attention to
some characteristics of the theory presented above and of other theories of the same type.

The basic variable in Festinger’s theory is the need to evaluate one’s own opinions and
abilities. It seems fruitful to compare Festinger’s analysis with the analysis of several other
writers who discussed, often in a quite different fashion, similar human needs and the social
conditions that led to the arousal of these needs. Let me recall here E. Fromm’s statement
that besides physiologically conditioned needs there is another imperative part of man’s na-
ture—“just as compelling”: “the need to be related to the world outside oneself, the need to
avoidaloneness.” Fromm writes that “this relatedness to others is not identical with physi-
ical contact. An individual may be alone in a physical sense for many years and yet he may
be related to ideas, values, or at least social patterns that give him a feeling of communion and ‘belonging.’ Physical aloneness becomes unbearable only if it implies also moral aloneness.”

The needs which are fundamental in Fromm’s analysis are not very different from the basic variable of Festinger’s theory. Let me also recall David Riesman’s distinctions between inner-directed and other-directed people and between societies dependent on inner-direction and those dependent on other-direction. Neither writer uses experimental techniques and their style of work is quite different from Festinger’s. But their ideas are not quite unrelated to the basic problems of Festinger’s theory. The discussion of similarities and differences might be fruitful.

Festinger suggests some implications of his theory for the processes of group formation. There are many other implications. For instance, in studies of voting behavior it has been discovered that “the larger the number of social cross-pressures to which the voters are subjected, the less interest they exhibit in a presidential election” and consequently the upwardly and downwardly mobile people, those who have a variety of statuses, tend to abstain from voting. These findings can apparently be derived from Festinger’s theory. The same regularities have been discovered many times in various areas of the behavioral sciences. The integration of such findings into more inclusive theories seems to be a very important task.

It was previously mentioned that Festinger’s theory is one of the drive- or tension-reduction theories. Several theories of the same type can be found in contemporary psychology, social psychology, sociology, and social anthropology. If we compared types of variables included in these various theories, we would realize that certain types of variables are taken into consideration in some of them but do not appear in others. We mean here such types of variables as, for example, the previous experiences of individuals, personality differences, or contemporary situational determinants of the strength of a given drive. The comparison may suggest in what direction a given theory should be developed.

The comparison of several drive-reduction theories may also help in constructing theories which would be more economic than two theories known today. In one of his papers, Festinger states that “any specifically defined human motive must be treated as a hypothetical construct..., a notion which the psychologist invents in an attempt to explain certain behavior which he observes.” The choice between alternative motives should be made “on the basis of which one explains the most data most efficiently.”

One cannot, and must not, choose on the basis of questions such as: “Are people aware of the existence of such needs or motives?”; “Is there a physiological basis for such a need or motive?”; or “Does it sound plausible?” These are all irrelevant issues to raise. The only issue is whether or not the hypothetical construct is useful, that is, functions better than other constructs in explaining the data.

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62 B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld and W. McPhee, *Voting*.
63 Compare, from this point of view, Festinger’s theory of social comparison processes with S. Schacter’s theory of affiliation.
“But,” Festinger continues, “no one single hypothetical construct can explain anything. Before it can do any explaining it must be a part of a theory or at least a part of a hypothesis. Thus it turns out that one cannot choose among alternative hypothetical human needs apart from the theory in which these constructs are imbedded... The greater the number of different antecedent conditions which affect the magnitude of the need, and the greater the number of consequent behaviors which are motivated by the need, the greater is the usefulness as an explanatory device, of the postulated need and of the theory concerning it.” 65

Festinger’s point of view immediately raises several questions regarding the theory of social comparison processes. Can we explain more efficiently all theorems of this theory as well as several other hypotheses by another hypothetical drive? What is the explanatory and predictive power of such a drive as the drive to evaluate one’s own opinions and abilities as compared, for example, to such hypothetical drives as a cognitive dissonance or a threat to one’s self-image? What is the relationship between theories which postulate these alternative drives or needs? Which one is the most inclusive?

The theories that assume the drive- or tension-reduction hypothesis but do not postulate any specific need or drive give rise to another problem. Some of these theories are formulated in such general terms as to deal with any kind of drive. The elaboration of reinforcement learning theory by T. Dollard and N. Miller may be used as a case in point. 66 The question arises as to whether these theories are fully consistent with less general theories and what additional assumptions are necessary to derive the less general theories from the more general ones.

So far I have discussed the theories that claim that a great part of human behavior can be explained by assuming as a basic force a striving to reduce tension or to restore equilibrium. However, it is well known that many psychologists do not consider the drive-reduction hypothesis as adequate to account for all motivation. 67 Often some supplementary models are accepted as, for example, the generation-of-tensions model or the self-expression model. This gives rise to the question of the theoretic fruitfulness of these models and of the relationship between theories based on these models and the theories discussed above.

I have paid much attention to the drive-reduction type of theories because of their frequency in various areas of the contemporary social sciences. However, it is only one among many types of theories that can by analyzed by discussing their concrete instances. Let us now present some theories that analyze various relationships from the point of view not of their importance to personality, but of their importance to the functioning of a social system.

2. Theories of Mutually Interdependent Factors Within Small Groups

A small group is presumably the simplest kind of social system. Among the existing theories concerning small groups, two types of theories can be distinguished. The theories of the first type describe relationships between various characteristics of individuals as members of a group. The theories of the second kind describe relationships between properties not of group members but of groups themselves.

66 J. Dollard and N. Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy.
67 See, e.g.
A good example of the first of these types is given by the theory constructed by T. Hopkins. He defined first of all the concept of a small group and five concepts that designate various characteristics of the members of a small group. These five characteristics are:

1) “rank,” that is, “the generally agreed upon worth or value of a member relative to the worth or value of the other members.” It may be measured by the ratings of other members on “leadership,” “contributions to the group,” “greatest importance to the group,” and so forth.

2) “observability,” that is, the member’s knowledge of the norms accepted in the group. The relationship between the actual number of members who accept the given norms and estimations of members concerning this number may be used as an index.

3) “centrality,” which depends on the frequency with which a member interacts with other members and the range of other members with whom he interacts.

4) “conformity,” that is, the degree of congruence between the member’s norms and the norms of the group.

5) “influence,” conceived as effect on a consensus of opinions in the group.

“Those five properties,” Hopkins says, “are the variables of the theory which, in consequence, consists of assertions about the way these properties are related to one another.” He formulates and reports empirical evidence for 14 such propositions. Some of them are the postulates of the theory; others are derivable from the postulates. These are the propositions of the theory:

For any member of a small group

(1) The greater his centrality relative to other members, the greater his observability;
(2) The greater his observability, the greater his influence;
(3) The greater his centrality, the greater his influence;
(4) The greater his conformity, the greater his observability and vice versa;
(5) The greater his centrality, the greater his conformity;
(6) The greater his conformity, the greater his influence;
(7) The higher his rank, the greater his centrality;
(8) The higher his rank, the higher his observability;
(9) The higher his rank, the higher his conformity;
(10) The higher his rank, the greater his influence;
(11) The greater his influence, the higher his rank;
(12) The greater his influence, the higher his conformity;
(13) The greater his influence, the higher his observability;
(14) The greater his centrality, the higher his rank.

The theory presented above is one of the theories that describe the mutual relationships within small groups. It describes interrelationships between five variables that characterize properties of individuals as members of a group. Other theories include propositions that refer to several other variables as, for example, friendliness, equality of rank, or dependence, which can characterize the relationship between two members of a group, or some properties of a group such as the degree of connectedness of the power structure and of the communication network, the degree of discrepancy of opinion, the structural balance,
etc. Comparison of several such theories may help in constructing a more inclusive theory, which would include more variables, describe more regularities, and allow us to predict a greater number of facts.

The analysis of existing theories may also help in finding out to what extent the regularities described in these theories also hold in larger social systems and what relationships exist between theories concerning small groups and theories concerning the reduction of drive or tensions.

3. Theories of a Larger Social System as Composed of Subgroups Competing for Scarce Goods

Let us show now a third type of theories. It can be exemplified by the theory of oligarchy and democracy which was developed by S.M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. Coleman. In one respect this theory is similar to the preceding one. It also deals with a social system—one that is, however, larger than a small group. The theory to be discussed has a formal organization as its subject.

It has been observed for a time that in trade unions, business associations, professional societies, and cooperatives—in myriad nominally democratic voluntary organizations—the real and often permanent power rests with the men who hold the highest positions. This observation has led Michels to the conclusion that “it is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy.”

Several factors make for this tendency:

1. The efficiency of an organization’s hierarchical structure for the accomplishment of organizational aims.
2. The control by the officials of an organization over the means of communication.
3. The monopoly over organizational skills by the functionaries of the organization.
4. The desires of the leaders to retain their power in the organization.
5. The apathy of the average members and their lack of interest in the organization.

If all these factors are very strong, then independently of the ideology of the organization, “the real and often permanent power rests with the men who hold the highest positions.” However, these factors are not necessarily connected with the existence of an organization. The less important they are, the greater the chances of democracy. The theory discussed here describes several conditions that determine the strength of the factors mentioned above. It seems that its basic ideas may be presented, in a somewhat generalized form, in the following set of propositions.

1. The chances of democracy in an organization increase if there is no outside threat to the organization that would increase the need for unity and subordination.

When applied to trade unions within the private enterprise system, this hypothesis means that

(a) The more secure a union is in its relations with management, the less it is obliged to behave like a military organization, or

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(b) The more decentralized and unconcentrated in ownership is the industry with which a union deals, the less it is obliged to create a large and bureaucratized administration.

Similar hypotheses concerning the conditions which increase the effectiveness of a hierarchical structure and centralization of power by the leaders could be formulated as “other types of organizations and for other situations.”

(2) Chances of democracy in an organization increase if the members have an opportunity to communicate with one another and to acquire the prestige of leaders outside of the administrative machine.

The opportunity for independent communication and for achieving the status of independent leader increases:

(a) The greater the number of strengths of independent organizations, formal and informal;
(b) The more leisure time and money the rank and file members have available for engaging in organizational activity;
(c) The more secure is the average member against the repressions of functionaries of the organization; for example, the more secure is the process of getting and holding a job, and the stronger the protection for the rights of the opposition;
(d) The more available are alternative sources of status, which make it possible for members to acquire the status and prestige of leaders, outside the administrative machine, and which enables status to be attached more to the men as persons than to any office they hold.

(3) The chances of democracy in an organization increase if the members have an opportunity to develop organizational skills. This opportunity increases if, for example:

(a) There exist independent organizations as a means of training potential opposition leaders in organizational skills.

When applied to trade unions, this hypothesis allows one to predict that

(a1) The unions with the greater autonomy of their locals have greater chances of democracy;
(a2) the unions that came into existence through the federation of existing independent locals have greater chances for democracy than unions that are organized “from the top down” by a central committee or single local;
(b) Previous and potential leaders who are the most able and most ambitious, remain in the organization and take a part in the life of the organization.

Within the trade unions it can be expected that

(b1) the more attractive the job—in the same occupation—awaiting a union leader who leaves office as compared with alternative jobs he could get outside the occupation, the greater the chances that he will remain in the same occupation and in the same unions as one of the potential leaders of the opposition.

(4) The chances of democracy in an organization increase if the leaders are less interested in retaining their power.

The interest in retaining the leader’s office decreases

(a) The less the status of leaders is dependent on their holding office, for example,
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(a1) the more the acquired status attaches to the men as persons rather than to the office
(a2) the more they are able to attain status in other ways than through holding office
(a3) the more able they are to retain the statuses of leaders on leaving office.

(b) The greater the protection for the rights of the opposition based both on the organization’s code of law and on real sources of independence.

(5) Chances of democracy in an organization increase with the increase of interest of their members in the organization and with the increase of their participation in organizational activities.

The interest in the organizational affairs and organizational activity of the members increases

(a) The more the members of an organization associate with each other informally.

In trade unionism the informal interaction increases

(a1) the more the workers are cut off from association with people outside their occupation, by a “deviant work schedule,” by status marginality, or by physical isolation;
(a2) the greater the chances for men to socialize with one another informally on or around the job; for example, as a result of irregular work-loads during a normal shift;
(a3) the greater the identification with their occupation and the more interested men are in their work;

(b) The greater the number and variety of functions which an organization performs for its members.

The theory, which was presented above in a form a little more general than the original one, suggests some general observations.

In this theory there is one basic dependent variable: the degree of oligarchy and democracy, or in other words, the extent of equality in the distribution of power. From this point of view, the theory presented above is a particular instance of a larger set of theories. We mean here theories that consider social systems as systems of subgroups that compete for the greatest share in certain scarce and desirable goods. The goods that are the subject of competition can be various: it can be power, or wealth, or something else. It seems worthwhile to explore (1) how far the basic propositions of the presented theory can be applied to the analysis of inequalities in the distribution of power (or degree of democracy) within societies and (2) how far they can be useful in the analysis of inequalities of different kinds, for example, inequalities of wealth or prestige.

In their analysis of factors that determine the increase or decrease of oligarchy, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman introduce several psychological hypotheses. Some of them describe regularities known from other investigations; for example, the hypothesis that the less the status of individuals is dependent on their position of leaders, the weaker their need to retain power; or the hypothesis that the more attractive the job in the same occupation awaiting a union leader who leaves office as compared with alternative jobs he could get outside the occupation, the greater the chances that he will remain in the same occupation and in the same union. In both cases the continuation of a certain social relationship is explained by
a comparison of the rewards and costs of this relationship with those of other relationships available to the individual. It is the same type of relationship which was explored by Kelley and Thibaut in order to account for the viability of a dyadic relationship, or by March and Simon in order to explain the decision to leave an organization, or by K. Lewin and L. Festinger in order to explain moving from one group to another.

The theory presented above also includes several psychological hypotheses which, it seems, need further analysis and explanation in terms of more general theories. The authors state, for example, that “the men who willingly suffer marked personal disadvantage by opposing authority for a principle are... too rare to maintain a going opposition party. Principled opposition may enrich democracy with ideas, ideals, and issues, but economic security for the most of the oppositionists is essential for its maintenance.”

Is this hypothesis, considering economic security as a necessary condition of opposition, generally true? If so, what more general theory can explain this regularity? If not, what qualifications are needed?

Similar remarks are suggested by the hypothesis that the more workers in the same union associate with each other off the job, informally, and in various leisure-time clubs, the stronger their interest in the activities of the union and readiness to participate in those activities. Does it generally hold that with increasing frequency of informal interactions among the members of an organization their interest in the organization increases as well? What theory can explain this regularity? I believe that a detailed analysis of such problems may advance a codification of the existing theoretical knowledge in the social sciences.

Summary

In this article, I tried (1) to distinguish between various meanings given to the word “theory” in the contemporary social sciences; (2) to present examples of three types of theories conceived as systems of strictly general propositions; and (3) to point out some problems suggested by the analysis of existing theories which seem to be relevant to the codification of theoretical knowledge in the social sciences.

An attempt was made toward clarification of three main meanings of the term “theory.”

In the first meaning the term “theory” designates speculations that have not been empirically tested and that often are not testable.

In the second meaning the term is used to refer to every kind of result of scientific nativity except description. In this way “theory” is used to include: (a) new concepts, (b) operational definitions of non-operational concepts, (c) heuristic directives which describe certain classes of variables as the most important determinants of behavior, (d) models conceived as mathematical functions, sentences, diagrams, or tables concerning relationships between variables which have no empirical interpretation, (e) single general hypothe-
ses supported by systematic evidence, (f) systems of strictly general hypotheses; and many other results of scientific work, as for example, post facto interpretations, the characteristics of a given society, metatheoretical analysis, etc.

In the third meaning the term “theory” is synonymous with a system of empirical and strictly general propositions which are in some way mutually related.

Theories conceived in the third sense were the main subject of our interest. I tried to give a systematic presentation of the basic proposition of three theories: (1) the theory of social comparison processes by L. Festinger; (2) the theory of interrelationships in small groups by T. Hopkins; and (3) the theory of distribution of power in formal organizations by S. M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. Coleman. In the discussion of Festinger’s theory I tried to emphasize certain similarities between the propositions of this theory and the basic ideas of such writers as Fromm and Riesman. I suggested some implications of this theory as well.

Festinger’s theory was also used as an example of a drive-reduction type of theory. It was stated that the comparison of several theories of this type (1) may suggest how the theories can be elaborated by pointing out what type of variables are used in some of them and not used in others, and (2) may help to find out which hypothetical drives have greater explanatory power than others and can be used to construct the most inclusive and most economic theories. The other problems concerned the relationship between theories that assumed a specific kind of drive and theories dealing with any kind of drive or theories that do not imply the reduction-of-tensions hypothesis.

The theory formulated by T. Hopkins was used as an example of theories that describe mutual relationships within the smallest social systems. It was expected that the systematization of several such theories and their comparison could lead to the construction of a theory that would include more variables than the theories known today and that would allow us to predict more events. The other problems mentioned dealt with the possibility of generalizing at least some propositions concerning small groups to larger social systems.

The theory proposed by S. M. Lipset, N. Trow, and J. Coleman was analyzed as an example of theories that consider social systems to be systems of subgroups competing for the greatest share in some scarce but desirable goods. It would seem that for an analysis of inequalities in the distribution of power within societies—as well other kinds of inequalities—taking this theory as a starting point may be fruitful. It also seems that the analysis of psychological hypotheses included in theories of this kind, in terms of general psychological theories, may be fruitful both for the development of organization theories and general theories of behavior.
Socio-Economic Status and Attitudes

ANDRZEJ MALEWSKI

The Theory of Defense of One’s Own Position:
Self-Esteem and Conscience—The Ideologies of Privileged Groups

1. In the last thirty years, variation of opinion in accordance with income, occupation, status in the community, or class awareness has often been investigated.¹ The results of some of these investigations have shown, for example, that in the United States and West European countries the higher income groups are more in favor of certain institutional property rights and more against government control of business and further extension of government welfare activities.²

In the present paper, I would like to show, first, that in a country where large-scale enterprises are government-owned, and political power is vested in the hands of the Communist party, quite opposite correlations may occur. Second, I will try to present a theory which may account for both kinds of correlations, as well as for certain findings traditionally considered as belonging to industrial sociology, the sociology of ethnic relations, or the sociology of military life.

2. The data that will be presented was obtained by a survey made in Warsaw in 1958. This survey was conducted among 1,530 employees (mainly factory workers, engineers, and white-collar workers) of various governmental enterprises and offices. The study was concerned mainly, but not exclusively, with attitudes toward the ruling economic system and toward the existing difference of incomes.³

To discover the attitudes of various occupational and income groups toward basic features of Poland’s economic system, we asked, for instance, whether private enterprise should be allowed in large-scale industry, on large agricultural estates, or in the wholesale trades. We asked whether the high incomes of private enterprises should be limited by high taxation, and whether the workers’ councils ought to be the real managers of the factories or only advisory boards—or if they were necessary at all.

³ Because of some peculiar difficulties and practical limitations this must be seen as only a rough picture. Further investigation seems to be desirable.
Table 1

The Attitudes of the Various Income Groups Toward Private Enterprise, in Per Cent

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Against admitting private enterprise to the big Industries</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against admitting private enterprise to the large agricultural estates</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against permitting Wholesale trade in private hands</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the high taxing of private enterprise</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1 shows the distribution of answers to some of these questions according to the incomes of the surveyed groups.

As can be seen from Table 1, compared to the lower income levels, the higher income groups were more opposed to the admission of private enterprise to large-scale industry, large land-ownership, or wholesale trade, and much more in favor of limiting the incomes of private enterprises by high taxes.

The data presented above should not be interpreted solely as evidence that lower income groups in Poland are strongly in favor of private enterprise. The attitudes of the lower income groups were characterized rather by indifference and lack of interest in whether the executives of enterprises are appointed by the government or by private owners. This is suggested by the fact that with the decrease in income levels, the proportion of answers favorable to private enterprise in the above-mentioned fields increases very slowly, but the proportion of people who have no opinion on these matters increases very rapidly.

Table 2 provides some similar findings. When we compare the opinions of people of different occupations, it appears that engineers were much more against private enterprise in the basic fields of the economy than were factory workers. It may be seen from the above that in Warsaw, contrary to the United States, opposition to private enterprise increases with the rise in socio-economic status.\(^4\)

Some other correlations are found to be similar in Poland and the United States. A negative answer to the question “Should the difference between the highest and lowest incomes be reduced?” was given by 64.3% of people earning 5,000–8,000 zlotys monthly and by 6.8% of people earning 700–1,000 zlotys monthly. To the question “How high should the top level of income be?” 21% of engineers and 1% of workers answered “no limit.” The question “Should people with higher education earn more than those without higher education?” was answered in the affirmative by 89.7% of people with college educations and only by 20% of people with elementary education. In Poland, as in the United States, the disposition to equalization increases with the lowering in socio-economic status.

3. The similarities, as well as differences, in the attitudes of higher income groups may be explained by a theory which I propose to call the “theory of defending one’s own posi-

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\(^4\) It must be remembered that the sample consisted only of employees of government enterprises and offices. Neither peasants nor businessmen were included.
The Attitudes of Engineers and Workers Toward Private Enterprise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Decidedly or rather yes</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Decidedly or rather not</th>
<th>No answera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you for admitting private enterprise to large industry?</td>
<td>Engineers (N = 280)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>factory workers (N = 504)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you for admitting private enterprise to the larger agricultural estates?</td>
<td>Engineers (N = 280)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>factory workers (N = 504)</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you for admitting private enterprise to the wholesale trade?</td>
<td>Engineers (N = 280)</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>factory workers (N = 504)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think it is just to limit the high income of private enterprises by high taxation?</td>
<td>Engineers (N = 280)</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>factory workers (N = 504)</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aTo make certain that the respondents knew their answers would be anonymous seemed to be one of the most important problems in this study. Consequently, the questionnaires were filled out by the people surveyed themselves. This accounts for the large number of “no answer” responses to some questions.

The theory states that those groups that have a greater share of wealth, prestige, and power than others tend to defend the characteristics of the existing system, which has enabled them to achieve and retain their relatively superior position, and they also tend to reject beliefs that could threaten their position, their ego, or their conscience.

In accordance with this theory, the higher income groups, with a greater feeling of economic security, tend to display stronger acceptance for programs that defend the existing economic differences and the existing economic system. If this system is based on private ownership, as it is in the United States, they defend private ownership. If it is based, as in Poland, on government ownership, they defend government ownership more strongly.

4. This theory is not limited to accounting for differences in opinions between different social classes. It may help to explain many other results traditionally considered as belonging to the sociology of ethnic relationships, the sociology of industry, or the sociology of military life. Whites versus blacks in the southern United States, executives and foremen compared to workers in Poland, officers compared to enlisted men in the U.S. Army—these are just selected cases of groups which have greater income, greater prestige, and, as a rule, greater power. Some differences in the opinions between these groups may be explained as resulting from the unequal share in scarce goods and from the striving to defend one’s own

position, self-esteem, and conscience. Consequently, in the next part of this paper, I will use the evidence from these seemingly different domains.\(^7\)

The theory presented above can account not only for difference in the acceptance of various kinds of programs, but also differences in the explanations, predictions, and evaluations that are accepted.\(^8\) Let us try to describe in general terms some patterns in the assertions and evaluations common to various privileged groups.

5. The conviction that the situation of others is unbearable could result in guilt feelings and threaten the consciences of the members of privileged groups. Thus, according to the theory described above, it can be expected that people with higher status in a hierarchy of wealth, prestige, or power will show a tendency to overlook and underestimate the deprivations experienced by people occupying less profitable positions. This is confirmed by evidence from various investigations. For instance, white soldiers, much more often than black ones, accepted the opinion that the majority of black soldiers had the chance to contribute as much as they would like to the war effort.\(^9\) The officers were much more inclined than the enlisted men to believe that all or most officers would readily agree to participate in the very same situations they were ordering their soldiers to undergo,\(^10\) that the criticism in soldiers’ letters published by the Army newspaper was untrue,\(^11\) and that the overall situation in which enlisted men found themselves was quite satisfactory.\(^12\)

6. The tendency described above may be considered a portion—though a rather substantial one—of a more general tendency. People with a higher share of income, prestige, and power tend to be more satisfied with the existing system. Consequently, the conclusion to be derived from our theory is that members of this group will tend to support the features of the existing system that help to maintain their own higher positions and place their own egos in a more favorable light. This is further confirmed by investigations in political sociology, the sociology of ethnic relations, the sociology of industry, and the sociology of military life. Studies of the U.S. Army show that a far greater percentage of officers than soldiers was inclined to agree that the army “always keeps its promises,”\(^13\) that promotions are based on knowledge not acquaintances,\(^14\) or that the army tries its best to praise and reward those who really are good soldiers.\(^15\)

The same patterns can be seen in a Polish survey of industrial relations.\(^16\) Factory executives propagandize that production levels were raised above the established norms. In

\(^{7}\) R. K. Merton and A. Kitt remarked that the traditional divisions of social sciences into the sociology of ethnic relations, the sociology of industry, or the sociology of military life obscures the similarity of psychological and sociological processes occurring in all these domains. (See R. K. Merton, \textit{Social Theory and Social Structure}. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957, p.) This is exactly the point of view of the present paper.

\(^{8}\) The importance of these distinctions for the clarification of the sociological language is stressed by H. L. Zetterberg, “Compliant Actions,” \textit{Acta Sociologica}, Vol. 2, Copenhagen, 1957, pp. 180–183.


\(^{10}\) Ibid, p. 394.

\(^{11}\) Ibid, p. 398.

\(^{12}\) Ibid, pp. 280 and 282–3.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, p. 423.

\(^{14}\) Ibid, p. 422.

\(^{15}\) Ibid, p. 422.

\(^{16}\) The Survey was made in 1959. The subjects were 156 foremen and 769 factory workers. The distributions of age, sex, and geographic region in the sample corresponded to the distribution in the population of all persons employed in government enterprises.
considering the role in production of those who met the goal, 40% of foremen and 62% of workers were of the opinion that such leaders were not liked by their fellow workers. 42% of foremen and 64% of workers considered them to be causing undue haste and anxiety. 40% of the foremen and 62% of the workers were of the opinion that such work leaders were rapidly deteriorating physically, and so on. While speaking of the efficiency norms set up in their factory, 64% of foremen and 45% of the workers considered them to be fair; 59% of the foremen and 42% of the workers thought they were helping to do the job. Those who have more power and obtain greater income from a system are more likely to assert that all is right within the existing system.

7. Sometimes, however, such facts as poverty, exploitation, bad housing conditions, lack of educational facilities, general discrimination, dissatisfaction, or the open revolt of certain underprivileged groups against the existing conditions are so striking that they cannot be denied. Explaining such facts by highlighting the faults of the existing social system may threaten one’s own position. Thus, according to our theory, it may be expected that the members of privileged groups will tend to explain such circumstances by factors not connected with the existing system and its social inequalities. So, for instance, southern whites in the United States often explain the social inferiority of the black population by the blacks’ so-called “biological inferiority.”

The unemployment affecting various groups was often explained (by privileged people) as due to laziness on the part of those who were out of work. Dissatisfaction or active demonstrations against existing conditions is often explained as due to the subversive activity of foreign agitators. Wrongs, deprivations, and a rise in disappointment and hostility are explained by errors and faults committed by particular functionaries of the system. Sometimes it is Stalin, sometimes the leaders of trade unions, sometimes a certain pope, and sometimes particular large landowners. But the on-going system itself is considered to be all right.

Groups that have seized power in a revolutionary way are inclined to explain all shortcomings as an inheritance from the preceding system. For instance, one of the elements of official Stalinist ideology was that a conflict between workers and factory management cannot exist in a socialist society because both sides pursue a common goal: to raise production and improve the cultural and material environment of the workers. All conflicts which may happen are due to capitalistic remnants in men’s consciousness, causing bureaucratic distortions and egoistic claims.

The preceding explanations have, in spite of their diversity, one common element. It is the tendency to explain all unfavorable facts by elements that are foreign to the existing system and especially foreign to the existing social inequalities. Holding such a specific selection of elements responsible for facts considered unfavorable is characteristic of the way of thinking of the very groups that have a greater share of wealth, prestige, and power.

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18 See J. Dollard, op. cit., p. 285. “When discontent is to be accounted for, it is then done not by asking what conditions are actually imposed on the inferior with which he might legitimately be discontented, but rather by asserting that someone has ‘put ideas into his head.’ This is the familiar picture of the ‘outside agitator’ who is responsible for discontent in patriarchal industrial enterprises in the North.” Similar explanations can be found, for instance, in “Rerum Novarum” by Pope Leo XIII, and in Stalinist ideology.
8. The conviction that the existing social privileges are unjustified would threaten the existence of these privileges as well as the self-worth of people occupying the more profitable positions in the hierarchies of wealth, prestige, and power. So it may be expected that members of privileged groups will be prone to explain their better positions by factors that simultaneously justify them according to existing evaluations. In the United States, the middle class was more inclined than the working class to accept the opinion that most people who are successful are successful because of ability. In Sweden, the upper and middle classes were more inclined than the working class to believe that differences in education were the chief reason for class distinctions; and the former were much less likely to consider differences of income to be the chief reason for those class distinctions. Southern whites in the United States often explain the reservation of some occupations for whites by a lack of ability on the part of the blacks, who are viewed as being incapable of performing these jobs. The denial of civil rights and suffrage to blacks is explained by the alleged fact that blacks are childish, immature, and insufficiently developed. A similar explanation is given for the differences in access to education. The opinion that “officers deserve extra rights and privileges because they have more responsibility than enlisted men” was accepted by 67% of American officers and only 23% of enlisted men. An ideology popular among whites in the southern states claims that blacks like their lower status and that anyone who attempts to change it is not a “true friend,” since the blacks themselves are not seeking advancement. Thus, privileged groups are prone to express opinions that justify their specific advantages.

9. The trend toward greater equality would threaten the positions of the privileged class. From the theory presented in this paper it follows that the members of privileged groups tend to predict that all changes tending to reduce social inequalities would have unfavorable consequences. For instance, these changes would negatively affect the very functioning of the existing system or be harmful to the whole population (including the underprivileged).

This is further confirmed by evidence obtained from different studies. The great majority of large businessmen in a U.S. study rejected the opinion that everyone would be happier, more secure, and more prosperous if the working class were given more power and more influence in government; they also rejected the opinion that wages would be fairer, jobs more stable, and that fewer people would be out of work if the government were to supervise the industries. American Army captains were prone to accept the opinion—strongly rejected by the enlisted men—that officers would lose the respect of their subordinates if they were to fraternize with them. The members of privileged ethnic groups often believe that to increase the wages of low-paid workers would result only in greater expenditures on drinking and gambling, and that the abolition of segregation in residential districts

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24 R. Centers, op. cit., p. 60.
26 S. Stouffer, op. cit., p. 374.
would disturb the functioning of the existing economic system.\textsuperscript{28} The same predictions have a quite different probability in the eyes of people occupying different positions in the hierarchies of wealth, prestige, and power.\textsuperscript{29}

10. Let us show other evidence which seems to support our theory. Many investigators tend to admit the simple generalization that higher income groups are more conservative than lower income groups and more content with the status quo. But it is well known that this greater conservatism is limited only to certain issues. Thus, the generalization is supplemented by the additional information that in some fields the attitudes of the higher income groups are not more conservative and are sometimes even more radical. Examples may be given for both kinds of issues. It is said, for instance, that the attitudes of the highest income groups toward ethnic minorities, international affairs, religion, or the labor of women fail to support the hypothesis according to which the higher income groups are more conservative.

Our theory seems to answer the question of why some attitudes belong to the first category and others to the second and how both these categories can be described in general terms. If certain beliefs are more likely to threaten the position, ego, or conscience of members of privileged groups, they are more likely to be rejected by such groups. If they have no such function, the difference in positions need not be accompanied by differences in attitudes. The deviation from the relationship between a higher position and greater conservatism seems to accord with our theory.

Conclusions

11. Data obtained from a country in which large-scale industries are owned by the government and political power is in the hands of the Communist party suggested the modification and generalization of the previously established hypothesis concerning the relationship between high socio-economic position and more favorable attitudes toward unlimited private property rights. The more general theory was thus presented. I have tried to show that this theory can account for some of the findings established in seemingly different branches of sociology and can foretell certain patterns of description, explanation, evaluation, and prediction that seem to be characteristic of the way of thinking of many privileged groups. Some of these patterns were briefly presented.

Certainly the theory presented needs some qualifications. In my opinion, to develop this theory further, it would be necessary 1) to analyze deviations from the patterns of thinking displayed; 2) to examine the intervening psychological variables that cause these patterns, and the social situations in which some of these variables at least are absent or weakened; 3) to examine the social situations in which groups occupying lower positions in the hierarchies of wealth, prestige, and power are fully satisfied with their lower positions and strongly accept the existing social inequalities. Limitations of space do not allow me to discuss these problems more thoroughly in the present paper.

\textsuperscript{28} G. Myrdal, op. cit., p. 107.

Education Legitimates Income Inequality:
Normative Beliefs in Early Post-Communist and Market-oriented Nations

Abstract: Using data from large, representative national samples in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Australia, Finland, and the Netherlands, we examine moral norms about just rewards for education. Comparing these norms in East Central Europe shortly after Communism—where the dominant ideology was egalitarian, schooling free, rewards to education modest, and alternative investments absent—and in market-oriented societies where the opposite held, provides insight into the influence of institutional arrangements on moral norms. We find that the publics in all these countries favor large rewards for education (which legitimates substantial income inequality), showing that these moral norms are resilient to institutional arrangements. These results align with Aristotle’s claim that people believe job performance merits reward because it makes valuable contributions. They undermine alternative theories: credentialism, radical egalitarianism, and the hegemonic power of dominant political elites. These results also undermine economists’ human capital arguments insofar as they are seen as a moral justification for income inequality.

Keywords: education, human capital, pay equity, income justice, legitimate earnings, East Central Europe, Communism.

Introduction

Income inequality has seized the sociological imagination, yet again. Researchers wrestle with complex evidence to assess the potential role of income inequality in a wide variety of social dysfunctions (Babones 2008; Beckfield 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Zagorski, Evans, Kelley, and Piotrowska 2014). An influential analysis of capital concentration (Piketty 2014) has inflamed concern both within the discipline and more broadly. A growing tradition of empirical research on the public’s norms about income distribution has labeled the topic “social justice,” “equity,” or the “legitimation of inequality” (Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen 1972; Gijsberts 2002; Jasso 1980; Kelley and Evans 1993; Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995; Moore 1991; Shepelak and Alwin 1986). These are key issues in fields ranging from equity theory to political sociology, as well as in more pragmatic matters of job evaluation, pay administration, and public policy (Della Torre, Pelagatti, and Solari 2014; Dornstein 1991: Ch. 1; Dulebohn and Werling 2007; Marshall, Swift, Routh, and Burgoyne 1999; Milkovich, Newman, and Gerhart 2013). Indeed, non-market approaches to pay, for example “comparable worth,” all assume that people agree
on how to distribute pay fairly. This concern is not new. Instead, around the world and re-
currently throughout history, the moral evaluation of income inequality has attracted philo-
sophical discussion, prescriptive argument, and social science analysis (Aristotle c. 334–

This paper investigates a key thread woven into the citizenry’s moral judgments about
income inequality: Which underlying principles does the general public use to judge how
large earnings differences should be and how widely shared are these principles? Self-interest,
politics and social structure provide part of the answer (Austen 2002; Castillo 2011; Gi-
jsberts 2002; Hadler 2005; Headey 1991; Kelley and Evans 1993; Svaalfors 1993; Zagorski
1994), but much remains unexplained. Using data from large, representative national sam-
pies in six nations, we focus on a missing link: moral norms about the ideal pay for different
educational attainments.

More specifically we use these data to assess whether higher pay for more educated
people was widely accepted across a huge institutional divide. During Communism’s
40-year reign, education received much lower pay than in the West (Flanagan 1998;
Machonin and Tucek 1994; Mateju and Lim 1995; van de Werfhorst 2011; Verhoeven,
Jansen, and Dessens 2005; Zagorski and Domanski 1996) and the white-collar jobs held
by the ‘intelligentsia’ were downgraded (Kraus and Hodge 1987). Did these stark dif-
ferences depress, or even suppress, the public’s legitimation of income rewards to edu-
cation? A comparative cross-national perspective is key in allowing us to discern uni-
versal patterns that hold across societies (Kalleberg 1988; Kohn, Slomczynski, Janicka,
Khmelko, Mach, Pagnotta, Zaborowski, Gutierrez, and Heyman 1997), to assess institu-
tionally patterned differences across societies, and to distinguish such patterns from the
idiosyncrasies of a single nation. The paper focuses on one aspect of the culture of in-
equality—the size of legitimate income rewards to education in the minds of the gen-
eral public—and on assessing the extent to which that differed between East Central Eu-
rope before or shortly after the end of Communism and advanced, market-oriented soci-
eties.

What This Paper Is and Is Not

This paper is not an analysis of these six societies in the present day or of how they have
changed in the nearly 3 decades after 1989. Instead, we are getting as close as possible to
the Communist period, so that most of our respondents had spent most of their lives in the
world of Communist ideology and institutional arrangements.

Theory

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics argues that the public believes that rewards ought to reflect
performance. According to this line of reasoning, the populace will hold that people whose
skill, effort or ability enable them to produce more or higher quality goods have a moral
right to be rewarded in proportion (Deutsch 1975; Jasso 1980). Hence, equal pay for un-
equal contributions is unjust (Table 1, column 1). On this logic, all causes of performance
differences are equally entitled to reward. Notice that this argument concerns attitudes and values about the legitimate size of rewards, it does not concern whether a system actually embodies this principle.

This paper focuses on one of the most important traits relevant to performance in the modern world: Education. Our argument, following Aristotle’s emphasis on consensus about the legitimacy of rewarding performance, is that people will believe that education ought to be rewarded in proportion to its (substantial) effects on productivity (Table 1, Row 1: Basic Principle), that the world should be meritocratic (Deutsch 1975; Duru-Bellat and Tenret 2012; Kunovich and Slomczynski 2007; Marks 2010; Reynolds and Xian 2014; Smith and Mateju 2012). The thesis is that ordinary people’s judgments about just rewards to education will emphasize “equity” over “equality” or “need,” although the other principles of allocation may be endorsed for other domains (Deutsch 1975; Evans, Kelley, and Peoples 2010; Reesksens and Oorschot 2013; Evans, Peoples, and Kelley 2014). Objectively, in industrial societies a year of education increases performance by something like 5% to 15% (e.g. Murphy and Welch 1994; Psacharopoulos 1973; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004).

Thus, if people endorse the equity approach, the ideal income rewards to a university degree compared to secondary school completion would be something between 15% to 75% (viz, a 3-year course times 5% per year at the low end, through a 5-year course times 15% per year at the high), with the range 30% to 70% the most plausible. This variability and uncertainty implies that people’s subjective perceptions of education’s effect on different workers’ contributions, and hence their norms about legitimate rewards to education, will also vary. Because the Aristotelian argument is that norms endorsing meritocracy are consensual, these variations should not be systematically related to class or demographic position, except to the limited extent that class and demographic position bias people’s perceptions of the links between education and performance (Table 1, Rows 2 and 4, H1 and H2).

Much the same patterns should hold in all advanced societies on the Aristotelian thesis, since work is organized in much the same way in all, education is similar, and hence performance differences also broadly similar (e.g. Ganzeboom, Luijx, and Treiman 1989; Treiman 1977; Wegener 1992: 262–264; van der Werfhorst 2011; but see Wong 1990).

Importantly, the training in East Central European schools and universities during the Communist period (when our respondents were educated) was similar to that in Western market economies, and of comparable, sometimes better, quality (Beirne and Campos 2007; Oesch 2013; Silova and Eklof 2013). Therefore, education should enhance productivity just as much in the East as in the West.

Then equity theory proposes that legitimate income rewards—not the actual rewards, but the ones people think are morally right—were as high in Communist societies as in market-oriented societies (Table 1, Column 1). For example, if university graduates in the West were, say, twice as productive as workers with primary education, they would be...
### Table 1

**Theories About the Legitimate Returns to Education: Hypotheses Derived from Preferred Theories and Implications of Some Rejected Alternative Theories**

[Predictions inconsistent with the evidence presented later are shown in square brackets and *bold italics*.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimate returns to education:</th>
<th>Preferred theories and hypotheses they imply</th>
<th>Rejected alternative theories and hypotheses they imply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equity: Performance justifies pay, meritocracy, existential\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>Folk human capital\textsuperscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic principle:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Traits rewarded</strong></td>
<td>Education (also ability, diligence, and any other productive trait)</td>
<td>Investments in education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predictions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Size of returns</strong> in a market economy</td>
<td>H1: Large, because education is productive</td>
<td>Large, same as physical capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Class differences</strong> in returns thought proper in a market economy</td>
<td>H2: Few or none (consensual)</td>
<td>Few or none (consensual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Size of returns</strong> in a Communist economy</td>
<td>H3: Large, education is productive under Communism as well as in market economies</td>
<td>[Low (little or no investment)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Class differences</strong> in returns thought proper in a Communist economy</td>
<td>H4: Few or none (consensual)</td>
<td>Few or none (consensual)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*. Also Parsons (1970) and decades of research in sociology and experimental social psychology supporting “equity theory” claim that people’s sense of fairness or justice entails rewarding “inputs” (e.g. Berger et al. 1973; Homans 1974; Walster, Walster and Berscheid 1978).

\textsuperscript{b}The economic version of human capital theory is well-known (especially Becker 1964; Mincer 1958; Schultz 1980, but more generally Adam Smith 1776, and neo-classical economics more broadly). The potential folk ideology arising from the popularity of this theory simplifies to the key “story” that rewards should reflect investments.

\textsuperscript{c}Bourdieu (1977), Collins (1971, 1979), Bills (2003). Employers and the elite choose which credentials to reward.


\textsuperscript{e}Gramsci (1971), Kluegel and Smith (1986: Ch. 2).
EDUCATION LEGITIMATES INCOME INEQUALITY

around twice as productive in the East as well. That all this is on a lower base is irrelevant, since we focus only on their productivity relative to others in the same nation. Hence, on performance grounds, education should offer just as legitimate a basis for income inequality in the Early Post-Communist countries as in the market-oriented countries (Table 1, Rows 1 and 3, H1 and H3).

**Competing theories.**

(1) If people adhere to “Folk Human Capital” theory, they will hold that pay should reflect the person’s investment and hence additional education should not get extra pay in formerly Communist economies where alternative investments had been few, tuition free, and comfortable financial support provided (Table 1, column 2); (2) Credentialism implies that class conflict sharply differentiates the citizenry’s ideals in market-oriented societies, but little if at all in East Central Europe where the dominant ideology of egalitarianism held at least moderately across classes, leading to low average ideals and little difference by social background (Table 1, column 3); (3) Radical Egalitarian theory positing a universal longing for equality so that denizens of all societies prefer little or no reward to extended study (Table 1, column 4); (4) Communist elites strove to instill egalitarian culture in their mass publics (Mateju and Rehakova 1996); and they had pervasive control over social and economic institutions. Hegemony theory thus implies that the successfully inculcated egalitarian culture will lead ordinary people in Communist and Early Post-Communist to endorse little or no extra income for the highly educated, whereas the successfully inculcated culture of the market-oriented societies will lead ordinary people to see as legitimate and desirable substantial extra income for the highly educated (Table 1, column 5).

Because the meritocracy/equity family of theories (Table 1, column 1) is, as we will see, the only one consistent with the results, we summarize the others in Table 1 as “Rejected alternatives” and do not discuss them at length here. We turn now to the evidence.

**Data and Methods**

This paper treats Communism in East-Central Europe as a natural experiment. This logic requires societies at or near the Communist era (treatment) compared to similar non-Communist societies (control). The ideal would be shortly before East Central European Communism’s (unexpected) end, as is possible for certain related questions in Poland (e.g. Kołczyńska and Merry 2016; Peoples 2011), but little data exist for our questions. So far as we are aware, the only closely comparable Communist era data available for the issue at hand is a single question from the 1987–88 Wave 1 of Słomczynski’s splendid POLPAN survey (Słomczynski et al. 2008) which we discuss below; it confirms our results. Research on many topics related to inequality attitudes for which data is lacking during Communism, takes Early Post-Communist data as imperfect, but nonetheless useful, proxy information about the Communist era and its early legacy (Breznau 2010; Gerber and Hout 1995; Gijsberts 2002; Haller and Richter 1994; Kelley and Sikora 1999; Sikora 2005; Verwiebe and
Wegener 2000). The soundness of this approach is bolstered by the finding from one of the few Communist-era surveys with cross-nationally comparable data on inequality attitudes that the strong egalitarianism of Hungarians in 1987 was still evident in the 1990s (Simkus and Robert 1995) and that perceptions about inequality had changed from 1987 to the early 1990s, but inequality ideals had not (Evans and Kelley 2017; see also Peoples 2011 on value continuity in Poland, 1988–1995, although this is not true of all inequality ideals, see Mateju and Vlachova 1998, Kelley and Zagorski 2005). The proxy approach is also supported by myriad studies documenting a strong legacy in the attitudes and values of cohorts socialized in the Communist era (Breznau 2010; Horvat and Evans 2011; Kelley and Evans 2017b; Sikora 2005; Słomczynski and Wilk 2002; Wegener and Liebig 1995). Thus, our proxy approach has a solid foundation in prior research, but intrinsically involves an assumption (as does all this prior research) that attitudes and values in this domain, inculcated over decades, did not change too rapidly. Later data would be worse, and, absent a time machine, the evidence from the Early Post-Communist period is valuable, albeit inherently provisional.

We analyze fourteen surveys from six nations shortly after the end of Communism in East-Central Europe; all are large, representative national samples. The data are from the second round of the ISEA: International Survey of Economic Attitudes (details in Kelley, Zagorski, Evans, Ervasti, Ganzeboom, Gijsberts, Kangas, Robert, and Zlatkov 1998). The crucial Eastern European data were collected in the 1990s not long after the fall of Communism and well before the benefits of the market economy became evident: Hungary in 1992 (Robert et al. 1993), Poland in 1991, 1994 and 1997 (Zagórski and Kolarska-Bobińska 1996, 1998), and Bulgaria in 1997 (Zlatkov et al. 1998). Western data are mainly from the same period: Finland in 1994 (Kangas and Ervasti 1995), the Netherlands in 1998 (Nieuwbeerta, Gijsberts and Ganzeboom 1998), and Australia (six surveys between 1987 and 2002, Kelley and Evans 1994). N = 13,046. Our multivariate analyses are based on about half that number, because only labor force participants were asked about occupation and ownership.

Attitude and value questions were identically in all nations, with minor variations in introductory and explanatory materials to cater for local circumstances and linguistic usage. Demographic and background questions were collected to a high standard of accuracy using questions appropriate to local circumstances and recoded into comparable measures following ISSP definitions (Sikora 2003). Details are in the online appendix.

Comparison of frequency distributions of demographic variables with national Census data confirms that the ISEA data are representative national samples (Sikora 1997). Correlations among demographic items in ISEA data echo those found in prior research on other datasets (Breznau 2010; Sikora 2005). Further details on the sampling are in (Sikora 2005: 241).

**Measurement**

*Response/Dependent Variable: Legitimate Rewards to Education*

The key questions about legitimate rewards to education were modeled after long established questions on legitimate occupational earnings, e.g. in the ISSP (Kelley and Evans
EDUCATION LEGITIMATES INCOME INEQUALITY

1993; Sarapata 1963; Verba and Orren 1985: Chapter 8) and, like them, are open ended, inviting respondents to nominate any income they feel is morally right for specific educational attainments: secondary school completion, university (undergraduate) completion, and PhD. According to local custom, annual, monthly, or weekly income was asked, and in some countries after-tax rather than before-tax income. Comparisons would be difficult in the original units because the answers are in different local currencies and for Poland (where we have three surveys) the value of money changed dramatically over time. We therefore express each respondent’s nominated ideal income for a specific educational attainment relative to that respondent’s perceived income of semi-skilled workers, broadly following the methods of (Kelley and Zagorski 2005). Using locally appropriate introductions and terminology, we asked:

- Nowadays in [Australia/Poland/...] workers with a primary school education earn about [$22,000] a year by the time they are 30 or 35 years old. Now please think about those who spend longer in school...
- (b) How much do you think a 30 year old who has finished secondary school should earn? $ per year
- (c) How about a typical university graduate who did a [three year/Bachelor of Arts] degree course? $ per year
- (d) How about someone who has completed a doctoral degree? $ per year

**Predictor Variables**

These are measured conventionally following Evans and Kelley (2004). We measure objective class by extending the Blau-Duncan model to ownership and authority (Halaby and Weakliem 1993; Kelley 1990a, 1990b; Robinson and Kelley 1979). *Occupational status* is measured in *Worldwide Status Scores* (Kelley 1990b: 350–356). Ownership and Control are a set of dichotomous variables: (1) Business owners are self-employed with paid employees (1 or 0); (2) the *Solo self-employed* or petty bourgeoisie are self-employed without employees (1 or 0); (3) Supervisory Authority is scored 1 for those who supervise others at work and zero otherwise. *Family Income* is in local currency, expressed as a ratio to the average income of full-time blue collar families (for comparability between nations). As further control variables, we also include age (in years), male (1 = male, 0 = female), education (in years).

These are important control variables, because, prior research on other inequality attitudes finds that background variables are sometimes significant, although their effect sizes are generally small (e.g. Evans and Kelley 2017). Details are in the online appendix.

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2 Australian university courses are varied and public understanding of durations is limited, so the questionnaire provided more descriptive detail, specifying a “university graduate who did a three year degree course” in part (c) and “went on another three years to take a higher degree” for part (d), those being the most common lengths for BAs and PhDs.
Methods

The methods used here range the frequency distributions to a variance-components multi-level model estimated by GLS with random intercepts by society and fixed effects across societies (Hox 1995); a corresponding mixed-effects multi-level regression produces identical results. We have large samples and the predictors have small to moderate correlations, so multicollinearity is not an issue, an impression confirmed by variance inflation factors well under 10 for each of the predictors when estimated by OLS.

Results

Baseline: Legitimate Rewards in the West

Western respondents share a near-consensus that people who complete secondary school should earn about 40% more than the unskilled wage (Figure 1, light dashed line). In more detail, a handful of the citizenry, about 5 percent, take the radically egalitarian view that people who completed secondary school should earn no more than the unskilled wage. Everyone else believes that they should earn more, mostly between 20% and 80% more, with the mean around 40%. Economists could point out that this is roughly the marginal product of a worker with secondary school and is also roughly the return to be expected from an equally large investment in material capital (e.g. Murphy and Welch 1994; Psacharopoulos 1973); Aristotle might also point out it is roughly what a self-employed person with a secondary school education would produce.

Moving up the educational ladder, university graduates, in the minds of the Western public, should on average earn about twice the unskilled wage (heavy line with long dashes), around half again the ideal earnings for people who left after secondary school. Finally, PhDs should earn about two and a half times the unskilled wage, with more diversity of opinion, especially a small fraction of the populace advocating much higher rewards to PhDs (solid line).

In sum, Western publics see substantial rewards to education as legitimate. These results are consistent with Aristotelian theory’s prediction for a market economy (Table 1, Row 2, H1) but also consistent with the predictions of many other theories—folk human capital, hegemonic, and credentialist theories about market economies (Table 1, Row 2). The evidence is clearly contrary only to radical egalitarianism.

Just Educational Rewards in Early Post-Communism

To adjudicate among the theories that are “left standing” by the evidence thus far, let us turn to education in East Central Europe, recalling that, under Communism, incomes were long set by fiat (not the market), where alternative self-employment investments were not possible in the government controlled economy, and where the ruling elites were on the political left, favoring the working class (not the offspring of well-educated, high-status families as is arguably the case in the West).
Figure 1

Pay thought proper for secondary school graduates, university graduates, and PhDs in three Western nations relative to perceived earnings of blue collar workers (“minimum income”).

Western nations pooled
International Survey of Economic Attitudes, Round 2.

People in Western nations believe education should be rewarded.
For secondary school graduates, near consensus on 40% more than blue-collar workers get.
For university, twice as much, some saying much higher.
For a PhD, over two and one-half times that, with very diverse views, some much higher.

![Kernel density estimates, Epanechnikov kernel. All means are significantly different from 1.0 at p < .001](image)

In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland in Early Post-Communism, the public felt that people with a secondary school education should earn 70% to 90% more than the minimum income earned by workers with just a primary school education (Figure 2, Panel A, heavy lines). All of these are significantly different from zero at p < .001. Thus, like Westerners (light lines), they endorse significant rewards to secondary school. But, according to the post-Communist respondents, the rewards should be even larger than Westerners see as legitimate, not smaller (note that the dark lines’ shoulders reach further to the right than do the light lines’).

Similarly, in all three Early Post-Communist surveys, the citizenry supports substantial rewards to university education, with the legitimate earnings for university graduates being 2.4 to 2.7 times the unskilled wage (Figure 2, Panel B; all significant at p < .001). PhDs are also seen as meriting ample reward, with ideal earnings 3.3 to 3.8 times the unskilled wage (Panel C; all significantly different from zero at p < .001). These results align with earlier findings for the Czech Republic (Mateju and Rehakova 1996).

Interestingly, it is the elite levels of education (BA and especially PhD) that legitimated strikingly higher rewards in these formerly Communist nations than they do in the West (for example 3.8 minimum incomes for a PhD in Poland versus 2.6 in the West; Figure 2, Panel C).

Thus, despite the legacy of 40 years of Communist egalitarianism, the rewards thought proper by Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Poles were no lower—indeed are higher—than the
Figure 2

Pay thought proper for secondary school graduates (Panel A), university graduates (Panel B), and PhDs (Panel C) in the West and in Early Post-Communist East-Central Europe (Bulgaria 1997 N = 791; Hungary 1992 N = 1,110; Poland 1991, 1994 and 1997 N = 4733). International Survey of Economic Attitudes, Round 2.

Panel A. Everyone thinks secondary education should be well rewarded.
Formerly Communist nations favor slightly higher rewards than the West.

Panel B. All believe university education should be well rewarded.
Formerly Communist nations favor higher rewards than the West.

Panel C. All believe a PhD should be well rewarded.
Formerly Communist nations favor much higher rewards than the West.

Kernel density estimates, Epanechnikov kernel.
All means are significantly different from 1.0 at p < .001

ideal rewards endorsed by Australians, Dutch, and Finns. Perhaps our East Central European respondents reacting to violations of meritocracy: Research in Poland during the Communist period discovered a widespread perception that meritocratic norms were systematically violated by the regime (Koralewicz-ZębiK 1984), a result echoed elsewhere in East Central Europe in the Early Post-Communist period (Mateju and Rehakova 1996).
We assume that these views, ascertained in surveys only a few years after the fall of communism, reflect what their views were toward the last few decades of the Communist era, not some sudden reaction to the uncertainties and confusions of the early post-Communist era. The vast majority completed their education under Communism, they and their friends and relatives spent years in the labor market under Communism before its sudden (and unexpected) demise. It is only reasonable to think that their views reflect their own history and experience. Moreover, as we will see shortly (Figure 4 below), the same pattern holds for the oldest cohorts, those who came of age under Communism and spent the majority of their working life under Communism, as well as the youngest with only a brief experience of Communism. Additional evidence for Poland in 1987 shows that this pattern held before Communism fell.

The high rewards to education thought legitimate under Communism are consistent with the Aristotelian theory’s prediction that legitimate earnings should reflect performance, and hence be no lower in formerly socialist economics than in market economies (Table 1, Row 4, H3). However, the other theories all predict low or zero rewards (Table 1, Row 4): radical egalitarian and credentialist for the usual reasons; hegemonic theories, because the Communist elite was vehemently and forcefully egalitarian; and most importantly folk human capital, because under Communism there were few costs to education and no alternative investments in physical capital. Results for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland are clearly inconsistent with all these theories.

Only the Aristotelian claim that meritocracy will be endorsed regardless of institutional arrangements is consistent with this evidence.

Coherent Views

The public’s views on the legitimate rewards to education are tightly coherent: Those who think that secondary schooling merits generous rewards generally think that undergraduate and PhD education are worthy of high pay as well. Conversely, those who would favor low rewards for secondary school graduates, tend to favor rather low rewards for workers who complete university and for PhDs. This can be seen in the correlations among the ideal rewards to education items which range from about 0.6 to the middle 0.8’s in both formerly Communist countries and in advanced market-oriented countries (Table 2).

Accordingly, we combine the three items measuring legitimate pay according to education into a single additive scale. Details are in the online supplement.

In Western nations, the scale has a mean of around 2. In formerly Communist nations, the mean is 2.5 or just more (Figure 3)—this is of course far higher, and significantly so (p < .001)—than the mean near zero predicted by all theories except equity theory stemming from Aristotle (Table 1, Row 4).

The finding that the general public in the formerly Communist societies sees substantial rewards to education as legitimate militates against the folk human capital culture hypothesis (little or no income is forgone) and the hegemony hypothesis (the public rejects this part of the Communist elite-promulgated equalitarian ideology).

Only the Aristotelian hypothesis is consistent with this evidence.
Table 2
Measurement of Legitimate Returns to Education: Correlations, Confirmatory Factor Loadings, and Other Statistics Separately for Formerly Communist Nations (Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, pooled) and for Market Economies (Australia, Finland, and the Netherlands, pooled)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formerly Communist</th>
<th></th>
<th>Market economies</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary (1)</td>
<td>University (2)</td>
<td>PhD (3)</td>
<td>Secondary (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel A: Correlations, legitimate pay for...
- (1&4) Year 12 education: 1.00
- (2&5) University education: .85
- (3&6) for a PhD: .70

Panel B: Criterion variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Formerly Communist</th>
<th>Market economies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1&amp;4)</td>
<td>(2&amp;5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s occupational status</td>
<td>.01 .06 .06</td>
<td>.00 .00 −.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>−.02 −.04 −.04</td>
<td>−.08 −.09 −.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>−.07 −.04 −.01</td>
<td>−.11 −.06 −.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>−.01 .06 .08</td>
<td>−.09 −.08 −.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational status</td>
<td>−.02 .05 .08</td>
<td>−.09 −.07 −.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervises</td>
<td>−.01 .04 .06</td>
<td>−.04 −.04 −.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owner</td>
<td>.00 .03 .04</td>
<td>−.03 −.04 −.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solo self-employed</td>
<td>−.03 −.05 −.07</td>
<td>−.04 −.03 −.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>.01 .02 .03</td>
<td>−.07 −.06 −.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Formerly Communist</th>
<th>Market economies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.87 2.65 3.70</td>
<td>1.65 2.32 3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>.74 1.05 1.73</td>
<td>.64 .95 1.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel D: Factor loading

<table>
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<th>Market economies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.83 1.03 .83</td>
<td>.73 1.03 .82</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Panel E: Alpha reliability

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Netherland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(For all 6 nations pooled: .84)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel F: Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Netherland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>4733</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>4760</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SEM confirmatory factor loading estimated by maximum likelihood, separately for formerly Communist nations and for market economies. N = 2,504 cases with complete information on all variables in formerly Communist nations and N = 3,215 in the West.

Cohort Differences

Importantly, the length of time that people lived under Communism makes little or no difference to their ideals about rewards to education (Figure 4).

Thus, the norms Aristotle described in antiquity seem still to have flourished in Eastern Europe before the rise of Communism, to have prevailed throughout its heyday, and to persist unchanged into the post-Communist world.

Confirmation From Before the Fall of Communism: Poland 1987–88

A Communist-era survey with a question about legitimate pay for education reasonably comparable to the ones are analyzing, the only one of which we are aware, provides confirmation (Figure 5). The survey (Slomczynski et al. 2008) is for Poland in 1987–88 just a year or two before the unexpected fall of Communism. The actual returns to university
EDUCATION LEGITIMATES INCOME INEQUALITY

Figure 3

Just Rewards to Education (summary scale averaging rewards for secondary school, university, and PhD)

Three formerly Communist nations and three Western nations, various years. International Survey of Economic Attitudes, Round 2.

Legitimate pay for education (averaging secondary, university, and PhD)

Formerly Communist nations favor high rewards, higher than the West.

Kernel density estimates, Epanechnikov kernel.
All means are significantly different from 1.0 at p < .001

education at the time were small, about 1.3 minimum incomes as we measure it. Nonetheless a clear majority of Poles, 64%, thought that earnings ought to depend on education. Moreover they thought high rewards proper, an average of 3.2 minimum incomes (this includes those who would not reward education as well as those who would). That is over twice what university graduates were actually paid at the time, and much more than Westerners thought proper, and at least as much as East-Central Europeans thought right a few years after the fall of Communism (compare Figure 2, Panel B).

Thus we suggest that amply rewarding education is an enduring moral norm, not merely economics, nor ideology, nor politics.

Class Differences?

There is little class conflict about the proper rewards to education. Instead, regression analyses show that class differences are unimportant (Table 3). There is variation in ideals about rewards to education, but it has little or no linkage to class position. The only substantial difference is that formerly Communist nations favor higher rewards to education (first two columns).

Education and Pay Inequality

However valuable education may be to society, educated people rarely receive a direct stipend from grateful fellow citizens. Instead they get a job based largely on the skills conferred by their education, and are paid for their work in that job and for their skills relevant to that job. The nexus between education and job is thus crucial: How do moral norms
**Figure 4**

*Just Rewards to Education Among Older Cohorts Coming of Age and Living Most of Their Adult Lives Under Communism and, for Contrast, Both Younger Cohorts Living Less of Their Lives Under Communism and Western Nations*

Three formerly Communist nations (Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) pooled. International Survey of Economic Attitudes, Round 2.

**Legitimate pay for education for those living long under Communism**

Those spending most of their lives under Communism, where schooling was free and actual returns to education modest, still favor high rewards for education, higher than in the West and no different from more recent cohorts.

---

About the legitimate reward for education structure moral norms about the legitimate pay of occupations—the main source of society’s income inequality and the focus of a large and flourishing research literature.

In short, views about the legitimate rewards to education strongly affect the pay people think legitimate for high status occupations—professionals, elite government officials, and the economic elite alike—as compared to more ordinary occupations (Table 4; details are in the online appendix). Standardized effects are large, around .20 to .35, net of a wide range of class and demographic factors. Those who would reward education generously (in the top 10% on that) advocate paying elite occupations some 25% to 35% more than those who would reward education meagerly (in the bottom 10% on that).

Thus, views about education are a major force legitimating income inequality, both in the East and in the West.

---

**Discussion**

**Summary: Distribution and Determinants of Ideal Rewards to Education**

Most people believe that education merits higher pay: In all six countries and in every social group examined, there is widespread acceptance of incorporating meritocracy into
Communist era Poland: Pay Thought Proper for University Graduates
Data from the POLPAN survey Wave 1, 1987–88; N = 1443 (Slomczynski et al. 2008).

Communist era Poland: Legitimate pay for university education
In 1987–88 before the unexpected fall of Communism and when the actual returns to education were still small, Poles nonetheless on average favored high rewards for university education (mean 3.2 minimum incomes).

Kernel density estimates, bandwidth = 0.75. Mean significantly different from 1.0 at p < .001

Question: “Do you think that employees with higher education should earn more than employees without such education or earnings should preferably not depend on education? ... How much more on average...?” (answers in zlotys).

pay determination. However simultaneously, there is substantial disagreement about the legitimate magnitude of educational differences in pay.

In more detail, people believe that secondary school (year 12) graduates should on average get 60% to 70% more than workers with just a primary school education—rather less in the West and rather more in formerly Communist nations. University graduates ought to get two times (in the West) or two and a half times (in the East) as much as those with only a primary school education. And PhDs should get two and a half (West) or three times (East) as much.

Thus Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Poles—including Poles still living under Communism in 1987—endorse high rewards to education. Indeed, they endorse income rewards to education even higher than Australians, Dutch, and Finns think proper.

There are few class differences in the educational rewards people think proper. Those in high ranking occupations and those in low, supervisors and those supervised, boss and worker, those who identify with the higher classes and those who identify with the lower, all have similar views. Only the solo self-employed (Marx’s petite bourgeoisie) advocate fractionally lower pay, at least in several nations.
### Table 3

Effect of Background and Socio-demographic Variables on Pay Thought Legitimate for Education

(natural log of year 12, university, and PhD, averaged). Standardized partial regression coefficients. Estimates from random effects multi-level models estimated by GLS (columns 1 and 2) or by OLS (other columns). \(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All nations</th>
<th>All nations, Communist era times(^b)</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Finland</th>
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<td>Fathers occupation</td>
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<td>0.06*</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>−0.06***</td>
<td>−0.07**</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>−0.12***</td>
<td>−0.09*</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
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<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>−0.07***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>−0.13***</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
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<td>Occupational status</td>
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<td>−0.03</td>
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<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervises</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>−0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solo self-employed</td>
<td>−0.04***</td>
<td>−0.05*</td>
<td>−0.06*</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.05*</td>
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<td>Family income</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjective social class</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formerly Communist nation</td>
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<td>0.42****</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho: Percent of variance due to country</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>6059</td>
<td>1717</td>
<td>1709</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>2178</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)For columns 1 and 2 there are N = 14 surveys, not enough for comfort for the contextual variable. Reassuringly, OLS estimates for these are essentially the same as the multi-level results shown, except having (as is well-known) unrealistically low standard errors for the contextual variable.

\(^b\)Respondents who came of age and spent most of their working life in the Communist era (reached age 15 after 1947 and before 1965).

Demographic differences are few and erratic, and those that exist are small. Well educated people occasionally would reward themselves more generously (Poland, both before and after the end of Communism), sometimes are abstemious (Australia), but mostly have views no different from anyone else.

**Implications**

Our results support Aristotelian theory’s equity/meritocracy hypothesis that the general public feels that pay ought to reflect performance—a norm that probably dates back to the origins of human civilization. This proposition is arguably one of the four basic templates for human action (Fiske 1991) and is one of the three primary reward allocation principles (Deutsch 1975; Jasso 1994).

We do not suggest that educational attainments and education-enhanced performance are the only justifications that people rely on in forming their earnings ideals. Rather we suggest that rewarding education coexists with many other legitimating principles—for example need, power, authority, tradition, moral virtue, or comparative worth. Important, this implies that although people in these diverse nations broadly agree on the appropriate
Table 4

Views About Legitimate Rewards to Education Are a Key Influence on How People Feel About Occupational Earnings Inequality (the ratio of high status earnings to low status earnings, logged)

Standardized partial regression coefficients (first differences in row 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate pay for education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First difference (top 10% vs bottom 10%)</td>
<td>+27%</td>
<td>+26%</td>
<td>+22%</td>
<td>+25%</td>
<td>+38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardized</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers occupation</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational status</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervises</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owner</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solo self-employed</td>
<td>−0.06*</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>−0.16**</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective social class</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>2159</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05,  **p < 0.01,  ***p < 0.001

See Kelley and Zagorski (2005) for the earnings measure.

rewards for education, they may still differ on appropriate rewards for other traits, and on appropriate degrees of redistribution via taxation and welfare/social security and hence on the overall level of inequality they believe proper in their society.

**Theoretical Implications: Meritocratic norms as a working hypothesis for future research**

Discovering whether meritocracy/equity in the sense of Aristotle’s theory of a universal norm of rewarding productivity holds was the first purpose of this paper. The results clearly support the claim for advanced societies, Communist, early post-Communist, and market-oriented. This is important, because it suggests that powerful and sustained institutional differences did not eliminate this common aspect of culture. However, our data only cover advanced societies. We will return later in this discussion to the issue of changes in meritocratic norms with socioeconomic development.

**Theoretical Implications: Rejected Alternative Theories**

The rejected alternative theories are listed in Table 1, above. Here is the key evidence on them.

**Egalitarianism rejected.** Radically egalitarian views reject anything—not just education—as a legitimate basis for inequality. The evidence shows that few hold these views: In all these societies and at all levels of their social hierarchies, income rewards to education are legitimate in the eyes of the majority.
The folk human capital hypothesis rejected. Sociological functionalist theory proposed that rewards to education need to be high in order to motivate youth to study long and hard (Davis and Moore 1945). This proposition has been developed elegantly and systematically in economists’ human capital theory which argues that potential students will not pursue education unless they perceive that their later earnings will compensate them for the money they pay for education and the income they forgo while acquiring it, with compensation at least equaling the cost of alternative investments in material capital (Becker 1964; Mincer 1958). Insofar as the general public endorses a simplified understanding of this theory as morally legitimate, they embrace what we call “folk human capital culture.”

East Central Europe in the Communist era provides a rare case where equity/meritocracy theory and folk human capital culture theory can be empirically distinguished. The East Central European data militate strongly against the folk human capital culture hypothesis: Much the same ideals about rewards to education arose in Communist Poland’s command economy where there was little cost to education, little reward for it once acquired, and few alternative investments and in the early post-Communist period in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

Hegemony/dominant ideology arguments rejected. These posit that pay levels are set in the interests of a dominant elite who control the economy, and are also legitimated by them through their control over the dominant ideology. These arguments can be rejected because, if true, the results would have shown high ideal rewards in market-oriented economies where elites valorize the equity principle and openly endorse inequality, together with low or zero rewards in early post-Communist economies where elites long emphasized equality or need as the appropriate basis for reward.

Instead, the results show that the public’s attitudes support substantial and broadly similar rewards to education in both market-oriented and early post-Communist societies. In this matter, elite ideology matters little.

Credentialism rejected. A theory with very similar implications, although more specifically tied to education and more strongly emphasizing the boundary maintenance function for the elite, is credentialism. This is the argument that rewards for education do not reflect performance or investments but instead are arbitrary. The main difference from hegemony theory is that credentialism suggests substantial class differences in the market societies, with the lower classes rejecting substantial rewards to education and the higher classes endorsing such rewards.

The evidence is clearly against credentialism: The effects of a wide array of class-related measures are all zero or very small. Moreover Communist elite’s attempts to inculcate egalitarian ideology did not persuade their citizens to devalue education.

Educational Policy Implications

Even in market economies, folk human capital and equity/Aristotelian norms/meritocracy arguments conflict in some settings—notably in large firms and in government where pay is set administratively and on-the-job training often provided at the firm’s expense (i.e. in ways similar to Communist economies).
In such settings, the dominance of Aristotelian notions of fair pay has important economic implications:

(1) In a free market with morally approved pay scales, employer financed training will be less than the socially optimal amount. That is because employers must pay double: once to pay for the training itself, and again to pay the extra wages to which the trained workers will then, by common consent, be entitled. Profit-maximizing employers will therefore forgo some training opportunities that would be profitable if they had to pay only the costs of training, rather than having to pay the double bill imposed by equity norms of fair pay.

(2) The same logic applies to government financed education: if a national government pays the direct costs of university education (as most nations do) as well as the indirect costs in production forgone while students are studying (as Communist governments did, and capitalist governments in part do in the form of tax revenues forgone), then a revenue-maximizing government in a society with normatively approved pay scales will invest too little in university education. On the other hand, inclusive educational institutions may further enhance societal consensus about the legitimate magnitude of rewards to education (Kocer and Werfhorst 2012).

Hypothesis for Future Research: Development Promotes Egalitarianism

More speculatively, we would suggest that Aristotle’s logic is clearest in an economy of small scale, independent producers. In such an economy, most workers directly produce goods by their own, unaided efforts. Productivity is clear. But in a modern economy with a complex division of labor, we speculate that individual contributions to performance are less clear, and so offer less justification for unequal pay. Moreover, research shows that the actual educational attainment process differs little according to institutional regime, but becomes substantially less ascriptive with socioeconomic development (Evans, Kelley, and Yang 2016; Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991; Marks 2009; Nielsen 2006; Treiman 1970). All this, together with Aristotle’s logic implies:

Modernization Hypothesis:
A modern economy will have more egalitarian norms on rewards to education than a traditional one, other things equal.

This would parallel a result that has already been found for legitimate rewards to occupation (Evans and Kelley 2007; Kelley and Evans 2009). Education and occupation are of course the main determinants of income, and hence indirectly of savings and the accumulation of wealth over the life-cycle. So we are, in sum, arguing that economic development creates more egalitarian norms about the distribution of income and wealth.

Acknowledgements

We thank Guillermina Jasso, Kazimierz M. Słomczynski, Krzysztof Zagórski, and several anonymous reviewers for comments and Claire Kelley for statistical assistance. Earlier versions of portions of this paper were given to seminars at the American Sociological Association; the Australian National University, the University of California, Berkeley; Cornell University; the Johns Hopkins University;
the University of Melbourne; the University of Nevada; the Ohio State University, Research Committee 28 of the International Sociological Association; the International Social Survey Programme, and the World Congress of Sociology.

References


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E-mail: international.survey@gmail.com
The Effects of Social Origin and Formal Education on First Job in the Process of Transformation to Market Capitalism: A Cohort Analysis of Data from the Polish Panel Survey

Abstract: This paper analyses trends in social mobility in Poland in the process of system transformation to market capitalism. Using data from the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN, it compares social origin effects on educational attainment and on occupational status of the first job as well as the impact of formal education on the latter. The analysis is performed over four cohorts that have entered the labor market: (1) between 1983 and 1989, (2) between 1990 and 1998, (3) between 1999 and 2006, and (4) between 2007 and 2013. With regard to the impact of social origin on attainment of tertiary education upon entry to the labor market and on the status of the first job the analyses show stable social origin effects across time. Furthermore, there is evidence of a rising polarization of the effect of educational level on occupational position in the first employment.

Keywords: social mobility; labor market entry; educational attainment; system transformation; post-socialist countries; cohort comparison.

Introduction

Almost three decades after transition from state socialism to market capitalism of countries in Central and Eastern Europe there is no consistent picture of how this societal transformation has affected the permeability of their social structure. A few studies existing to date on social mobility in transition economies give mixed evidence on the dynamics of the level of social openness. Some find that openness is growing (Breen and Luijx 2004; Mach 2004), whereas others find that it is falling (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2010; Gerber and Hout 2004; Robert and Bukodi 2004; Saar 2009) or remains stable over time (Domański 2000; Domanski, Mach and Przybysz 2008). A common methodological limitation of these studies is that they cover only a short post-transformation period and/or use cross sectional data, which makes it hard to detect cohort differences. To provide new empirical evidence on the dynamics of social mobility in emerging market economies, in this article I use panel survey data from 1988 to 2013 to conduct a systematic cohort comparison of social mobility trends in Poland, one of the largest of all transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe that has undergone a very rapid transformation. The paper considers the effects of system change on social mobility over a longer time frame than has been done hitherto thus accounting for the process character of transformation to market capitalism. Next, the study applies a cohort rather than a period perspective in order to make changes in mobility more
easily discernible. Lastly, inheritance of social advantage is measured utilizing three different scales that measure socioeconomic status (reflecting a general position in the social structure) and social prestige and material status (reflecting different dimensions of social stratification).

There are two theoretical propositions concerning the dynamics of social openness in transition societies: industrialization theory and “market versus meritocracy” thesis. Specifically, if we consider system transformation in 1989 as a beginning of a catch-up modernization process then we should expect to find rising educational effects on allocation of rewards in terms of social prestige, socio-economic status and earnings and a falling importance of social origin as a counterpart of this development (Treiman 1970). According to the second theoretical perspective social origin effects should rise under market capitalism as market economy offers more channels of intergenerational transmission of social advantage than a bureaucratic order of command economy (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2010). This argument pertains also to the process of rolling back of the public sector in the course of transformation. The transition to market capitalism may have, therefore, rather resulted in a growing social closure. On top, an alternative source of change in social mobility patterns in many transition states may be a rapid expansion of tertiary education, which should decrease educational inequality but possibly also reduce the educational effect on occupational attainment in consequence of a falling signaling power of educational titles due to de-stratification of the educational system.

On the example of Poland, one of the largest post-socialist societies, the present article shows that neither industrialization theory nor the “market versus meritocracy” thesis is able to account for the development of social fluidity there. Instead, it offers support for a claim of basic stability in fluidity levels irrespective of changing institutional settings (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993; Featherman, Jones and Hauser 1975; for counterevidence see Slomczynski and Krauze 1987). Furthermore, it offers support for signaling theory as the value of educational credentials decreases. The analyses apply the o.l.s. regression technique thus allowing for the usage of different measures of social origin depicting different dimensions of social stratification and their intergenerational reproduction (see also Hout 2015). Following recent research practice (Gugushvili 2015; Yaish and Andersen 2012) the strength of the social origin effect is treated as a measure of social (im)mobility. In accordance with the status attainment research tradition I assess first the strength of the overall social origin effect, which comprises all possible sources of social advantage that may be transmitted intergenerationally (Bowles and Gintis 2002). In the second step I control for educational attainment as a major path of social advantage reproduction and thus estimate the influence of parental social position on individual occupational status net of education. I use the terms social origin effect, social mobility, social openness and social fluidity interchangeably.

To date, empirical evidence on intergenerational mobility for present day democratic Poland is mixed. Mach (2004) finds stable relative mobility rates for men and growing mobility for women between the 1970s and the early 90s. Yaish and Andersen (2012) report for Poland declining intergenerational ISEI associations over the period from 1992 to 1999, placing this country approximately at the mean of the studied sample of 20 developed countries. In turn, Domański, Mach and Przybysz (2008) find fluctuations but no
stable trend towards either greater or lesser fluidity in the first 15 years after transformation, whereas Domański and Przybysz (2012) argue for stability in the level of social fluidity in Poland after transformation. Analyzing social reproduction in terms of educational attainment Kwick (2015) classifies Poland among the four least fluid European countries (together with Italy, Ireland and Portugal) with regard to intergenerational transmission of tertiary education status. Yet, Wasielewski (2015) finds growing chances of achieving tertiary education by rural youth in the course of educational expansion. In the same vain Herbst and Rok (2014) report a major drop in educational inequalities. Admittedly, the cited studies differ in their methodology and analytical approach. Substantial results should be, however, more or less stable irrespective of a method applied (Breen and Jonsson 2005).

The present article contributes to the mobility literature by extending the observation window up to the early 2010s and by applying a cohort design, which is better suited to detect temporal variation. Furthermore, the analyses use different measures of social status thus allowing for a more comprehensive view on social advantage reproduction in the market transformation process.

**Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses**

According to liberal theory of industrialism (Bell 1973; Treiman 1970) growing complexity of work will lead to a tightening of the education-destination association as free market forces will push towards allocations to occupational positions on the basis of individual merit, most readily expressed in educational attainment. At the same time origin effects on education are expected to decrease due to better access to education. Although challenged by a number of empirical facts, leading Hout and DiPrete (2006) to conclude that “modernity theory is wrong,” the theory again finds support in the recent paper by Yaish and Andersen (2012). With respect to transformation from socialism to capitalism and subsequent growth of market economy industrialization theory predicts on the one hand a steady, and even increased in pace, growth in importance of education for occupational returns and on the other hand falling social origin effects. This line of reasoning, which has been adapted to the context of post socialist societies by Nee (1989) in his market transition theory, has informed studies on stratification in Central and Eastern Europe and led scholars to expect an increasing importance of educational attainment on class positions and decreasing effects of social background. Indeed, in line with this theoretical approach, Domański (1999, 2011) finds for Poland a growing income premium on tertiary education. Similar increasing effects of education on social position have been found for China (Bian and Logan 1996; Li 2003; Zhang, Zhao, Park and Song 2005) and a number of post socialist European countries (Fleisher, Sabirianova and Wang 2005; Hoffman, Bičanić and Vukoja 2012; Newell and Reilly 1999; Orazem and Vodopivec 1995) with Russia as an important exception (Gerber and Hout 1998). In the light of industrialization theory we should therefore expect rising education-destination associations and falling both direct and overall social origin effects.

Proponents of a so called “market versus meritocracy” thesis claim, in turn, that with the transition to market economy social origin effects should get stronger and the educa-
tion-destination association should weaken (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2010). They reason that capitalist societies offer better chances for a passage of social advantage to the children generation because a democratic order is generally less well suited to constrain it by political means. For example, a free market allows for a transformation of monetary resources into goods and services facilitating educational success. Furthermore, the linkage between educational attainment and occupational position should be weaker under the capitalist regime, because personnel decisions are less bureaucratized and private employers are generally free to choose whom they want to hire. Admittedly, stratification research on socialist countries has reported higher levels of social fluidity there than in western democracies (Andorka 1971; Meyer, Tuma and Zagórski 1979). Moreover, Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2010) find for Hungary declining social mobility rates as market capitalism stabilizes there.

In the same vein, Gugushvili (2015) has most recently established for a range of post-socialist European countries that the level of social openness is negatively correlated with economic liberalization. According to “market versus meritocracy” thesis a transition to market capitalism should therefore lead to a rise in overall and direct social origin effects, growing educational inequalities and a drop in education-destination association.

Furthermore, the effects of education on occupational status are believed to depend on the institutional shape of the educational sector (Gangl 2004; Müller and Gangl 2003; Müller and Shavit 1998). Educational systems with a strong vocational orientation are believed to provide a better fit between the level of qualification and occupational position (Andersen and Van De Werfhorst 2010; Büchtemann, Schupp and Soloff 1993), but at the same time they are said to display also a higher degree of educational inequality (Almendinger 1989). Therefore, expansion of general secondary schooling offering access to tertiary education and a corresponding expansion of the latter is expected to result in diminishing social origin effects on educational attainment (Breen, Luijkx, Müller and Pollak 2009). In the course of transition to democracy many former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have witnessed a shift towards general programs at the secondary educational level at the expense of vocationally oriented lower secondary educational paths and a rapid expansion of tertiary education (Hanushek, Woessmann and Zhang 2011; Kogan, Gebel and Noelke 2012). Specifically in Poland the percentage of students eligible for tertiary education grew substantially from 45 in 1990 to 75 in 2013 (GUS 2014, GUS 2000). The capacity of tertiary level education institutions expanded accordingly, owing much to the development of the private sector. As a result the share of tertiary education graduates increased considerably. In 2011 almost 40 per cent of 25–34 year-olds had a tertiary qualification (OECD 2013). A decreasing share of students attaining lower secondary vocational programs not leading to tertiary education and an expanding tertiary sector should lead to a reduction of educational inequalities for two reasons. As the lower secondary “dead-end” educational path loses popularity, for a growing proportion of students the decision concerning their educational goals is being postponed and should be therefore less dependent on their family background (Mare 1980). Second, a very rapid expansion of tertiary education may have reached a saturation point at which interests of middle classes are satisfied and class barriers in access to tertiary schooling decrease also for lower classes (Raftery and Hout 1993). At the same time, as high level educational credentials become common, they lose their signaling power resulting in employers looking for other proxies of future produc-
tivity. This may be an especially valid point in a situation when this expansion is carried out by new and predominantly private institutions with no reputation. On the grounds of signaling theory (for a recent review see Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel 2010; Feltovich, Harbaugh and To 2002; Spence 1973) a possible result of such educational expansion may therefore be an increase in direct social origin effects. In sum, I expect a reform of the educational sector towards a more general schooling to result in a falling social origin effect on education, a falling effect of education on destination and rising direct origin effects, whereas the overall social origin effect on destination will depend on the development of the origin effect on educational attainment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The dynamic of:</th>
<th>Industrialization theory</th>
<th>“Market versus Meritocracy” thesis</th>
<th>Expansion of tertiary education (Signaling theory)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall social origin effect on first job status</td>
<td>indeterminate</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct social origin effect on first job status</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social origin effect on holding a tertiary degree upon labor market entry</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>falling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of educational attainment on first job status</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>falling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1**

A Summary of the Theoretical Propositions Concerning the Dynamic of Social Origin Effects on Education and Position in First Employment

**Data and Methods**

**Data**

Data comes from the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN\(^1\). POLPAN, spanning from 1988 to 2013, is repeated in five year intervals with new cohorts entering the panel in subsequent years, and is the longest-running panel survey in Central and Eastern Europe on the topics of occupational careers, educational attainment, and inequality (Tomescu-Dubrow and Slomczynski 2016). The main focus of the panel remains the employment history with detailed information on the employment form, working hours and work conditions. It is asked retrospectively for the five-year period between the waves, thus providing a complete record of economic activity of survey participants. The panel structure of the data allows me to set a common point of comparison across cohorts in employment histories, in this case the first “serious” occupation, and hence to reduce variance due to effects of biographical time. I apply weights to the data in order to account for an overrepresentation of young persons (20–25 years) in the 2008 wave of the panel.

\(^1\) [http://polpan.org/about-polpan/project-description](http://polpan.org/about-polpan/project-description)
Analytical strategy

I estimate a series of linear and logistic regression models regarding the relationship between social origin and educational and occupational outcomes applying interaction effects in order to assess changes over four consecutive labor market entry cohorts.

I distinguish four labor market entry cohorts: The socialist cohort has entered the labor market between the lifting of the martial law and the systemic transformation in 1989, i.e. spans the years 1983 till 1989. It represents the baseline for the developments in the three subsequent market transition cohorts. The early transition cohort consists of persons who have entered the labor market between the years 1990 and 1998. The Polish economy at that time has been undergoing fast structural changes. Many new occupational profiles have been emerging reflecting the changing labor demand in the emerging capitalist society. Consequently, many vocational titles offered by educational institutions have turned obsolete. For this reason it is sometimes argued that in such transition periods allocations to occupational positions are more erratic and the value of educational credentials falls (Sackmann and Wingens 1996). The advanced transition cohort has entered the labor market between 1999 and 2006, which has been the time of persistently high youth unemployment rates. Their fall by the end of this period is a result of an economic upturn following the accession of Poland to the European Union in 2004. The post-transition cohort consists of those entering the labor market between 2007 and 2013. This period has been characterized by better employment prospects for youth in spite of economic stagnation.

Conceptualization of Dependent and Independent Variables

The social origin variable corresponds to the status of a father’s occupation at respondent’s age of 14. The social destination measure reflects the occupational position of an individual
in his or her first “serious” job. I define this job as the first occupation that an individual holds for at least 3 months without interruption and performs with a weekly working time of no less than 20 hours. I decide to measure social destination at entry to the labor market in contrast to a measurement at “maturity” because I believe that the effect of social origin and educational attainment can be most accurately assessed at the point in the work career, in which individual work experience on the one hand, and such externalities as variable opportunity structures for promotion generated by economic dynamic on the other, do not blur the associations (Bills 2003). Furthermore, I omit difficulties associated with influences of other life course domains on work career, which may be especially glaring for young women (Aassve, Billari and Piccarreta 2007). Last but not least, in this way I consider younger birth cohorts, which allows me to observe the effects of changes in the educational system.

I assess the level of social status reproduction utilizing three different scales, while the scales for social origin and social destination variables are consistent within models. Following the research practice I make use of the socioeconomic status scale, which is the most widespread approach in social mobility research applying linear regression modeling (Gugushvili 2015; Sieben and de Graaf 2001; Yaish and Andersen 2012). Because information on father’s occupation for the earlier POLPAN waves has not been coded in ISCO, though, instead of the ISEI scale I use the Polish Socioeconomic Status Scale (Domański, Sawiński, Słomczyński and Słomczyńska 2009). The use of a SES scale, which combines mean educational attainment and income for occupational categories, is not straightforward if one of the main explanatory variables is educational attainment, however. In order to avoid this methodological ambiguity I apply also models utilizing the Polish Occupational Prestige Scale and the Polish Material Status Scale (Domański, Sawiński, Słomczyński and Słomczyńska 2009). Although they focus only on one dimension of social stratification, they are free from collinearity issues and together they offer a more comprehensive picture of social stratification. Originally developed along with the Polish SES scale in 1979 the Occupational Prestige and the Material Status Scale have been updated in 2009 in order to incorporate new occupational profiles that have emerged after system change. In spite of these amendments, both scales correlate highly with their earlier versions so that applying them to the socialist cohort is warranted.

Educational attainment is conceptualized as a categorical variable with six response options: 1) primary/ lower secondary general, 2) basic vocational, 3) secondary general, 4) secondary vocational, 5) post-secondary vocational and 6) tertiary. Educational attainment is recorded in every wave of the panel. However, in wave 1998 there is an extra question concerning being presently in education, which, if answered positively excludes from answering a question about present educational level. For a part of these respondents educational level has been recorded in the consecutive wave so that the missing values on education could be substituted with valid information. In the regression models I control for it with a dummy variable. Educational status is recorded only at the moment of survey and there is no record of educational trajectories between the waves. As valid is taken the

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2 Following the educational reform implemented in Poland in 1999 the 8-year primary school has been limited to 6 years and a new 3-year lower secondary school has been established as an intermediate level between the primary and secondary track.

3 “Not accomplished tertiary education” has been recoded as secondary general.
educational level that is reported in the survey wave directly after the year of entry on the labor market.

Regression models control for cohort specific gender effects and, where applicable, also for age at labor market entry (linear and quadratic term), substitution of educational attainment information and cohort specific effects of education.

**Results I: Educational Attainment, Social Status of the First Occupation and Social Background Distribution in Comparison across Cohorts**

Figure 2 presents the distribution of educational attainment in cohort comparison. For each cohort the left bar reveals the percentage of those with primary, respectively lower secondary general education, whereas the right one shows relative percentages of educational titles in the group of those educated above the primary level. There is a clear upward trend in the educational level across cohorts. There is a substantial drop in the share of those with basic vocational certificate whereas the percentage of tertiary education graduates rises. Furthermore, if we put cumulative shares of those with vocational education (bars for basic, secondary and post-secondary vocational titles) against those with general schooling (bars for general secondary and tertiary education) the data reveals a shift in the structure of educational attainment away from vocational training towards general education. Whereas in the socialist cohort there is a strong domination of vocational training (almost 75 per cent), in the most contemporary post-transformation cohort its share drops to approximately 45 per cent.

![Figure 2](image-url)
With regard to distributions of father’s occupational status across labor market entry cohorts (Figure 3) two facts stand out. First of all, cohort differences can be discerned in the lower half of the distribution. It becomes more condensed in the younger cohorts reflecting structural changes in economy and a decreasing share of simple jobs. Secondly, and more interestingly, the upper ends of the distribution of parental occupational status are substantially lower in the advanced transition cohort than in the three others. This difference may be an effect of educational expansion. Apparently, individuals originating from higher status families have disproportionally often seized the new educational opportunities and prolonged their educational careers thus postponing their labor market entry. As a result, they are missing in the advanced transition cohort and reappear in the next thus turning the distribution back to “normal.”

As for socioeconomic status of the first occupation across cohorts (Figure 4) we can see that young individuals in all three post-transformation cohorts occupy lower status positions at entry to the labor market than their counterparts under the socialist regime. The differences are most pronounced for the Socioeconomic Status Scale, but they are also discernible with regard to Occupational Prestige Scale. As far as the latter is concerned, the advanced transition cohort stands out. The difference to the neighboring co-

\[\text{Figure 3}\]

\textbf{Distribution of Parental Occupational Status Across Cohorts}

\[\text{As for socioeconomic status of the first occupation across cohorts (Figure 4) we can see that young individuals in all three post-transformation cohorts occupy lower status positions at entry to the labor market than their counterparts under the socialist regime. The differences are most pronounced for the Socioeconomic Status Scale, but they are also discernible with regard to Occupational Prestige Scale. As far as the latter is concerned, the advanced transition cohort stands out. The difference to the neighboring co-}\]

\[\text{4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for having pointed this out to me.}\]
horts is most pronounced in the upper half of the distribution, which may suggest that under conditions of a slack labor market there are fewer allocations to higher status positions.

Figure 4
Distribution of Occupational Status of First Job Across Cohorts

Results II: Social Origin Effects on First Occupation and Educational Attainment and Educational Effects on First Occupation in the Transition Period from State Socialism to Market Capitalism in Poland

1. Social Origin Effects on Occupational Attainment in the First Job

The point of departure for the discussion of social advantage reproduction in the period of transformation to market capitalism is the dynamic of overall and direct social origin effect on social status in the first job. According to industrialization theory the social origin effect should fall. The “market versus meritocracy” thesis and conclusions from signaling theory as applied to the situation of educational expansion make a contrasting prediction.

Table 2 displays the results of o.l.s. regression models estimating the main effect of social origin variables on occupational attainment and cohort differences in this effect. Model
Table 2

Linear Effect on Social Status of the First Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social origin measure</th>
<th>Socioeconomic status</th>
<th>Prestige</th>
<th>Material status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall b (se)</td>
<td>Direct b (se)</td>
<td>Overall b (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social origin measure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.10** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.37*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.11* (0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Socialist cohort (ref.)
| Early transition cohort |
| –0.44 (2.62) | –1.90 (2.92) | –2.06 (2.98) | –2.35 (3.98) | –0.26 (2.07) | 0.93 (2.42) |
| Advanced transition cohort |
| –0.82 (2.67) | –1.40 (2.57) | 0.61 (2.79) | –0.81 (3.24) | –1.42 (1.41) | –0.96 (1.52) |
| Post-transition cohort |
| 3.66 (2.49) | 2.13 (2.32) | 5.85* (2.80) | 3.71 (3.01) | 2.02 (1.54) | 1.41 (1.64) |

Interaction terms:

social origin measure × cohort

| Socialist cohort (ref.)
| Early transition cohort |
| –0.06 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.12+ (0.07) | 0.05 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.05) |
| Advanced transition cohort |
| –0.04 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.07) | –0.07 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) |
| Post-transition cohort |
| –0.07 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.06) | –0.11 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.04) |
| Intercept |
| 19.95*** (1.67) | 19.22*** (1.67) | 17.10*** (1.91) | 14.61*** (2.27) | 23.91*** (0.93) | 21.94*** (1.13) |
| Adjusted R² |
| 0.10 | 0.40 | 0.12 | 0.39 | 0.03 | 0.12 |

“Overall” and model “Direct” control for cohort specific gender effect; model “Direct” controls additionally for educational attainment.

It is clear that social origin exerts a substantial influence on occupational attainment in terms of prestige and socioeconomic status. With respect to temporal variance in the effect strength we see that only one interaction term of social origin variables with cohort is statistically significant and that is only at the 90 per cent level. It is therefore safe to say that generally social origin effects remain stable across the transformation period. The “outlier” is the direct effect of social prestige. It is significantly higher in the early transformation cohort than in all other cohorts. It is difficult, however, to draw any firm conclusions from this estimate with regard to social mobility dynamic as both alternative conceptualizations of social status do not follow this pattern.

Additionally, the table reveals a major discrepancy in the effect strength of social origin variables between different dimensions of social position. The intergenerational association in terms of material rewards is much lower than it is with regard to social prestige or socioeconomic status. In the light of the data the intergenerational transmission of social status in terms of work income is therefore almost nonexistent. Such picture contrasts with the regularity found in USA of generally higher intergenerational income than socioeconomic status elasticities.
2. Effects of Formal Education on Social Status in the First Occupation

Next, I turn to the education effects on destination measured here as social status of the first job. In view of industrialization theory we should expect rising educational returns in terms of social status of occupational position. In contrast, the “market versus meritocracy” argument predicts lower educational effects under the capitalist order then under the socialist rule. Following signaling theory educational effects should fall with rising access to tertiary education. According to this last argument we should expect a decline in educational effects to be most pronounced in the two youngest cohorts and to pertain especially to educational categories that have expanded: secondary general and tertiary education.

I have estimated OLS regression models with social status of the first occupation measured on the three different scales as dependent variable. In order to achieve unbiased estimates of a cohort specific change in the effects of education on social destination models contain a triple interaction term of gender by cohort and by educational level along with controls for age at entry to the first job (together with a squared term) and for imputation of educational information. For the ease of interpretation I present estimated results from these models together with their goodness of fit statistic. Regression tables can be found in Appendix.

The left side of Figure 5 displays the changing effect of different levels of educational attainment across cohorts. It is clear from the graphs that as far as socioeconomic status and prestige of the first occupation are concerned higher educational credentials lose more on value from cohort to cohort than is the case for lower level credentials. We can see that the effect of primary education does not change significantly across cohorts. The premium connected with a basic vocational title and a secondary vocational credential decreases only slightly. The estimated returns drop to the greatest extent for secondary general and post-secondary level graduates, whereas the fall for tertiary education credential is somewhat smaller. In cohort comparison the value of higher level educational credentials decreases after system change.

The estimates for the effect on the material status of the first occupation show a different picture. Neither of the educational levels changes the value of its estimated returns in a significant way. The estimated marginal effects, however, rise with the level of education, which is a reverse picture to what has been established for the two alternative scales. It seems, therefore, that whereas the effects of higher educational credentials in term of social prestige and socioeconomic status decrease significantly with transformation, there is tentative evidence that material returns to education rise.

The right hand side of Figure 5 shows estimated values of social status in the first occupation at each educational level. Whereas in the socialist cohort the differences in the effect on social status of the first occupation between consecutive educational levels are well pronounced and 95 per cent confidence intervals only slightly overlap, starting from the early transition cohort the coefficients for primary, basic vocational, secondary and post-secondary certificates are increasingly grouped together. The premium associated with secondary education over basic vocational educational titles almost disappears already in the advanced transition cohort. In the post-transition cohort it is no longer statistically significant at the 95 per cent level. Only the distance to tertiary education remains sharp and highly
significant and displays an increasing tendency (with respect to secondary education). The estimates suggest a clear polarization trend of effects of educational credentials with time, which can be discerned for every measure of occupational attainment, although it is most prevalent for the Socioeconomic Status and Prestige Scales.

Noteworthy are, again, smaller effects and associations for the Material Status Scale. We see that the material status of the first occupation depends far less on educational attainment
than prestige and socioeconomic status. The indirect path of social advantage transmission is therefore very weak in terms of intergenerational reproduction of material rewards in Poland.


With a rising dominance of tertiary education credentials over all other educational categories and with a rising distance between tertiary level education and the rest it is clear that as far as educational attainment remains a channel of social advancement it is only through tertiary education. Of importance for social mobility is therefore the degree of social inequality in completing this education level. Following a vast and rapid expansion of the tertiary educational sector in Poland it can be expected that the social origin effect on attaining a tertiary degree will decrease across cohorts. Table 3 presents model specifications for holding a tertiary degree in the moment of labor market entry with respect to gender, cohort and social origin measures.

First and foremost the models reveal that independent of measure social origin exerts an effect of a very similar strength on the log odds of being a tertiary graduate. Furthermore, it is evident from Model 1 in each panel that the mean chance of entering the first occupation bearing a tertiary degree rises across cohorts. The chances of tertiary education are also gendered, favoring women. At the same time the social origin effect on graduation from tertiary level education remains stable across cohorts. In fact, only the effect of social prestige decreases significantly by the most contemporary cohort, but it is not robust for the alternative model specification (see Model 2). Model 2 introduces a control for cohort specific gender effects which significantly changes the estimates. The main effect for female turns insignificant and negative suggesting that the relative advantage of women is present only in the three market capitalism cohorts. Furthermore, the chance of reaching a tertiary level degree upon entering the first occupation increases across cohorts only for women. Men, in contrast, display significantly higher chances of holding a tertiary degree only in the advanced transition cohort. Cohort specific social origin effects are insignificant across the board. The decrease in the effect of social prestige of a father’s occupation in the post-transition cohort gets smaller and turns insignificant suggesting compositional differences between genders, but no substantially lower social origin effects.

Discussion

The results of a comparison study of four consecutive labor market entry cohorts in Poland spanning the period from 1983 to 2013 concerning temporal trends in the effect of social origin on educational and occupational attainment as well as in the effect of formal education on the latter presented in this article are somewhat perplexing. Social origin effects neither rise, as the market versus meritocracy thesis would suggest, nor do they decrease, as the industrialization theory would predict. There is also no effect on social fluidity of the vast expansion of tertiary education in Poland, the empirical fact that has been also found in Denmark (Breen 2004), which speaks against the thesis of a compositional effect of ter-
Table 3
Log Odds of Entering First Job as a Tertiary Level Graduate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Socioeconomic status</th>
<th>Prestige</th>
<th>Material status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 B (se)</td>
<td>Model 2 B (se)</td>
<td>Model 1 B (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social origin measure</td>
<td>0.04*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist cohort (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early transition cohort</td>
<td>0.62 (0.53)</td>
<td>0.78 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced transition cohort</td>
<td>1.41** (0.50)</td>
<td>1.39** (0.54)</td>
<td>0.86+ (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-transition cohort</td>
<td>1.56*** (0.45)</td>
<td>1.64*** (0.51)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction terms:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social origin measure × cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist cohort (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early transition cohort</td>
<td>−0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>−0.00 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced transition cohort</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-transition cohort</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>−0.02+ (0.01)</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.75*** (0.14)</td>
<td>0.77*** (0.32)</td>
<td>−0.10 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction terms:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female × cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist cohort (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early transition cohort</td>
<td>0.90* (0.46)</td>
<td>0.92* (0.46)</td>
<td>0.98* (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced transition cohort</td>
<td>0.73+ (0.41)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.42)</td>
<td>0.70+ (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-transition cohort</td>
<td>1.39*** (0.39)</td>
<td>1.31*** (0.39)</td>
<td>1.35*** (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−3.91*** (0.40)</td>
<td>−3.26*** (0.41)</td>
<td>−3.84*** (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFadden’s pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effects of social origin and formal education on first job. Hence, no of the developed theoretical arguments is in congruence with the data. Instead, the data supports the residual theoretical position of stable social mobility levels irrespective of institutional variability.

The only robust inter-cohort change concerns the composition of returns to education. In consequence of the dismantling of the vocational track and of a rapid growth in secondary general and tertiary schooling the structure of educational returns evolves into a bi-polar pattern. Differences between educational levels below tertiary education decrease and turn insignificant, whereas the distance of tertiary level graduates to the rest in terms of occupational status becomes larger. Such a temporal pattern challenges further the industrialization theory, whereas it is in line with the market versus meritocracy thesis and with signaling.
theory. As far as a similar declining importance of educational path as a mechanism of social reproduction has been found in other developed states, which have not undergone transformation to market capitalism (Breen 2004; Goldthorpe 2014) and in which this decline can be attributed to a shift in the composition of educational attainment along the lines of the signaling theory (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2016; Bol 2015) it would be safe to assume a similar mechanism in Poland.

Last but not least, the presented analysis of the status attainment process and the role of social origin in it accounts for a multidimensional character of social stratification by applying three different measures of occupational status. The socioeconomic status of the occupational position, which is a standard conceptualization of occupational attainment may be regarded as the most general measure of social standing. At the same time this construct combines inputs and returns of the status attainment process, which is problematic from the methodological viewpoint, especially if one of the independent variables in the models is individual educational level. Therefore the analysis of intergenerational transmission of social advantage in terms of socioeconomic status has been supplemented in this article by two other measures of occupational position, each of them reflecting a specific type of societal rewards: social prestige and material gratification. Whereas the analyses point at a far reaching similarity in the effect strength as well as in the share of explained variance between socioeconomic status and prestige measures, the values obtained for the Material Status Scale are much lower. According to the data material status is less intergenerationally correlated in Poland. The question arises as to why prestige and socioeconomic status are more easily intergenerationally transmitted there than material status is. It is a well established empirical fact that in USA the opposite is the case. Such a discrepancy might be due to a different role of the educational path for different dimensions of status reproduction in both states. The data for Poland indicate a very weak origin-education and education-destination association with respect to material status, which may account for lower overall origin destination associations. Furthermore, differences in associations and effect strength suggest that material rewards and those in terms of prestige are not highly correlated in Poland. This may partly be a result of a perverse structure of material rewards in the socialist period, which pertains especially for high prestige public service professionals (education, medicine, public administration).

Acknowledgment

The author gratefully acknowledges comments on previous versions of the text by Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, Joshua J. Dubrov, and Reinhold Sackman.

This paper is based on the analysis of the data from the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN, 1988–2013 supported by the National Science Centre Poland, grant No. 2011/02/A/HS6/00238.

This work was supported by DAAD (PRIME Program: grant number 57339733).

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Cultural Context of Social Life

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How the University Organizational Culture Is Being Experienced?
Phenomenological Studies of Experiencing the Here and Now of the Organization

Abstract: This paper undertakes the issue of how the organizational culture of a certain institution is being experienced by reconstructing the leading themes coming from auto-observation and descriptions of it. Still, instead of investigating how it is perceived or how its values are verbalized, the study referring to the actual experiencing of certain spaces, social relations, as well as how these are being conceptually embraced therein has been undertaken. To do so, phenomenological methodology and the analysis of qualitative data—adjusted to the research framework at hand—have been employed. Throughout the observation of bodily and mind responses, the lived experience under scrutiny has been given a leading role in regards to determining whether and how the research preconceptualizations should be superseded by the perceptions of the organizational reality under study, as seen and experienced by those who actively partake in the institution at hand.

This research refers to how the University is being experienced by the students of one of its degree courses.

Keywords: organizational culture, experiencing, phenomenological studies, University, emotions.

Introduction

Our study was phenomenological in nature. The research goal was the “reconstruction of themes from students’ accounts of their own impressions in regard to how students experience the University.” The research question was as open as possible to avoid preconceptions and distortions of the experience and perception of daily life in an organization.

Phenomenological study concerns analyzing phenomena as they manifest themselves in the consciousness. Therefore, it is a turn to things-in-themselves (Husserl 1970). Consciousness has an intentional nature—we are always aware of something (Groenewald 2004: 4)—and investigating such consciousness will thus constitute the main goal of the research. Phenomenological research is about describing a phenomenon as accurately as possible, without being influenced by any a priori assumptions, as it should transparently reflect the facts. It is associated with the description of everyday life experiences people have (Groenewald 2004: 5). The point here is thus to gain the most in-depth understanding of the studied phenomenon not in light of some previously build theories, but as it appears in the participants’ experience (Hycner 1985: 299–300). “Phenomenology is used to obtain knowledge about how we think and feel in the most direct ways. Its focus is what goes on within the person in an attempt to get to and describe lived experience in a language as free from the constructs of the intellect and society as possible” (Bentz and Shapiro 1998: 96).
Any object, event, situation or experience that a person can see, hear, touch, smell, taste, feel, intuit, know, understand, or live through is a legitimate topic for phenomenological investigation. There can be a phenomenology of light, of color, of architecture, of landscape, of place, of home, of travel, of seeing, of learning, of blindness, of jealousy, of change, of relationship, of friendship, of power, of economy, of sociability, and so forth. (Seamon 2000: 159)

Therefore, a phenomenology of organizations and management, where one studies substantial characteristics of organizing, power, leadership, organizational communication, control, surveillance, bureaucracy, organizational culture, et cetera, can also be imagined. This last phenomenon will be subject to study described in this paper.

The so-called phenomenological reduction (epoché), that is, bracketing our assumed conceptual frameworks that structure our perceptions and experiences, is essential in any phenomenological study (Rehorick & Bentz 2008: 11–12; Englander 2016). It is crucial to elicit essential characteristics of the phenomenon without using our epistemic and socialized filters. This method was proposed by Edmund Husserl ([1954] 1970). Evidently, bracketing our knowledge and assumptions does not mean denying the world, or even to doubt its existence. Study of a certain phenomenon (object) begins with describing its experience. There are two aspects of bracketing our knowledge. The first level of bracketing is to suspend what we have learned about the phenomenon from scientific studies, accepted theories, and other legitimated sources of knowledge. Next, one must bracket the notions about the phenomenon stemming from one’s cultural milieu (Rehorick & Bentz 2008: 12). This knowledge is embedded in the language by typifications and cognitive constructs, which have been internalized and used by ourselves in naming people and objects (Schütz [1932] 1967; 1970). In this paper, these two aspects will be of utmost interest. We may observe some parallels between the epoché and the meditation on emptiness in Buddhism (Bentz and Shapiro 1998: 52; Depraz 2002; Simpson 2008: 61–62). Pragmatic approach to epoché can be characterized in three successive phases:

a. A phase of suspension of the habitual thought and judgment, the basic possibility of any change in the attention which the subject gives to his own experience and which represents a break with a “natural” or unexamined attitude;

b. A phase of reflective conversion of attention from “the exterior” to “the interior”;

c. A phase of letting-go or of reception of the experience. (Depraz 2002: 122)

Another technique of phenomenological analysis is using imaginative variations while scrutinizing the data. Here, we seek different meanings by using imagination, various reference frameworks, different perspectives, positions, roles, and functions to fully and in all-encompassing manner describe the structures of our experience, as well as its significance attributes. Owing to the fact of using imaginative variations, we are able to tell apart which attributes are random and which are necessary to the phenomenon (Rehorick & Bentz 2008: 14–15; see also Benz & Shapiro 1998: 99).

The third technique applicable in phenomenological reduction is horizontalization. We can tell that what is essential here is the context of realizing a phenomenon within certain experience here and now.

Horizontalization gives each element equal value, opening up possibilities for seeing things differently and changing one’s perspective. Let us say, for example, that in a given hour you tie your shoe laces, pet your dog, write
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apoem, and watch capsule news on CNN. If someone asked what you had done in that past hour, you might say, “I wrote a poem and watched the news.” If your best friend, also a poet, telephoned, you might say, “I wrote a poem.” If your spouse called, you might say that you played with the dog. (Rehorick & Bentz 2008: 16; see also Benz & Shapiro 1998: 99)

There may be a number of horizons of experiencing, and each time, as the time goes by, a new horizon may be brought to light.

The phenomenological research method is distinctive. Certain phenomenon “chooses,” as it were, the method of analysis. Many phenomenological researchers have objections to the very terms—method and analysis. (Hycner 1985: 280). However, we need to adopt some way of proceeding to be able to interpret and explicitate “empirical data.” What is important here is the word explicitation (explain) (Giorgi 1970; Hycner 1985: 300), unlike the word analyzing, since it is not about dividing the phenomenon apart, but finding what is essential and common for that phenomenon in its experiential perception. Here, we attempt to directly reveal and pass meanings included in what we call empirical data.

Research, Methods, and Data

In this study, we quite systematically followed a scheme presented by Richard H. Hycner (1985), in order to explicate phenomena revealed during interviews. These phenomena are the experiences described by the study participants, who were present in a certain environment (the University). We did not make use of all of Hycner’s guidelines. In adapting his proposals in regard to experiencing an organizational culture, we established the research and analysis scheme below.

1. The first stage after conducting the interviews (in this case, recordings of individuals’ observations on their experiences after entering the University) involves transcription.
2. Then, we engage in phenomenological reduction and bracket the knowledge we have about our object of study, approaching the data with openness and letting it reveal itself completely. One good practice of bracketing is to create a list of our own assumptions and knowledge, and to discuss it with other researchers (Hycner 1985: 280–281).
3. Afterwards, we examine the recorded interviews repeatedly (by reading our observation notes a number of times) in order to gain a sense of the whole (see also Churchill & Wertz 1985). We pay attention to non- and para-verbal elements accompanying the utterances. Researchers ought to record their general impressions in an observation log to make themselves aware of the difference between an observation and an interpretation.
4. Reconstructing the units of general meaning. At this stage, the researcher aims to determine the meanings conveyed by the research participants. We do not refer to researcher’s questions for the time being. Here, we are dealing with the crystallization and solidification of what has been done/said by the participant, while using as many in vivo terms as possible. Units of general meaning have to be enumerated in our transcription, and on the right-hand side of the text we need to write down important locutions and words for each unit of general meaning. “I define a unit of general meaning as those words, phrases, non-verbal, or para-linguistic communications which express a unique
and coherent meaning (irrespective of the research question) clearly differentiated from that which precedes and follows” (Hycner 1985: 282).

5. Describing units of meaning relevant to the research question. The researcher strives here to find units of general meaning that are related to the research question.

6. Eliminating redundancies. This involves eliminating repetitive units of general meaning.

7. Clustering units of meaning relevant to the research question. The researcher attempts to cluster units of meaning relevant to the research question based on some common theme or essence that unite them (Hycner 1985: 287; see also Groenewald 2004: 19–20).

8. Determining themes for clusters of meaning. The researcher goes through clusters of meaning in order to find a common theme for all the clusters. One or more themes might be found.

9. Writing a summary for each interview/observation notes. The summary is based on the common themes that are found (see point 8). This is about reconstructing the inner world of experience of a given person (Hycner 1985: 291).

10. Return to the participant with the summary and themes—conducting a second interview. The researcher checks if the participant agrees that the essential characteristics of the interview/observation record have been captured. At this moment, a process of verifying research accuracy begins. In the case of incompatibility, the researchers and participants jointly determine the common characteristics that are essential for a certain interview/observation record.

11. Summarizing all the interviews. Such summary describes the world in which a phenomenon took place and was experienced in a certain way by the participants. It is important to place themes within the horizons where participants experience reality, as well as to highlight individual differences if such manifest themselves among the research participants (Hycner 1985: 294).

Phenomenological research according to the abovementioned (also modified) method was conducted by Groenewald (2004: 11), who was interested in cooperative education aimed at growing talents in South Africa. The mentors and their presence turned up to be crucial for such education, as well as the commitment of employees and their ability to sacrifice a maximum dose of managerial energy in the task at hand and in reactivating educational institutions to meet the demand of enterprises (Groenewald 2004: 22). Michalak and Ristino (2013) performed a similar type of research, where they have been studying perceptions of organizational culture as it manifests itself in managers’ behaviors, and they described the phenomenon studied as an individual enactment of such culture by research participants. The research participants were compiling auto-reports related to the issues mentioned above. Cluster units of meaning referring to the perception of management behaviors, described as management style, communication style, and decision-making process, were highlighted as impacting upon the organizational environment (Michalak & Ristino 2013: 69). Positive perception of management behaviors eventuated in a positive perception of organizational environment, and vice versa. A positive language used in describing management behaviors (e.g., charismatic) was related to a positive description of managers’ personality (enthusiastic, caring, confident; Michalak & Ristino 2013: 70).
Those investigations show, for example, that values and beliefs, which are regarded as essential characteristics of organizational culture, were rarely mentioned by people under study. Therefore, this aspect of organizational culture was not reflected in participants’ experience. We may assume that accepting the *a priori* definition of organizational culture frequently might lead the researcher to constructing the studied subject (Hatch 1993).

The recording and explication of experiences of the University environment were done according to the scheme mentioned above. The goal of the research was to point out the main themes related to organizational culture that emerged from a detailed examination of the empirical materials.

The method used in the paper is inspired by Giorgi (1970) who was in actuality conducting psychological research, although he was inspired by phenomenology; the same was done by Hycner (1985), whose research was in the psychological style. We used phenomenology to research a sociological topic: the organizational culture of the University. Therefore, we can say that phenomenological research could be an inspiration for the sociology of organization.

We agree here with the statement by Kociatkiewicz and Kostera (2015: 64) that: “we should look at the campus primarily as a site of experience. It is a space encompassing many destinations, where different wanderers traverse the passages in search of their own specific goals.” Observation of experiences and its records were performed by 24 third-year students of Social Analytics. (The participants were 18 women and 6 men; 13 reports were selected for clarification because they were longer and could be analyzed in more detail). The project was done by students during the course “Multiculturalism in Management” (at the University of X, in a city of 660,000 inhabitants). Students wrote down and attempted to analyze their feelings according to the scheme at hand. However, ultimately, the author of this paper has himself made necessary explicitations. Afterwards, he contacted each student individually in order to get their points of view in regards to the explicitations made, and in the case of ambiguity—to obtain additional information (see point 10). After getting feedback, the interpretation was partially changed, however, such situation took place only twice. Students gave their consent to use their records in the research and its possible publication.

At the beginning, the students were taught what is organizational culture. The following was agreed upon as to the understanding of organizational culture:

Organizational culture would thus embrace the systems of values collectively shared and proclaimed in a given organization, common and often unrealized assumptions deriving from the latter, binding the ones partaking to the organization at hand, the rules of procedure, as well as the whole symbolical sphere of how the organization operates. Symbolical sphere consists of organizational language, ideologies, myths, beliefs, knowledge systems, rituals, which manifest themselves in a given organization. (Konecki 1994: 6–7)

Still, students discussed also other definitions and conceptualizations in order to obtain a wider observational perspective of phenomena related to the organizational culture.

The project was a part of the course. The goal of the course was to learn about many different approaches of studying organizations and organizational culture. So the students should have studied also the concepts, definitions, theories of the organizational culture. I wanted to show them that *a priori* concepts to study some phenomena did not always fit the
phenomenon. Although, I was open to the results of the research. I used phenomenological style of research and explicitation to show the complexity of relation of a priori concepts to the research results and discoveries. So it was also the didactic goal that was included in the research.

Furthermore, the students had classes about Hycner’s (1985) and Rehorick and Bentz’s (2008) phenomenological research schemes. They were thus asked to bracket their previous experiences and knowledge about studying (also on organizational culture), and focus on their impressions while being at the University. Also, they received instructions how to keep track of their experiences in the University environment:

I would like to ask you to write down and to hand over at least ONE OR TWO PAGES describing your experiences after entering the University area to the person responsible for collecting your work. Instruction is as follows:

What do I feel when entering the University area? Write down what you experience when entering the University area, run this experiment after entering the University, stop, concentrate and observe your insights (describe your emotions, the way you perceive other people and objects, thoughts, and your bodily experiences, etc.). Everything that comes to your mind. Be frank. Write straight from your heart. Do not weigh up yourself, do not write according to some thesis, just simply describe your feelings without self-censure. Also, observe what happens next, when the classes start. Note down everything that you experienced directly and consciously.

I trained the students how to concentrate on here and now using two methods: cognitive and “meditative” one. The cognitive approach was connected with identifying assumptions and reflection on them (scientific and cultural) that should be written down and discussed in the group to be aware of their possible influence on their perception and to separate what they known from what they experience.

The “meditative” method is a pragmatic approach to epoché outlined by Depraz (2002). This approach to epoché can be characterized in three successive phases:

a. A phase of suspension of the habitual thought and judgment, the basic possibility of any change in the attention which the subject gives to his own experience and which represents a break with a “natural” or unexamined attitude;
b. A phase of reflective conversion of attention from “the exterior” to “the interior”;
c. A phase of letting-go or of reception of the experience. (Depraz 2002: 122)

Thus, first of all, we decide to suspend our everyday knowledge (phase A). Thereafter, in phase B, we redirect our attention from perception content to the perception act itself. This way, we can find out how the mind works, and this will allow us to cleanse it by “letting go” all impressions and thoughts which may emerge in it. Phase B can be comprehended similarly to Zen Buddhism meditative practices, when concentrating on the breath or on the mantra, while phase C is about alienating ourselves from perceived things, and not binding ourselves to those things. Students were trained in this activity.

Everything that comes around goes around. Such self-consciousness is pre-reflective, pre-discoursed, pre-verbal, and non-conceptual. So, we open up our mind to everything that is created in it. Practically, we do not refuse a thing, since we are not tied up to anything, including our own concepts or assumptions. Hence, we can take in that Zen meditation is an epoché praxis, as well as preparation to a direct observing the experiences and writing about them. It is also a preparation to meditational contemplation on concepts, and experiences of phenomena and their relations.

Therefore, students had to pay attention to the environment they have found themselves in, and to which they were “thrown” with their bodies (see Seamon 2000: 162).
They avoided to use the filter of their knowledge of organizational culture concept that they learned before. Being in a certain place is associated with embodying of this very being—the body at hand exists and moves within a certain place in a certain way. The body thus defines our relation to place and phenomena appearing therein (see Toombs 1995; Merleau-Ponty 2005). The body precedes the conceptual knowing of the world.

In the explicitations, we paid attention to units of relevant meanings which were related to the widely-defined organizational culture mentioned above.

**Research Results: Experiencing the University Organizational Culture**

Here, we introduce the summary of all self-reports regarding experiencing the University organizational culture.

While experiencing organizational culture, students are mainly aware of the following:

1. Emotions felt while being at the University,
2. Infrastructure of the University and its administrative and other services,
3. Routine activities,
4. Social relations with other students.

These four aspects (themes) comprise the essence of experiencing the University organizational culture among research participants. The reconstructing themes was the main goal of the research and explicitation of auto-description. However, these experiences are distinctly complicated as to their meaning and thus it is not always possible to extract them unequivocally on the logical level. Such experiences have an all-encompassing character for each person, and the units of relevant meaning are usually clustered in such way that their explicitation requires unveiling this meaning texture.

Apart from the main four themes, we recognize a couple of unique topics, which will be described, as well. Some of them will be introduced in combination with the previously mentioned four themes, if they create a relations of meaning on a verbal level, and some separately.

**Experiencing Emotional States While Being at the University**

In the University area, the students mainly feel and observe emotions. It is a major theme acknowledged in the majority of explicitated self-reports (out of 13 explicitated reports, in 7 auto-reports its appearance is explicit and in 3 implicit). Nevertheless, these emotions are not unambiguous. In the coverage below, these range from curiosity and anxiety, through agitation and calming down, till the author gets up to the feeling of pride.

Therefore, emotions are diverse and of a changing nature. In the auto-report below, a rotation and dynamism of experienced emotions can be noticed.

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After I've entered the University area, I feel curiosity, I wonder what will happen. Sometimes also anxiety and impatience, if I sense that these impressions might be negative. Usually, I also feel the urge of lighting up a cigarette. I get upset when I see cars parked in a wrong way or some clumsy attempts to get out from one's parking space in a visibly mindless manner. At the same time, I feel pity for those who have to break through a crowd of students. I am trying to calm down my thoughts and concentrate on today's classes, wondering if we didn't forget something today. I smile once I see my mates. Sometimes I feel kinda proud that I can be part of all this, especially when I see groups of students and manifold student research groups exhibited next to the entry. [D.B.]
In student’s explicitation to my comment and question (Was anxiety a dominant emotion among the negative ones?), the student clearly points out that anxiety is a variable and fading emotion. Anxiety manifests itself when some unpredictable events are prone to occur (e.g., the course of some classes is unpredictable). However, once the student realizes that nothing can surprise her on this day at the University, she calms down. At the end of explicating my remarks, she ascertains that her feelings regarding the University are positive; she even emphasizes that by using capital letters in the word POSITIVE: “To sum up, in the majority of cases, I definitely feel POSITIVE curiosity about what will happen today during the classes.”

Another student also feels proud of being part of the University environment. The expanse of the University offers a horizon and related references to the past, in which famous names from the world of science and culture appear. Pride is intertwined here with a reflection about the commercialization of the University, “Anyone can become a student these days.” The uniqueness and perdition of studying at the University is ultimately accepted by the narrator:

What do I feel entering the University of X? Pride above all else. Self-pride, the pride of my family and my loved ones. I am proud that I have the opportunity to move within the building which educated such outstanding personalities like Leszek Kolakowski, Marek Belka, Paweł Edelman, Antonina Kłoskowska, Jan Lutyński, or Władysław Pasikowski. I am proud that it’s me now who strolls through the building corridors that experienced a lot during these seventy years of its existence, and, in addition to this, I am doing really well. Even its current commercialized form won’t blot that out. So different than what it was some time ago. Commercialized, massed, commonly accessible. Anyone can become a student these days. Some uniqueness has been lost, which, I believe, was caused by specific requirements of our times. Perhaps it is how it should be? After all, its people who create organizations. [P.P.]

The knowledge about the past sets the horizon of perceiving the current University environment and of emerging emotions (pride).

In regards to realizing and delivering some values (value of learning), one of the students feels specific emotions. These, on the one hand, will be negative emotions, when she does not approve the state which she is undergoing (hanger-on time emotions) or when she is not sure about the quality of her project, which evokes anxiety. On the other hand, these will be positive emotions—in the days when she feels the joy of studying. She particularly enjoys some of the classes, like the ones about qualitative analysis. One of the students feels the joy of studying, but on certain days. Therefore, experiencing emotions is here related to the time frame; time, classes schedule are a bureaucratic context for experiencing certain emotions.

However, there is a generalized satisfaction of studying, which contains pride of qualifying to the University, as well as mother’s pride of the fact that her daughter studies, pride of meeting experienced lecturers and of the possibility of using the University library.

One of the students feels happiness when she leaves the Faculty after finishing her classes. She is satisfied by the fact that she lives nearby and thus she can quickly move within the space around the University, especially when she sees people struggling at the car park to park their vehicles or get out from it.

The abovementioned emotional diversity is highlighted by another student. This is related to the length of time spend on studying. While end-of-term examinations, a number of emotions can be experienced, starting from being stressed after entering the University
building, to irritation caused by lack of empty coat hangers in the coatroom, and ending up on seeing the examiner. Positive emotions appear, as well. These are related to meeting classmates (joy), thus being emotions emerged by social relations, and passing the exam. Also, pride surfaces within the family relations context. Emotions are likewise reflected in this student’s non-verbal communication (confident walk while leaving the University building):

I passed the exam with 4,5 grade. I feel self-satisfaction. After leaving the classroom, I give my friend a “high five” and we are in great moods. I call my mom to tell her how the exam went through. She congratulated me and I heard from her some appraisal words. I check what time is my return bus home. I confidently leave the building feeling relieved. [P.O.]

Additionally, emotions reveal in other perceptional areas of students’ lifeworlds. For example, these manifest when meeting friends, and are then positive, like joy. Therefore, positive emotions are connected to social relations (see section 3 further in the text). They can also be reflected indirectly, what can be noticed in rating one’s state of being and a day-to-day student’s life while in the University area.

For one of the students, very important are sentiments experienced in the morning, when entering the University building. Here, we can see an indirect reference to emotions.

The quality of experienced emotions may differ, one might feel well or bad, what can be related to the weather or the assessed level of being prepared prior to classes. These two conditions cause one’s willingness to back up or participate in the University activities (classes). Therefore, positive and/or negative meanings of these impressions rise:

When entering the Faculty... of the University, the first thought which comes to my mind is a wish for this day to finish. I think this is related to the weather as in such days the best thing to do is to curl up under a proverbial blanket with a cup of tea. Then I wonder whether I am well prepared for my classes, and if so, I feel confident and enter the classroom feeling no stress that in a moment I won’t be able to answer to any of the lecturer’s questions. While if I am not prepared, I keep on looking away and agitated keep clock watching till this one hour and thirty minutes of class finish.

Also, sometimes I have this thought that perhaps, on this very day, the class which I really don’t like will be canceled, and then, for a moment, I feel such pleasant thrill of satisfaction, which passes away as I approach an already opened classroom. [K.K.]

The positive assessments also apply to general emotions related to the benefits of studying and being at the University. These are perceptions like experiencing the seriousness of authority, duties, and adulthood. Time, waking up in the morning, entering the world of responsibilities and daily adulthood, so to speak, are here clearly specified. These experiences were assessed positively (“pleasant experiences and feelings”). Furthermore, for one student, the University becomes her second/third home. The case here is about the acquaintanceship and awareness of the University area, buildings’ location, as well as the time spent at the University:

I would even stick my neck out and say that after three years of attending the University, I could call it my third home, since there were some days when I would spend there plenty of time. When entering the building, I am under the impression that I know every corner, and a lot of University employees, I roughly know where all the buildings are located. Perhaps that’s why I called the University a second home. [K.K.]
Equally important in experiencing organizational culture was perceiving and solving encountered problems related to the University infrastructure—an environment which students were attending—and its employees’ behaviors. Four direct and five indirect references related to the issue at hand appeared. After reading students’ statements, we could be under the impression that emotional sensations related to various aspects of how the organization functions, as well as experiencing its infrastructure were two most important kinds of experiencing the organizational culture. Oftentimes, these two themes join together, creating a certain whole, but here these will be described separately, for better experience explication.

Experiencing external objects and phenomena related to the “University infrastructure and services” simultaneously is associated with evaluating these elements. It would seem that even a purely descriptive narration element related to entering the building and approaching the coatroom had an evaluative character, which was verified in case of this student’s relation at the inquiring stage of the research, as presented below:

*I enter E building. Immediately, I have a dilemma about passing by the coatroom without leaving a coat and make the lecturer upset that I enter the classroom with my coat on, or to stand in an endless queue to coatroom. All right, I decide to leave my coat. It’s my turn now. I say, “Good morning” and hand my coat. I received my coatroom number, but didn’t hear back a reply to my greeting. It’s not the first time this happens, apparently, that lady is too tired. Or, perhaps she has a bad day? Week? Month? Doesn’t matter. [J.G.]*

At the end of the quoted student’s statement, a general reflection being an interpretation/summary appears, which represents a positive assessment of the experiences she had that day at the University:

*Some positive aspects about today? Yes—a good coffee (it’s cool to have a buffet in D building). We can plug in a laptop to a socket—none of the lecturers ever reprimanded us (as a group) that we steal electricity ;) Also, we have an access to the Internet through Wi-Fi, which enables us to find precious data. [J.G.]*

At the inquiring stage, it was determined that the winking emoticon was not used to express irony; instead, it was put upon in a good faith to highlight a positive opinion about the University infrastructure.

Therefore, assessing is one of experiencing the University processes. Hence, we are facing here a specific duality of experiencing the University (it is a unique unit of meaning, which emerges once only at this level): some parts of the University infrastructure are rated positively while other negatively. Thus, the experience does not have a changeless character within the structure of one person’s assessment.

Let us employ the “imaginative variations” method to research on how organizational culture is being experienced. For example, let us imagine a survey questionnaire regarding the organizational culture with a conclusive question, and even a Likert scale, investigating the evaluation of infrastructure. This would be “forcing data,” since the rating process is related to so many various organizational aspects, contexts, as well as periods of time that such forcing generalization would remarkably distort the organizational reality. The evaluations might differ and be ambiguous at times (see the winking emoticon above).
Encountering physical infrastructure of the Faculty plays an important role in students’ experiences. Its size, as well as the need to relocate due to finding the right classroom are explicitly noticed. Still, these impressions are not decisive in evaluating the University by the below-quoted student; her assessment is positive and it is immediately brought to light in the below-cited statement, after a description of a “maze,” as she refers to the Faculty (see Kociatkiewicz & Kostera 2015: 63–64). The horizon elicited from the entire utterance has a positive character as to the assessment of the Faculty, through the prism of which the whole University is being perceived.

Once entering the University the first thought which comes to my mind is: “In which room I have my classes.” After a brief thought, realizing the facts, or checking my notebook, I know where my classes are. It takes me another while to remember where this classroom is and how to get there as quickly as possible. At that moment I get stunned by the size of the Faculty. When I have my classes in D building, I don’t have any problems, since it’s where the majority of my classes are held. However, if I need to get to building A or C, I need to spend a while thinking where I have my classes and how to get there. While passing by the coatroom, I always wonder shall I leave my coat, but since my next classes are in a different part of the building and coatrooms are located pretty far from each other, I abandon the idea. Summing up, for me, the Faculty is like a small maze, however, this doesn’t overwhelm me cause I always get to my destination. My feelings regarding the University are positive for the most part. By attending my classes, I gain knowledge and new skills, which might help me in the future. [D.R.]

The Faculty localization is of crucial importance for this student (it is the second time that the motif at hand has been brought to our attention, the first time being when the student highlighted the positive aspect of the Faculty location in regards to where she lives). Since she resides 60 kilometers from the city, and thus needs to commute every day to attend the classes, she seems pleased with the proximity of bus stops vis-à-vis the Faculty. Therefore, “external” environment, as part of the University infrastructure, is also important as to the impressions regarding the University:

Due to the fact that our Faculty is located in the downtown, I don’t need to worry how I’ll get there or back home. Since I live 60 kilometers from X and commute on daily basis to attend the classes, the Faculty location and the fact that there are a lot of bus or tram lines running near allow me not to worry that I won’t catch a particular bus cause then I can always use an alternative one. [D.R.]

It is a unique unit of meaning (external area and the Faculty location), and an important one for the student who travels 60 kilometers to X. Therefore, her horizon of experiencing the University special localization is set by the distance at hand.

Another student has yet a different dilemma when entering the University building. There is a problem with the coatroom, which is always crowded and she has to stand in the queue, what causes her being late for her classes. Her concern is whether to leave her coat in the coatroom and get late for the classes, or to keep it and be reprimanded by the lecturer. It is an issue related to the University infrastructure faced by this student:

I enter the building of the Faculty, part of the University of X. A dilemma arises. Shall I go to the coatroom and listen to complaints about lack of a coat hanger, or risk irritating the lecturer... I choose the second option, why to mess up with the lady from the coatroom. I calm down. [I.O.]

However, looking through the prism of the whole statement (horizontalisation), we can see that this problem does not result in a negative assessment of the University (by the Faculty prism), which instead is generally positive. The student likes everything which is
encompassed by the University (“I like this degree course, I like this Faculty, and everything which is encompassed by the University of X enables me to progress”).

Very interesting and unique unit of meaning (which appears once only), related to the infrastructure, is about the color of the walls and the internal design of the Faculty buildings. Experiencing the environment through the color of the walls, buildings, and classrooms prism is essential here. The student precisely describes the colors at hand, as well as related experiences. Warm colors cause a good mood, while cold colors cause a bad one. According to her, this impacts upon the quality of class participation.

As to the locale, I definitely prefer buildings E, F, and T rather than D or A. This is caused by the colors of the walls, furniture, the whole design, in general. In buildings E, F, and T warm colors predominate, which makes me feel much better than in other buildings. There, I experience a warm and nice atmosphere, which positively affects my state of being, concentration, and makes me more keen to participate in my classes. In contrast, in buildings D and A, the atmosphere is pretty cold and this is caused by the cold color of the walls; this does not affect my mood in a positive way.

I have noticed that I participate more actively and more alert in classes which are held in buildings with walls painted in warm colors. I have never expected that internal design will have such a massive effect on my state of being and participating in classes. [W.M.]

Rushing and being in a hurry while relocating within the Faculty area might be related to the infrastructure unit (a unique unit of meaning, which appears once only), which can, in turn, lead to a certain way of experiencing the time. Below-quoted student is in a hurry while relocating between classes. This is related to how the infrastructure operates (crowded coatroom in the morning), too short brakes compared to the distance between the classrooms and the size of the Faculty. Furthermore, when the lecturers overrun the classes, it is reducing break time, and thus eventuates in students being in a hurry to get to next classes.

It's 07:55 AM, so there is a lot of students at the University. Everyone rushes to their classrooms. Me, too. In a moment, the classes start. I bypass the coatroom cause I don't want to stand in a long queue to leave my coat. It's a waste of time. [A.Ś.]

Taking a seat in the classroom is also time-consuming. The student would like to have a seat in the last desk. She does that on classes she is interested in, as well as those less interesting, were she struggles and waits for the class to finish. The student acknowledges that she experiences the passage of time differently, depending on whether the classes are boring, or interesting for her. The latter cause a feeling of time passing by quickly (perceived when these are over), while the non-interesting ones cause a feeling of time dragging on (see Flaherty 1987; 1991).

Class begins, not really interesting for me, therefore I already can't wait for it to finish. I'm not in a good mood since the morning. This hour and a half pass really slowly. Unlike the break which is not long enough to do anything at all... Even though I don't have a lot of classes, I feel tired and bored. During the break, I was able to get to a different classroom, to D building. I've quickly entered the room and, again, took a place in the last desk with my mates. This class went much quicker, and in a more entertaining way, than the previous one. Actually, I didn't even notice when this hour and a half passed by. I felt better immediately. While I was still in the classroom, I have quickly put on my coat and left. [A.Ś.]

After having inquired the student what she felt while leaving the building, she said that she felt relieved that this day has finished. However, she was not entirely pleased about her activities beyond the University (work):
After my classes finished, when I was heading to the bus stop, I felt some kind of relief that this day at the University passed rather quickly and I didn’t have any problems during the classes. On the one hand, I was happy, since I had no more classes that day. But, on the other hand, I was a little bit upset cause after my classes I wasn’t going straight home, but I had to go to work. [D.R.]

The student was in a constant hurry to get to work on time. Haste, as a way of managing the time passing by, alongside one’s impression that it passes by slowly seem to be a cluster of two units of relevant meaning (time pressure and a conscious experiencing of passing time), which reflects how the student experiences the organization. Time (rush here) is her main experience while being at the University; it is the horizon which sets her perception of events at the University. Therefore, infrastructural issues (causing delays) were mentioned here. However, her experience is unique among the elicited utterances.

**Organization Participants’ Routine Activities**

Experiencing the organization as a mechanism related to routine activities of its participants might indicate referring to the organizational culture on a basic-level assumptions, since experiences other than those related to daily repetitive acting, which is not subjected to reflection, appear rarely. Probably, the question from the instruction revealed this routine of activities within the organizational lifeworld, which we define here referring to the concept of organizational culture. Apart from anxiety, only routine exists for the below-quoted student:

*Generally speaking, this place builds me up with positive emotions. However, sometimes I feel stress caused by the fact that my future depends on this place. I think this is because I might not meet the expectations of me, and while entering the University, I have this feeling of anxiety from failure and not graduating because of some reason. Apart from that, I feel nothing else cause attending the University became a daily routine for me. The feelings mentioned above manifest rarely, since I don’t really think often about how I feel while being at the University cause I’ve got used to this place. I just simply go there to learn and to pass further stages of my education, as graduating is my main goal.* [A.P.]

Thus, impressions different from the routine emerge seldom, which was highlighted by the student. It is an important indicator that routine is one of the fundamental theme of meaning organizing this student’s life as to experiencing the University organization.

In this case, we can notice that physical structure of the organization, as well as its automatic and routine functioning within the system constitute an important experience of the University organization. Physical artifacts, like a spatial maze of the University, are experienced mainly at the very beginning, right after entering the organization. And sometimes routine actions and a system of reciprocally related elements are experienced:

*Afterwards, this observation comes to my mind, that when entering there, everyone changes to a person who knows what to do, and at the same time, to a person who acts like others, but doesn’t consider that as something weird. I have this very feeling after entering the University that I am one of many elements of the University structure, and I attend it cause I have a goal. I experience also some kind of dependence, as without the students, including me, the University wouldn’t have anyone to operate for.* [A.P.]

Another student feels only “dailiness” when entering the University. It appears that these are routine activities for her, although, within this context, she expresses a positive assessment of the Faculty atmosphere:
I feel nothing special when entering the University. It became dailiness to me. I feel nothing exceptional, it is nothing joyful nor depressing, but a noncompulsory everyday reality. I evaluate the University atmosphere as pleasant and knowledge and skills absorption exhorting. [W.M.]

These experiences, as well as the evaluation which follows are concluded with a positive assessment of the lecturers. The latter pins together the utterance at hand, which begins with experiencing routine and lack of emotions after entering the University, passing to the positive evaluation of the lecturers.

[After inquiring the student whether her positive evaluation was not due to the research context and lecturer-student relation, it turned out that, according to the student, her assessment was neither related to the fact that the research at hand was conducted as part of her classes, nor to the formal context of lecturer-student relation.]

One student’s account is interesting here, as alongside the routine he mentions a feeling of mystical energy and hope. Apparently, such feelings also can arise within the organizational lifeworld, even if juxtaposed with routine. The student experiences routine after entering the University:

I enter the Faculty and what do I feel? Usually, I act routinely, schematically—I feel nothing; practically, no reflection. You act like a machine. I enter the Faculty (usually through E building)—alternatively, the coatroom—I head towards the classroom. [P.P.]

However, sometimes the student reflects upon studying. Furthermore, sometimes, as he points out, he feels mystical energy (unique unit of meaning, which occurs once only), which is hard for him to describe; still, it is provided by the locale at hand.

When entering the Faculty, I SOMETIMES [the purpose of at times writing a word in capital letters is to emphasize the frequency of this experience] feel mystical energy, which is hard for me to describe; I experience that neither at work, nor in places I attend for amusement. I know that the University provides such moments full of magical “grace,” and not always appraises its students fairly. [A.R.]

Thus, the meanings related to energy (the moments of magical grace) appear alongside references to evaluating the students unfairly by the University. Therefore, some meanings, which the student does not separate but juxtapose, appear oftentimes, outlining a paradox of studying: mystical energy versus unfair (implicitly bureaucratic) student appraisal.

Another such denoting bridge is exemplified by collating the energy at hand with a hope that with some help from the lecturers the student will be able to discover and unblock the abilities to be used later in life:

With every successive term/class, I hope that it won’t be an anguish and a torture, but a chance to learn “something” in an easy/pleasant way, which I will be able to use in future life. That it will be some kind of inspiration, that it will be conducted by someone who will expose oneself to our hopes and expectations, or will guide us towards such—someone from whom you can learn something—someone who won’t be afraid of telling, explaining, teaching us, students, useful, important things. This energy consists of such hope, a precious opportunity to increase/unblock the potential of one’s skills, talents, to be used in future life, with the lecturers or other students help. [A.R.]

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1 Answer to the question, second comment: “Words that begin with capital letters were written so to highlight/stress certain word. E.g., that ‘sometimes’ I feel something different when entering the Faculty. Not on daily basis, or every other day, but from time to time. Sometimes it just happens” (A.R.).
What is striking in the structure of this utterance is the very juxtaposition of routine and mystical energy at the same time. These two themes do not seem to be contradictory in the student’s statement; they just emerge at different points in time, that is, the routine usually appears while entering the University, and mystical energy being present only *seldom*. All of these is interspersed with hope for effective education in the future (e.g., during the following term), but also refer to hope for making use of the knowledge acquired at the University in future professional life.

**Social Relations at the University**

For some students, social relations are of crucial importance. 3 out of 13 students mention the issue at hand explicitly.

For one student, the importance of relations with others translates into her relation with one person, that is, her female friend. She cooperates with this friend very well—the student is pleased when she associates with such person, they understand each other wordlessly. In further statements (second interview), she mentions 3 other female friends with whom she likes to gossip, talk about the classes, and discuss required readings. When leaving the Faculty, she gets help from her friend to get to work; of special interest is here the word *survive*:

> After surviving the day at the University, I definitely have too little time to get to work, therefore, I usually accept my colleague’s courtesy, who gives me a ride there. On the way, we talk about the past day at the University, and very frequently we exchange ideas what to do for dinner. [D.R.]

Relations with several male and female friends from the group are important for another student. Some of them are popular and some are not. Those relations are equally vital for reducing stress related to the exam. Entering the exam with her friend has a positive impact on this student. Besides feelings associated with the University, another kind of social relations is mentioned—family relations. The student recalled above is proud of her exam outcome and she shares that with her parents, she also thinks about her grandparents’ satisfaction from her achievements.

Positive emotions (happiness felt), as a unit of relevant meaning, are here associated with social relations (male and female friends, family) and educational achievements. Her horizon of perceiving the organizational world is related to social relations; she experiences the world through the prism of these.

Another student feels joy when seeing her mates. Emotions noticed here are associated with social relations:

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2 Second explicitation consequent to inquiring:

Question: Isn’t a hope for better and more practical future learning a critique of the current teaching condition? Why this hope emerges? What is the basis? Please provide an honest answer... It is important for me to understand this statement.

Answer: “Hope is very important. A student without faith, hope that his studies ‘will be of some use’ looses motivation, by extension, his efficiency and level of commitment decrease, which may eventuate in quitting studies.

Therefore, my hope is based, above all else, on a will of learning something interesting, cool, useful, as well as on curiosity of what I will be able to do, how (after graduating) I will be using acquired knowledge and experience.”
When looking at a group of my mates whom I’m heading to, I feel joy. Studying here gave me the opportunity to make new acquaintances. We enter the classroom, I choose my favorite seat—in the back. The ability to watch everyone and analyze their behaviors calms me down. I like doing that. [I.O.]

What emerges from students’ auto-reports is that they do not maintain informal relations with the lecturers. There are no such relations; only formal relationships exist. Therefore, on the organizational culture level, informal social relations arise only between students, however, they do not intersect the organizational structure levels (lecturer–student).

**Unique Themes of Meaning Not Related to the Foregoing Ones**

Several unique themes, which occur alongside other abovementioned themes of meaning, were described in previous sections of this paper.

Out of 18 themes we have 2 unique units left untold: acquiring knowledge and personality-shaping.

One of the students claims that at the University he acquires knowledge and shapes his personality. Also, he is pleased that the knowledge at hand is received from the finest sources. According to him, it is a privilege to be in touch with those who are more knowledgeable than he is. The student seems really pleased with that: “It’s a beautiful thing” (“beautiful feeling”—explicitation of the second auto-report received from this research participant). Based on the context of the whole utterance, it is apparent that the student feels pride and satisfaction due to studying at the University. It is the horizon of his statement. Still, some sentences referring to a possible improvement of the quality of studying appear. The size of the University physical area brings this student’s special attention. However, his satisfaction appears in his utterance regarding the issue at hand, as well:

_Hundreds of corridors, rooms, doors. Thousands of stairs and windows. At the beginning, I felt like Harry Potter in this enormous space. However, the most important thing is that I have this feeling that this is worth doing. It is worth doing cause the University makes me a better person. Sometimes it is done inefficiently. Not all of the hours spent at [that] street are effective and there is a lot to improve; however, even if I won’t find my dream job after graduating, I won’t regret the decision of undertaking studies. I acquire knowledge from the finest sources._ [P.P.]

It is clear that the horizon of this utterance concerns the future, as well—even if the student will not get his dream job, he will not regret his decision of undertaking studies. In a sense, his satisfaction thus embraces the future. Not entirely positive phenomena from _modo futuri exacti_ (getting a job in the future) do not impact upon assessments of studying enunciated from one’s position here and now. The evaluation at hand is positive.

**Discussion**

The research has shown that not all of the organizational culture elements assumed by the researchers are actually experienced by those who partake in the organization. The examination of assumptions, values, and organizational norms, as well as symbols is most often pre-conceptualized by the researchers, and thus these elements are being studied, for
the most part, through the corresponding structure of research tools or methods applied (Danziger, Rachman-Moore, & Valency 2008; Schein 2010). Still, the elements which evidence of an organization countenance are precisely those that are experienced directly by the participants, for example, the University infrastructure, routine, and physical environment. Encountering these organizational elements, the participants may experience them directly while feeling certain emotions. The emotional layer of experiences appears to be an extremely important element of the organization everyday life (Fineman 2000; Chatman & O’Reilly 2016). The emphasis placed on investigating how emotions are being manipulated and dealt with in organizations (Fineman 2000: 73–74) often overlooks how these are being experienced individually and spontaneously due to partaking in organizations. Furthermore, measuring emotions is yet another factor causing its differentiation and analyzing these on varying levels (Ashkanasy 2003). Including in the research the interpretations and symbolization (Hatch 1993) also does not touch the experiencing the organization. The *a priori* models of organizational identity and its relation to the culture also does not relate to the real experiencing of the organization (see concepts of Hatch and Schultz 2002). The same relates to the quantitative research of national dimensions of culture that would supposedly influence the organizational culture (Hofstede 2001; Hofstede & Hofstede 2005; Trompenaars, Turner 1993). Sometimes we see the arguments about the correlations between the dimensions that are proofs of necessity to use some dimensions and some not (Trompenaars, Turner 1997: 249–252). We do not know if the content of dimensions appeared factually in experiences of participants in the research. Statistics is distancing researcher from the individual lived experience what is difficult to accept in phenomenological approach. To see something behind “statistical curtain” we need phenomenological reduction.

Surprisingly, the same problems as in the quantitative research concern the grounded theory research of organization. There are abstract categories created basing on the different kind of data that do not relate often to the experiences of the participants (Martin & Turner 1986; Kenealy 2008; Pearse & Kanyangale 2009) and we do not see them how they are grounded in the unit of experience of participant and in the context of experiencing. Even if the paradigmatic base, researcher’s value position, and the researcher epistemological and ontological assumptions are referenced (ibidem) the goal of the investigators is to escape from representing the experiences of members of organization, because abstraction and distancing is the fetish for grounded theorists. The fetish is often connected with forcing *data* (sometimes descriptions of experiences) to adjust them to preconceived categories (Kelle 2005).

In our study, experiencing several elements as a whole is noticeable (e.g., infrastructure and emotions; maze-infrastructure and experiencing the value of studying, as well as having satisfaction from so doing); thus, distincing variables and categories at the beginning of the research and operating with these separately in statistical or casual relations and even in qualitative research eventuate in the loss of valuable data about organization culture as experienced by individuals. Reconstructing the themes of experiences give more reliable and direct access what is organization culture. After the analysis we could define, in our case, that it is the emotionally bounded infrastructure and administrative services of University with routine activities and social relations. This is the culture emerging from the
experiences of the territory of the University and people inhabiting it plus physical objects that are associated with it.

We tried to confront often assumed before the research a priori concept of organizational culture with experiencing the University without any concept. Student were trained to have access to their direct experience of the University and to do description of this. They were trained to bracket also their assumptions. So the knowing the concept by them did not affect the collected data. There were no abstract terms in describing of the University. They described their experiences of being in the space of the University, their feelings, thoughts that come to their mind, emotions and rarely the body sensations. It was illuminating for the students when they have seen finally the difference between the formal and a priori definition of organizational culture and their themes that appeared on the base of the descriptions of the experiences.

What was striking here was a lack of explicit references to the body whatsoever. The body, as it were, underpinned one’s self, guided the individual through the University maze, facilitated perceiving here and now, relocating and perceiving all over again, seeing the color of the walls, experiencing emotions. However, in itself, it was not the subject of one’s perception. Perhaps we are dealing here with the absent body phenomenon (Leder, 1990: 1). Therefore, we are facing a paradox here: the body is absent in one’s being here and now, even though it is essential to this very being.3

Summarizing the conclusions we could reflect that benefits of the research are following:

• University authorities can see the system of relevancies of the students in their experiences. They could see that the infrastructure, social relations are of the most important feature of these experiences and moreover the factual organizational culture is connected with the arranging the space of the organization, infrastructure and services. The values and norms, symbols, ideologies or missions of the institution are rather not perceived or experienced but emotions and routines becomes significant part of experiencing the organization. More visible and perceived are mundane features of organization and authorities should give more attention to these traits of organizational culture if they want to mold it.

• Students could see how the description of experiencing of organization could reveal the features of the organizational culture that could not be predicted from theoretical analysis and abstract elaboration of institutional reality. The qualitative research and explication of the data are close to the real and factual experiencing of the organization than it could be achieved in quantitative research or deductive approach. They could feel the factuality of experience since the beginning of the research till the end of explicitation. The students’ knowledge about organization becomes embodied. The perception is a part of the whole situation where they are immersed (Merleau-Ponty 2005: 4).

3 “When I gaze at a landscape I dwell most fully in my eyes. Yet this is only possible because... my neck muscles adjust my head into the proper position for viewing. My feet, my legs, my arms, all lend their support. My other perceptual senses flesh out the scene I witness with sound and warmth, even if my attention is centered on visual characteristics. My whole body provides the background that supports and enables the point of corporeal focus” (Leder 1990: 24).
Concerning the academic discourse we put some more arguments for research of organization without preconceptualization using the methods that try to avoid a priori concepts. The methodology of grounded theory also tries to avoid the a priori concepts. However it creates concepts that evolve far from the real experiences of the organizational reality by participants. Even, if we use the sensitizing concepts (Blumer 1969), they are far from content of experiences because they are used in the causal schemes of thinking and explanation. The concepts are tools for explaining and/or understanding the organization in grounded theory (Martin & Turner 1986; Kenealy 2008), not themes that are the effects of descriptions of direct experiencing of institutional life.

We could see that even in the case of having such concepts (as in our case was organizational culture) we could use some phenomenological methods (epoche) to neutralize them in the description of the phenomena and in the explicitation of them. So we have tried to develop further the phenomenological style of research in organizational studies and to give the rationale for such research.

References


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Patterns of Preference for Dispute Resolution in Poland

Abstract: This paper presents information from a nationally representative Polish survey in 2014 on the types of dispute resolution preferred by the respondents. It places the findings in the conceptual background of studies conducted since the mid-1970s in Polish sociology of law on the subject of disputes and the use of the courts. The purpose of the analysis was to identify the more general types of dispute settlement preferred in the popular legal culture in Poland, and the socio-demographic variables that correlate significantly with these preferences. The significance of social position, as measured by a version of the Center-Periphery index, has also been confirmed.

Keywords: dispute, court, compromise.

A careful analytical study of research conducted at the request of the Nuffield Foundation listed more than 20 countries where empirical research has been done on the public’s use of the courts (Pleasance, Balmer, Sandefur 2013). Poland is missing from the list. Since the 1990s, international interest in this area has been growing. A few important instances should be mentioned. Socio-legal research into the incidence of justiciable events, that is, problems that can be resolved with the help of courts and lawyers, and the paths to these civil-justice resolutions, was first developed in the United Kingdom through the early work of Hazel Genn, *Paths to Justice* (Genn 1999). Such research remains a standard element in the British Ministry of Justice’s empirical evaluations of the justice system (cf. LPRS 2017). In Japan, in-depth research on the use of lawyers to resolve problems has remained in the hands of sociologists of law (Murayama 2011). In the United States, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira’s (2009) deep statistical inquiry into popular legitimation of the Supreme Court has also become a point of reference for studying the court system.

In Poland in the 1960s, a complex research project on lay assessors threw light on the functioning of the justice system. It was modeled after the US Jury Project, and was directed by Sylwester Zawadzki and Leszek Kubicki (1970). They collaborated with—among other people—two eminent Polish sociologists of law: Maria Borucka-Arctowa, whose team studied the public perception of courts; and Adam Pogórecki, who focused on general attitudes towards the law (Ziegert 2013). Interest in the settlement of civil disputes began when Jacek Kurczewski and Kazimierz Frieske prepared a study on the Social Conciliatory Commisions, which were a voluntary informal alternative to courts in the case of petty disputes between neighbors. The study was published as part of the Florence
Access-to-Justice Project headed by Mauro Cappelletti (Kurczewski and Frieske 1977). In the 1970s Jacek Kurczewski (1982; 1993) directed local surveys on the experience of disputes and on dispute settlement patterns, while Małgorzata Fuszara (1989) investigated disputes brought before local courts in the form of private criminal prosecutions (these are allowed by Polish law in cases of a breach of physical or moral integrity such as insult, slander, or minor physical injury). This is the only example of long-term research that makes it possible to compare the use and perception of the courts or other options during the communist period with attitudes to dispute settlement in the post-1989 period of democracy and a market economy. Though the historical comparison has already been made elsewhere (Kurczewski & Orzechowski 2016, Kurczewski & Fuszara 2017), the historical context of the above research must be borne in mind in order to explain the specific choice of variables and concepts in the research discussed here. The Polish school of sociology of law as developed by Podgórecki (cf. Motyka 1993) was based upon the empirical theory of law proposed at the beginning of the twentieth century by Leon Petrażycki, who was a professor first at St. Petersburg Imperial University and later, after 1920, at the University of Warsaw (Podgórecki 1980).

Theoretical Premises

The current paper deals with an aspect of dispute settlement patterns conceptualized earlier on the basis of the Petrażycki/Podgórecki empirical theory of law. Petrażycki described law as embedded in (social) consciousness, arguing that the empirical reference point for law lies in the inner emotions experienced by people—lawyers or not—where the sense of obligation x which A has to perform towards B is associated with the sense of a right that B may claim x to be performed by A. This is the basic juridical relationship (nexus iuris) already established in Roman jurisprudence and recognised in all normative cultures. This two-way connection (obligatio–attributio) defines the legal phenomena that may be subjected to empirical investigation. When Petrażycki was writing, standard sociological public-opinion research methods had not been developed, but empirical psychology, dominated by an introspectivist methodology, was beginning to emerge. Petrażycki, among others, proposed the introspective-experimental method of systematic and controlled arousal of emotion by presenting and imagining various external stimuli. His emblematic example of emotion was appetite (to be differentiated from physiological hunger); he proposed imagining (or even better experiencing) a live spider in one’s soup to check for appetite. By analogy, he suggested a researcher could imagine a heinous crime like matricide in order to check what law-related emotion might be stimulated. Petrażycki’s theory was not limited to law. Looking at “moral emotions,” he proposed that they involved a sense of duty without a correlative right, and thus he interpreted the Christian rule not to reciprocate a wrong as a purely moral duty, there being no associated right to harm the victim or the perpetrator. Moral consciousness differs in his theory from legal consciousness as the emotions of duty and obligation differ in the two cases. Emotions, in his theory, are active; they activate human behavior following a basic “repulsion-attraction” equation (Petrażycki’s concept referring to the basic negative/positive motivation). Normative emotions exceed the scope of
ethical (legal and moral) ones as they also include esthetic emotions, where attraction and repulsion are often difficult to explain, but “beauty”—however defined or undefined—remains the criterion.

As for the social function of law, Petrażycki’s main point is that, except in crisis situations, everyday social interaction goes smoothly due to basic agreement on the fundamental normative “rules,” that is, we share similar normative emotions. Only in pathological cases does the need arise to turn to an external body such as the court to provide a normative decision. There is official law and unofficial law, intuitive law and positive law, and followers of Petrażycki are still in dispute about how to interpret these categories (Kurczewski). Strictly, if a person accepts the verdict of a court, the person adheres to official positive law (state court verdict), but if a person feels he or she has a right that was not recognized by the court and appeals the verdict, the action is motivated by an intuitive legal emotion. If the case is submitted to arbitration by friends, the result is an unofficial legal decision unless legitimized by the state. The novelty of Petrażycki’s position was that—in the 1900s—he allowed for a plurality of legal, official, and unofficial fora to be discovered under a unifying over-all concept of law, liberated from the legal monopoly of the state.

As Petrażycki observed as early as 1906, apart from the procedural and internal arrangement of the institutions of power, the

[...] actual base of the proper social ‘legal order’ and real driver of socio-legal life in this respect in this area is in essence not positive law but intuitive law. Only in exceptional, pathological cases of conflicts, or abuses, is the application of positive law needed (Petrażycki 1960: 260).

Along these lines, Kurczewski concluded in his study of disputes that

conflicts rarely move into the official sphere, and within this sphere rarely enter the courts. If the frequency of disputes expressed at the official forum is the tip of the iceberg for conflicts of various types in which an individual is involved, then the disputes already publicized at the official forum form an iceberg tipped by the dispute in a court as the pathologization of conflict at the second level (Kurczewski 1982: 95).

**Methodology**

The focus of our research is the normative consciousness of Polish society, that is, its declared preference for various forms of dispute settlement. We are therefore analysing here not actual but ideal patterns of behavior. The actual patterns were covered in another part of the project, which has already been published (cf. Fuszara’s chapters in Kurczewski and Fuszara 2017). We believe that our interest in the continuity, change, and diversity of such normative patterns is justified for two reasons: because the study of legal awareness is of intrinsic academic value—not limited to the frame of Petrażycki and Podgórecki’s empirical theory of law—and because we adhere to the widespread view that normative emotions (in Petrażycki’s sense) have direct influence as factors that may explain the actual conduct of people. A strict analysis of that causal relationship would, however, need a large panel survey, which was beyond our means. In this limited exploratory study we can only study people’s declared intent to use a particular form of dispute settlement; we can not relate the intention to subsequent actual behavior.
Nevertheless, by studying the respondents’ declared preference for different forms of dispute settlement we were able to evaluate the role played by the government administration of justice in the landscape of disputes and options for dispute settlement. On the imaginary line that starts with passive resignation and exit from conflict (Felstiner 1975), and ends with a government court, there are many other options. They have different names but are basically composed of two-party or third-party arrangements, that is, direct negotiations, or respectively, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. The actual content of this intermediary zone is complex as it may involve unofficial court-like institutions, officials acting informally as mediators, and family members, friends, or colleagues who act in the interest of the parties but at the same time may aim to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict. A proper ethnography of disputes and dispute settlement would include the identification of all such significant persons and linkages. Again, this is not the aim of the present study, which examines general preferences for dispute resolution and not concrete cases.

Using the CAPI method, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a random sample of 1,065 people living in Poland by CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center]. The questionnaire included closed and open-ended questions on general patterns of dispute settlement, as well as on ways out of a conflict, on the basis of several specific examples of types of conflict between an individual and other private persons, or between an individual and public bodies such as the local government, police, or health service.

**Social Position as a Strategic Variable**

An alternative sociological theory of disputes looks at the social status of parties to a conflict. Our pre-1989 study, which looks at divergence in status between parties at the individual level (Kurczewski 1982), might be re-stated in more general terms with reference to Donald Black’s theory of law (1976). In Black’s terms the use of official agencies of dispute management, especially the courts, is equivalent to increasing the amount of law in interpersonal or inter-group relations. Status divergence is important, as the “top-dogs” will be more likely to use official law against the “underdogs” than vice versa. It might also be expected that there is less “law” between equals than between people of different status (Black uses a narrow definition of law as conveying the threat of coercion, in contrast to the conciliatory style of social control). The earlier observation that court use is more prevalent among those with higher levels of education (Kurczewski 1983; Kurczewski and Fuszara 2004), which was confirmed in the English study (Genn 1999), could be subsumed under this statement, as could the greater propensity of corporations to sue individuals in the courts than to be sued by them.

The 2014 survey does not, however, include data on both parties, only on the one who happened to be interviewed. Under the circumstances we need to adjust our interpretive scheme by limiting the analysis of the relations of the social “power” of a party vis-a-vis a third actor as yet unmentioned, that is, the state and its justice system. The relative “power” of the social position of an individual is measured by comparing his or her power with that of the state and its actors. The distance between a judge and any citizen is assumed in a democracy, but structural theories of society assume a difference according to individual
social position: the socially unequal are at different distances from the societal center of power where the courts are located. According to these theories, the smaller the distance the greater the trust in state services, such as the administration of justice.

Social position in our study was measured using a version of the holistic Center-Periphery index developed by Johan Galtung (Wiberg et al. 2009). This index assumes that there are various planes of social differentiation at both the individual and collective level, and in defining social position we must take this variation into account. Following our earlier experience with CPI we arbitrarily allotted the value of 1 to the following socially privileged positions—male gender as opposed to female; university-level education vs. lower; being of middle age (35 to 50 years) vs. being young (up to 34 years) or old (above 50 years); being permanently or temporarily employed vs. being unemployed, pensioned, etc.; evaluating one’s own and one’s family’s living conditions as being above the local average vs. evaluating it as average or below average; living permanently in a city of at least 20,000 inhabitants vs. a village or small town. The idea behind the index is that the higher the score the closer a person is to the social Center, and the lower the score the further out a person is on the social Periphery. The coding (with 0 for the underprivileged—the “underdog” position, in Galtung’s term) led to the following distribution of scores on the index in the 2014 data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further analysis using the Social Position Index was made using the four-score quartile index with Quartile I = 0–1; Q2 = 2; Q3 = 3 and Q4 = 4–6, with the original scores bringing it closer to the normality of distribution.

**Between Authoritative Settlement and Friendly Mediation**

Historically, this issue is of primary importance. The crucial question in our study concerned the choice between, on the one hand, an official institution (e.g., a court) that has the power to impose a settlement, and on the other, an informal mediation of the dispute. This was followed by a series of general questions on law and justice, including two structurally similar questions asking the respondents to choose between a settlement fully satisfying the claims of one of the disputants at the expense of the opponent versus a mutually agreed compromise, and to choose between a settlement strictly in line with the law versus a flexible compromise. These questions were previously posed in 1974 in a survey of a representative nationwide sample (Kurczewski & Frieske 1978), using a methodology similar to that applied in 2014. The findings after the passage of 40 years show that the largest change consists in an increase in popularity of the authoritative official settlement (courts and similar institutions) and a decrease in popularity of informal settlements.

Apparently, the shift from a totalitarian regime (in which the independence of the judiciary was reduced to the individual conscience of a judge) to the democratic rule of law...
Table 1

Patterns of Dispute Settlement in National Public Opinion Polls in 1974 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns of dispute settlement</th>
<th>1974 (n = 974)</th>
<th>2014 (n = 1031)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is better</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Full satisfaction of claims made by one party</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mutual agreement</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is better</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Strictly according to law</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mutual compromise</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is better</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Official settlement, e.g., by a court</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Informal mediation</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in which the judiciary is constitutionally an independent branch of power) resulted in an increase in willingness to rely on the courts rather than to resort to informal ways of dealing with violations of legally protected rights. It might therefore be argued that amicable resolutions, based on the concept of restorative justice, are particularly popular not only when some of the roles of the state are taken over by various organizations as part of the state’s reconfiguration (Banaszak, Beckwith and Rucht 2003), but also when the state and its legal system are not particularly trusted by the citizens.

It is important to note, following Braithwaite’s argument (2003), that a belief in restorative justice can also produce rather dangerous outcomes. For example, it can empower a community to such an extent that its members feel authorized to employ drastic solutions going far beyond the law, such as corporal punishment or even lynching. In the scripts we presented to the respondents, “self-help”—including the use of physical force—was often described as justified in response to the prior conduct of one of the parties to a conflict. It is not the community that has this feeling of being excessively empowered, just the individual perpetrators. However, there is acceptance of such conduct, which means that the fears expressed by Braithwaite might actually materialize.

On the other end of the spectrum, there is the concept of legal empowerment, which posits that a reliance on law and legal procedures may be used to improve the situation of those who are underprivileged or marginalized. In this case, law is used as an instrument for pursuing their interests and improving their position: “Legal empowerment occurs when poor or marginalised people use the law, legal systems and justice mechanisms to improve or transform their social, political or economic situations” (Pilar and O’Neil 2014: 4).

While self-help and mediation reflect a departure from strictly legal procedures, legal empowerment and legal mobilization favor the opposite approach. Studies conducted in this framework focus on demonstrating “how and why law and legal entitlements are employed, often strategically, by and on behalf of marginalised groups and minorities, as well as by various kind of actors who seek to influence social change on their behalf” (Anagnostou 2014: 205). These two concepts match the two sets of attitudes towards law as an instrument of conflict resolution that we take into account in our research. The first consists in reliance on the law to pursue one’s interests; the other entails reliance on other instruments, such as amicable methods of conflict resolution, mediation, or ultimately self-help. Thus we begin with a statistical (regression) analysis of the relationship between socio-demographic and social-position variables and the binary variable of choice between
Table 2

Multiple Logistic Regression on the Question: In Your Opinion, Which is Better:
(0—settlement imposed by an official institution that has authority, like a court;
1—settlement mediated by third parties which can only advise)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-demographic variables:</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender—male (0/1)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age—older than 50 yrs (0/1)</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education—post-secondary and more (0/1)</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial status—good or very good (0/1)</td>
<td><strong>0.56</strong></td>
<td><strong>.001</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status—permanent, part-time, or sporadic employment (0/1)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of locality of residence—above 20,000 (0/1)</td>
<td><strong>0.76</strong></td>
<td><strong>.049</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wald’s $\chi^2(6) = 23.52, p = 0.001***$, Nagelkerke’s $R^2 = 0.03$, Hosmer & Lemeshow’s Test $p = 0.073$.

Significance level: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

declaring a preference for official dispute settlement or informal, third-party dispute settlement.

As for the socio-demographic variables, the correlation of preference for the authoritative settlement (such as through the courts) with better than average self-assessment of a person’s living standard, and living in a city, suggested a further verification of the above-described aggregate index of social position. We present the results of the model including only the Social Position Index in order to avoid over-estimating the role of the individual component variables.

Table 3

Social Position as Independent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social position as independent variable in bi-variate regression:</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Position Index—Me and higher (0/1)</td>
<td><strong>0.78</strong></td>
<td><strong>.000</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wald’s $\chi^2(1) = 13.57, p = 0.000***$, Nagelkerke’s $R^2 = 0.02$, Hosmer & Lemeshow’s Test $p = 0.484$

Significance level: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

We must note, however, that the strength of the bi-variate logistic regression on such an index and the choice of ideal settlement procedure are drastically weak as measured by Nagelkerke’s $R^2 = 0.02$ and lower even than the already low ($R^2 = 0.03$) in a model including several individual socio-demographic variables, as in Table 2.

Between the Courts and Informal Settlement in Everyday Conflicts

In the questionnaire we included eight vignettes or scripts that could be considered controversial, even if legally the situations described are quite clear. Observation of social practice and analysis of court files suggest that on many occasions the parties to such conflicts refrain from using legal or other formal steps, resorting instead to “self-help” measures or simply choosing not to act on their claims. Previous research suggests that some persons
declare they would never go to court at all, or they would never go to court against some
categories of persons, for instance, family members (Fuszara 1988). We compiled several
short, potentially controversial vignettes ("scripts") and asked the respondents what they
believed the victims in them should do. The respondents had to choose between the follow-
ing reactions: "(a) don't react, do nothing; (b) reach agreement and compromise; (c) use
self-help to achieve in private what one considers due; (d) go to court; (e) go to another
public body" (such as the police, the local administration, etc.).

The first three scripts concerned conflict between non-related individuals; the subse-
quent three were conflicts between an institution and an individual; and the last two were
between spouses:
1. An adult administered corporal punishment to his neighbor’s children because they
were generating a lot of noise under his windows. The most frequent reaction chosen
was to reach agreement and compromise with the neighbor (59.1%).
2. A person responded to defamation (in the form of being gossiped about) by slapping
the person who was spreading the gossip. The most frequent reaction chosen was to
reach agreement and compromise with the opponent (67.7%).
3. The next script of a conflict between two individuals involves a lender and a borrower.
When the loan was not repaid on time, the lender took an item that belonged to the
borrower, and that was equal in value to the amount of the loan. Here as well, the
most frequent reaction chosen was to reach agreement and compromise with the oppo-
nent (64.9%).
4. An employer asks a hospital to reveal information about a patient’s health status. This
information, once revealed, is used against the patient. In this case, the most frequent
reaction chosen was to go to court (50.7%).
5. The next script concerns an abuse of power by the police on intervening during a brawl.
The police officers used their batons, which hit not only the brawlers but also innocent
bystanders. In this case also the court option was most often chosen (47.0%).
6. The last script that involves an individual and an institution considers an order to de-
molish a house. The reason for the order is that the local area development plan (the
masterplan) has changed. Here also, the court was most often chosen (51.4%).
7. This script concerns financial conflict within a marriage. The wife has inherited a sum
of money (10,000 Euros) and has deposited it in her own private account rather than in
the joint account which she has with her husband. The most frequent reaction chosen
was to reach an agreement and compromise with the wife (71.5%).
8. In the last script, a jealous husband beats up his wife. This is, of course, a crime, and
one liable to be prosecuted by the public prosecutor. However, practice demonstrates
that in such circumstances cases of violence are only rarely reported. Testimony con-

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1 Legally, there is no doubt that the parents can go to court in defence of their children. However, people
in Poland are generally quite accepting of corporal punishment of children, and the children did misbehave by
playing noisily.

2 In terms of the law, she was fully within her rights to do so: funds that are inherited form a part of the heir’s
private property and are not automatically included in the community property. Therefore, the husband would
stand no chance in court if he argued that the money was part of the community property. Nonetheless, in the
popular perception spouses who have agreed to the community property regime should share all the money each
of them comes into, regardless of the laws, which is why we proposed this script.
cerning domestic violence appears in courts not only in cases of abuse or assault but also in divorce cases. This is why we asked the respondents who suggested going to court in this instance whether they would suggest a criminal court (to punish the perpetrator) or a divorce case (with no crime report filed). The most frequent reaction was to compromise and reach an agreement with the husband (55.4%).

The distribution of answers in the above eight cases shows that they can be conveniently divided into three types:

a) Those where the majority of respondents support mutual negotiation as the best possible option, while an important minority (from one fourth up to one third) opt, already at this phase, for moving the conflict into the public forum, whether a court or another public office—away from the police to local counselors or the head of the local government. This includes all private disputes involving physical violence (case scripts nos. 1 and 8).

b) Those where the majority select a third-party public forum and only a minority opt for the choice of informal direct negotiations with the opposing party. This includes all three cases of conflict with a corporate actor such as a hospital, the police, or local government (case scripts nos. 4, 5, and 6). For convenience we call these the “public disputes.”

c) Those where informal direct negotiations are selected as the dominant preferred solution and the dispute is kept, by an overwhelming majority, out of the public forum. This includes all private disputes from the set presented in the survey that do not involve physical violence except in its symbolic dimension (case scripts nos. 2, 3, and 7).

All this leads to the question of the socio-demographic characteristics of people who prefer particular types of reaction: Are those reactions correlated with experience of the courts and is the choice of reaction in particular types of conflict correlated with general attitudes toward dispute settlement? Regressions were made for each of the reactions advocated in each of the 8 case scripts (see Appendix A) and later the overall additive indices of frequency for each type of reaction (compromise, court, all official authoritative solutions) or non-reaction (that is, withdrawal, and private pursuit) were coded for all the cases of “private” disputes—that is, the five cases of disputes with other individuals, from within or outside the family (case scripts nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8) and the three “public” disputes, that is, with corporate bodies such as a hospital, the police, or the municipal administration (case scripts nos. 4, 5, and 6). The latter results are presented in Table 4 below.

As for significant relationships between the socio-demographic variables and aggregate indices of preference for this or another type of reaction to a dispute situation, the following observations can be made.

The preference for compromise in private disputes with people from outside the family is significantly related with being female, in average or lower living conditions, and living in the cities. The preference for compromise in public disputes (with the police, the municipal administration, or a hospital administration) is significantly related with being older, currently unemployed, and living in the countryside.

The preference for use of the courts in private disputes is significantly related with younger age, living conditions that are assessed as being above average, and living in the
Table 4
Multi-variable Linear Regression Models for Aggregate Indices of Types of Reaction Advocated in Hypothetical Public and Private Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispute settlement Predictors</th>
<th>No. of times compromise chosen (in private disputes 0–5;n public disputes 0–3)</th>
<th>No. of times court chosen (in private disputes 0–5;n public disputes 0–3)</th>
<th>No. of times any official option chosen (in private disputes 0–5;n public disputes 0–3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private disputes</td>
<td>Public disputes</td>
<td>Private disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender—Male (0/1)</td>
<td>−0.082</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age—older than 50 yrs (0/1)</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education—post-secondary (0/1)</td>
<td>−0.056</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>−0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living conditions—better than average (0/1)</td>
<td>−0.068</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
<td>−0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment—permanent or sporadic (0/1)</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>−0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence—above 20,000 (0/1)</td>
<td>−0.137</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>−0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model fitness</td>
<td>F(6;1000) = 14.02, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.07</td>
<td>F(6;1000) = 12.93, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.07</td>
<td>F(6;1000) = 12.49, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Dispute settlement Predictors | No. of times private pursuit chosen (in private disputes 0–5/in public disputes 0–3) | No. of times withdrawal chosen (in private disputes 0–5/in public disputes 0–3)
--- | --- | ---
**Socio-demographic variables:**
Constant | Beta: 0.000 | Beta: 0.077 |
Gender—Male (0/1) | Beta: 0.081 | Beta: -0.006 |
Age—elder than 50 yrs (0/1) | Beta: -0.130 | Beta: 0.123 |
Education—post-secondary (0/1) | Beta: -0.038 | Beta: 0.000 |
Living conditions—better than average (0/1) | Beta: 0.008 | Beta: 0.013 |
Employment—permanent or sporadic (0/1) | Beta: -0.064 | Beta: -0.050 |
Residence—above 20,000 (0/1) | Beta: 0.011 | Beta: 0.005 |

Model fitness:
- F(6;1000) = 3.92, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.02
- F(6;1000) = 0.71, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.002
- F(6;1000) = 4.07, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.02
- F(6;1000) = 4.25, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.02

Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
cities. In the case of public disputes the pattern is repeated except that living conditions give place to being currently employed in whatever way (permanently or temporarily).

When referral to all official bodies, including the courts, is taken into account, the pattern changes slightly in comparison to preference for the courts considered in isolation. Again, the younger urban group is significantly more prone to advocate the use of authoritative dispute-settlement bodies in both types of disputes—private and public—but this applies also to the better educated and those living in better than average conditions in regard to private disputes, and to employed persons in regard to public disputes.

Withdrawal was significantly related with being older and female, while men and younger people were more likely to prefer the ambiguous category of “self-help” or “private dealing with the matter on one’s own,” which could involve the arbitrary action of taking compensation for a loan as described in case script no. 3, or slapping someone’s face as in case script no. 2, or any type of revenge or compensatory action without official legitimacy. These findings made us look again at the aggregate Social Position Index as the predictor of dispute settlement patterns.

Contrary to our expectations, withdrawal as a reaction to a conflict situation was not significantly related to social position. The same lack of effect was disclosed on checking the relationship between private pursuit and social position.

Evidently, higher social position in general (the aggregate index discussed above) predicts a preference for the courts and other authoritative dispute settlement agencies, and a preference against informal dispute settlement by third parties.

**Judicial Experience**

Two subsets of data were created: one of individuals who declared personal experience of at least one civil case in their life—\(n = 313\); and the other composed of those who declared that they had at least once experienced criminal proceedings (\(n = 172\)). This is important as only minorities in the sample had actual court experience and the effect should be established within these sub-sets. In both sub-sets multivariate regression analysis was performed with patterns of dispute settlement as the dependent variable and socio-demographic variables as independent variables / predictors. Those people who considered that the court verdict in a case in which they were involved was just or at least partially just were coded against those who viewed the verdict as unjust or were unable to assess the court’s judgment. Such a variable was then added and removed from the regression models. For all the possible comparisons only once did assessing the court verdict to be just have a significant effect—the justness of the civil verdict allows us to predict a preference to withdraw from the dispute (beta = -.115, \(p < .05\)), together with age (beta = .148, \(p < .05\)), and the model including the justness of the civil verdict was a slightly better fit (corrected \(R^2 = .048\)) than the model that did not include the justness of the civil verdict (corrected \(R^2 = .031\)). We conclude therefore, within the scope of our data, that assessment of judicial decision-making as experienced personally is not associated with a preference for choosing the courts or an alternative dispute settlement procedure. Other factors seem to matter more.
Table 5

Multiple Regression Analysis of the Aggregate Indices of Preference for Compromise or the Courts and All Other Official Dispute Settlements, with Social Position as Predictor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Court in private disputes (0—none, 5—in all cases)</th>
<th>Court in public disputes (0—none, 3—in all cases)</th>
<th>Compromise in private disputes (0—none, 5—in all cases)</th>
<th>Compromise in public disputes (0—none, 3—in all cases)</th>
<th>All official in private disputes (0—none, 5—in all cases)</th>
<th>All official in public disputes (0—none, 3—in all cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>−0.22</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Position Index—high (0/6)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model fitness</td>
<td>F(1;971) = 26.03, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.025</td>
<td>F(1;971) = 44.54, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.043</td>
<td>F(1;971) = 47.09, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.045</td>
<td>F(1;971) = 32.90, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.032</td>
<td>F(1;971) = 91.81, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.085</td>
<td>F(1;971) = 63.38, p = 0.000***, R² = 0.060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Summary

In 2014 a nationally representative sample of 1,061 Polish people were asked two types of questions concerning their preference for different types of dispute settlement procedure. First, we asked about the ideal general pattern—pressing respondents to choose between settlement by an authoritative official body like a court and settlement by the mediation of other people. Second, we asked the respondents to choose between dispute settlement by a court or other authoritative body or informal direct compromise with the opponent in 8 hypothetical dispute scripts, ranging from intra-family conflict through private conflicts with friends and neighbors to conflicts with public bodies like the police or the municipality. Regression analysis disclosed a positive though very weak influence (if a causal link is assumed) of personal court experience on an individual’s decision to choose the courts as the ideal institutional agency for dispute settlement. Two other significant independent non-attitudinal predictors are (lower) age and individuals’ (better) self-assessment of their own or their household’s living conditions relative to the average in the locality of residence.

As for choosing the best ways out of the conflict situation in the hypothetical disputes, if we begin with the socio-demographic variables the findings are clear and consistent. Independent of the type of dispute—with a private or public opponent—members of the younger age group are more likely to choose the courts or another public referral body as the way out of a conflict situation, while members of the older age group are more likely to choose directly negotiated compromise with the opponent (entailing personal contact). The role of social habitat is also significant: those living in a city prefer public agency and reject personal compromise (regardless of the type of dispute), and choose the courts in public disputes. In the context of the fundamental controversy within the sociology of law about the role of institutional factors and attitudes or cultural factors, our findings speak in favor of the former, as regression analysis pointed to the predictive insufficiency of the variables related to attitudes. It seems that at least within the scope of the variables used in our study attitudes matter but not enough to provide a safe basis for predicting preferred legal practices. The clearest general conclusion is that informality and compromise have retained their popularity in Polish legal culture despite a marked increase, during consolidation of the democratic state, in preference for the court settlement of disputes. Though the preference for compromise with an opponent is more popular among the elderly, people living in the countryside, and the unemployed (pensioners, retired persons, etc.) or generally, people on the social periphery, there is also the distinctive cultural factor of religiosity (Kurczewski and Fuszara 2017: 121–125, 127–128), which partially reinforces the trend to settle disputes amicably.

One of the recurrent motifs in the statistical analysis of the parameters of choice between authoritative methods of dispute settlement and unofficial (informal) ones is the social position of the respondents. Whenever the index of social position is in a statistically significant relationship with socio-legal variables then the higher the position the more likely that the court or authoritative settlement will be chosen as proper in a dispute. This is not independent of the type of dispute involved, but if there is a difference then the better-off respondents are more likely to choose the court and not the unofficial alternative. This is a crucial point for understanding the relationship between the “official legal culture” and
the “unofficial one.” The world of power is simply the world close to those who have power even if in life there are shades of power and of influence.

There seems to be a social-structure filter on the way from a dispute to the court. We should report here that Petrażycki’s image of judicialized disputes as the tip of the iceberg of everyday interactions has been confirmed in our data, along with the image of double icebergs, or better yet, of pyramids standing on each other: among all those surveyed, 347 (26.2%) declared that they had experienced at least one dispute in the last three years; of these 43 (13.2%) declared that they took the case to court. If all the reported disputes are taken into account then below the visible tip of 49 cases that reportedly were brought to court, 91% of the declared disputes (546 in total) remained outside. But of primary importance seems to be the institutional context of the dispute—whether it is a dispute with an institution (where going to court prevails) or with an individual (where direct negotiations are the preferred option). Still, the sociological external variables seem to matter little; use of the court is either an institutional formal necessity or due to the specific intrinsic traits of the dispute—its substance and context. This necessitates deeper analysis of disputes as such; we have made the first attempt elsewhere (Fuszara 2016; Kurczewski and Fuszara 2017: Chapters III–V).

Acknowledgement

The authors wish to express their gratitude to Mavis Maclean (CBE) and two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions. The research on “Patterns of Dispute and Dispute Settlement in Popular Legal Culture” was founded by National Science Center Poland (NCN DEC-2012/07/B/HS6/02496). For more detailed statistical analysis of the research results see our book How People Use the Courts (Peter Lang, Franfurt a/M 2017).

References


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Appendix A

Distribution of Reactions to a Dispute in 8 Case Scripts in 2014 Survey
(100% = 1035)

Case Script 1

Somebody's children were beaten by a neighbour as he could not rest after work due to their noisy behaviour. In your opinion, what should the parents of the beaten children do?
1. Don't react, do nothing: n = 20 (2.0%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with the man: n = 613 (59.1%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 66 (6.4%)
4. Go to court: n = 174 (16.8%)
5. Go to another agency: n = 141 (13.6%)

Case Script 2

An acquaintance of Mr K. was gossiping about him among their friends, so Mr K. slapped him in the presence of others. In your opinion, what should the acquaintance do?
1. Don't react, do nothing: n = 62 (6.0%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with the friend: n = 701 (67.7%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 170 (16.4%)
4. Go to court: n = 45 (4.3%)
5. Go to another agency: n = 16 (1.5%)

Case Script 3

A friend borrowed 250 euros and failed to repay the debt despite repeated demis. The lender came to the debtor’s house and took something of that same value. In your opinion, what should the borrower (from whose house the item had been taken) do?
1. Don't react, do nothing: n = 67 (6.5%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with friend: n = 673 (64.9%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 103 (9.9%)
4. Go to court: n = 117 (11.3%)
5. Go to another agency (WHICH?): n = 43 (4.1%)

Case Script 4

An employer asked the hospital for information about the illness for which one of his employees was treated. The hospital provided the information, which was then used against the patient. In your opinion, what should the patient do?
1. Don't react, do nothing: n = 35 (3.4%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with employer: n = 271 (26.2%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 70 (6.7%)
4. Go to court: n = 525 (50.7%)
5. Go to another agency (WHICH?): n = 64 (6.2%)
Case Script 5

In the evening, a brawl started close to a restaurant. A police patrol was called in to calm the situation. Police officers used batons not only against the brawlers but against innocent bystanders as well. In your opinion, what should those bystanders do?
1. Don’t react, do nothing: n = 50 (4.8%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with police: n = 315 (30.4%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 51 (4.9%)
4. Go to court: n = 487 (47.0%)
5. Go to another agency (WHICH?): n = 69 (6.6%)

Case Script 6

Somebody built a house but due to a change in the local area development plan, the authorities ordered him to demolish it. In your opinion, what should the person who built the house do?
1. Don’t react, do nothing: n = 9 (0.9%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with authorities: n = 359 (34.7%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 34 (3.2%)
4. Go to court: n = 533 (51.4%)
5. Go to another agency (WHICH?): n = 53 (5.2%)

Case Script 7

A dispute arose between spouses when the wife inherited 10 000 euros and placed the funds in her own account, rather than contributing it to the family budget. In your opinion, what should her husband do?
1. Don’t react, do nothing: n = 234 (22.6%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with wife: n = 741 (71.5%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 18 (1.7%)
4. Go to court: n = 20 (2.0%)
5. Go to another agency (WHICH?): n = 3 (0.3%)

Case Script 8

A husband battered a wife suspecting her of secretly meeting with another man. In your opinion, what should the woman do?
1. Don’t react, do nothing: n = 49 (4.7%)
2. Reach agreement and compromise with husband: n = 574 (55.4%)
3. Use self-help to achieve in private what one considers as due: n = 69 (6.7%)
4. Go to court: n = 138 (13.3%)
5. Go to another agency (WHICH?): n = 128 (12.4%)
Mothering for Neoliberal Times. Mazahua Women, Poverty and the Cultural Politics of Development in Central Mexico

Abstract: This paper presents the results of fieldwork concerning local development programmes addressed to poor Indian women and the social changes they effect in the marginalised Mazahua communities in central Mexico conducted from 2011 to 2015. By analysing the operation of a women’s cooperative I show how neoliberal ideology, which is at the core of development schemes, incorporates both the feminist ideas of gender equality and empowerment of women, and the Mexican tradition of politicising maternity in a crisis to establish new social hierarchies, subjectivities, and power relations, promote individualistic attitudes and a new, “market-oriented” morality, and reinforce political clientelism, leading to profound and usually detrimental (for women and local gender relations) changes in the functioning of native communities.

Keywords: development, poverty, mothering, Mazahua, Mexico.

In a statement delivered a couple of days before May 10 (Mother’s Day) one of Mexico’s most important national holidays, the Secretary of Social Development Rosario Robles said that the federal human development programme (desarrollo humano) called “Opportunities” (Oportunidades) will no longer support Indian families with more than three children. The Mexican politician announced this policy shift on April 30, 2014 (Children’s Day) at a meeting with native communities in the state of Nayarit. She admonished the attending women from indigenous groups living in extreme social exclusion, poverty and under threat of hunger that they should be thinking about the future of their children and control their procreation, following the old (neo)Malthusian motto that “a small family leads a better life.”

1 Robles participated in the swearing-in of the local community committee appointed to supervise the implementation of a new government programme aimed at reducing hunger (la Cruzada Nacional Contra el Hambre), see: http://www.sedesol.gob.mx/es/SEDESOL/TodoSobreLaCruzada

2 The so-called Robles Law (Ley Robles)—draft act to liberalise abortion law in the Federal District (termination of pregnancy would be allowed in cases of rape or if the mother’s life was at risk), proposed in 2000 by Robles who was then head of local government; abortion on demand during the first trimester was made legal in the Federal District in 2007.
before the law, of discrimination based on the ethnicity of the programme’s beneficiaries, as well as of ignorance. Interestingly, in the mainstream media outlets, even the most progressive ones, such as the *Proceso* monthly, the criticism of the attitude presented by the liberal woman politician, an educated Mestizo from the urban middle class, was juxtaposed with reports of “unhappy childhood” of kids in poor families.\(^3\) Figures and statistics were mentioned in absence of even a superficial reflection on the structural causes of poverty (especially the feminisation of poverty) and social exclusion, including extreme poverty and deprivation, which is the reality of most indigenous communities in Mexico. Despite decades of struggle for the rights of women and indigenous peoples, the poorest Mexican women are still charged with the responsibility for “appropriate” reproduction of ethnic groups, and, by extension, the nation, in the biological, social, and cultural sense (Cf. Yuval-Davis 1997). The discourse of human rights and the deeply-rooted multiculturalism of Mexican politics have created the local variety of political correctness that render explicitly eugenic elements in social policy no longer acceptable. These elements have been replaced by neoliberal insistence on individual responsibility of mothers for the fate of their families, responsibility of Indian women for the wellbeing of ethnic groups, pressure exerted through national policy based on feminist calls for the liberation and empowerment of women, implemented by governmental institutions, including those established specifically for the promotion of women, such as *Instituto Nacional de la Mujer* (InMUJER 2000).

In this paper I examine the current neoliberal version of political maternalism that constitutes the core for the state’s social policy effected through the so-called assistance and development programmes targeting women of the Mazahua indigenous communities (the State of Mexico). Ethnography of a local women’s cooperative, the *Pjoxte* Association provides an insight into the specifics of developmental programs in the microscale. It shows the way the system of aiding the poor and efforts to stimulate local development steer the transformation of women’s social roles, mothering and community functioning, how those changes are viewed by the Indian women themselves and how they express their resistance to the imposition of behaviour models and the direction of developmental efforts in the region. I have collected the material for my analysis during field research in the Mazahua region in the years 2011–12\(^4\) and 2014–15; some of my arguments are also based on previous studies of the cultural politics of mothering in *colonias populares*\(^5\) of the Mexico City (Hryciuk 2009b, 2010).

\(^3\) According to the report titled “Poverty and social rights of children and adolescents in Mexico 2010–2012” drawn up by UNICEF and the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development (CONEVAL), currently 21.2 million children and adolescents in Mexico live in poverty, 4.7 million of whom in extreme poverty. Indian children account for 78.5% of poor children, and 33.4% of those living in extreme poverty. [http://www.unicef.org/mexico/spanish/UN_BriefPobreza_web.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/mexico/spanish/UN_BriefPobreza_web.pdf)

\(^4\) Fieldwork conducted as part of interdisciplinary project titled: “Socio-political changes in the indigenous regions of Mexico and their perception by the local population. The case of the Mazahua Region in the State of Mexico,” led by Jerzy Makowski (Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw) financed by the State Committee for Scientific Research.

\(^5\) The term *colonia popular* in Mexico refers to an administrative area called a “colonia” (part of a city district), inhabited by the lower middle and lower class.
Gendered Development in Mexico

Beginning in the 1970s, the so-called “women question” expressed in the slogan “Women are Key to Effective Development” is a constant presence in modernization strategies of multiple countries, development practices of international agencies, and in academic discussions on development programmes (Momsen 2010).

In Mexico, national modernization programmes for women, implemented systematically since the 1970s have been operating both in rural and urban areas (mostly colonias populares). Their aims were twofold: to limit the population growth by promoting family planning (mostly through the use of contraception, but also by mandatory sterilization) and to integrate Mexican women into the national economy by stimulating the employment of women in cities and encouraging women (Mestizos and Indians) living in rural areas to take part in a variety of production programmes meant to change local models of production and consumption. (Villareal 1996; McClenaghan 1997; Zapata Martelo et al. 2003, Chant 2003). In the decades that followed, men started to be included in the development efforts originally addressed exclusively to women; gender equality (equidad de género) was promoted and emphasis was put on the importance and empowerment of women (empoderamiento). Widening the spectrum of activities based on the equality discourse was meant to reconstruct gender relations so as to maximise productivity and effectiveness of implemented programmes (Cf. Chant, Guttmann 2000; Zapata Martelo, Flores Hernández 2003; Benería 2003).

The agenda of development programs was subject to change, adapted to current political and economic needs and goals of Mexican administration, as well as international organizations, UN recommendations, conditions on financial aid imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. And so, for example, in rural areas such as the state of Michoacán plagued by mass emigration to USA, the introduction of production development programmes targeting women (Mestizo and Indian) in the 1970s was meant to draw attention away from the political mobilization of peasants, channel social discontent, and, ultimately, lead to the co-optation of large sectors of the local population within the framework of government programmes (Villareal 1996).

In the decades that followed, during the era of structural adjustment programmes (1980–94) with the resulting privatisation of multiple areas of social life, rising unemployment, growing social and economic inequalities and, consequently, deteriorating quality of life for the majority of the population, profiled development programmes (small-scale production, handicraft projects, training, reskilling, etc.) were supposed to create social safety nets and prevent the rise of poverty and especially feminisation of poverty (Craske 2003). They pro-

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6 In the 1990s the introduction of gender mainstreaming in the Mexican politics resulted in the development of the so-called “gender industry,” including the newly established gender studies centres (e.g. PUEG UNAM and PIEM COLMEX) that train experts for, among other things, the implementation of development programmes for women.

7 Programmes introduced under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the so-called “developing countries”; their implementation was a condition for access to further loans by those institutions or for lowering interest on loans already disbursed. The key aspect of neoliberal development programs in Latin America since the 1980s.
vided means for modest existence and basic survival of local communities, while reducing the risk of social unrest and dissent (Cf. Chossudovsky 2003).

Safety net programmes aimed at mitigating the human cost of the neoliberal economic transformation were extended to the groups affected most severely by the privatisation of healthcare, withdrawal of food subsidies and liberalisation of commerce. A typical example of the kind is the implementation of a series of government programmes addressed to poor women in cities and rural communities (especially indigenous ones): the **Mujeres en Solidaridad** programme as part of PRONASOL (**Programa Nacional de Solidaridad** 1988–94), PROGRESA (**Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación**, 1997–2002) or **Oportunidades** (2002–2014) renamed **Prospera** in 2014 (Craske 2003; Benería 2003; Vizcarra Bordi, Romero 2008; Vizcarra Bordi 2009; Vizcarra Bordi 2014). Across much of Mexico, the long-term presence of this type of social assistance programmes (**programas de asistencia social**) had profound effects on social relations within local communities, fostering political clientelism, transforming gender relations, fuelling animosity between ethnic and religious groups, and, last but not least, causing profound changes in consumption patterns.

**Mazahua Region: Some Background**

I began my research in the northern part of the State of Mexico in 2011 with a series of field trips with a group of Polish and Mexican scientists. These trips familiarised me with the characteristics of the region. During my second visit in 2012 I conducted fieldwork (in-depth interviews with elements of life story and participant observation) in **Ranchería La Soledad** with members of the **Pjoxte** Cooperative; I also talked with non-governmental organisations’ employees who have worked with them over the years. The body of data I had collected was supplemented with observations during two short follow-up visits in the Mazahua region in the years 2014 and 2015.

By focusing on a single organisation and a specific group of people in a particular time and place, and performing concurrent analysis of press materials, webpages of non-governmental organisations, and government programmes, I was able to analyze the nature and trace the course of various developmental efforts within the local context. The use of feminist anthropology methods, according to which we not only study the experience of women, but also give them voice, helped me understand the impact of these activities on the life of Indian women who are members of **Pjoxte** and on the overall functioning of the local Mazahua community.

The site of my research was a small (population approx. 900) village of **Ranchería La Soledad**, located 15 kilometres from the main municipal centre of **San Felipe del Progreso**, in the north-western part of the state of Mexico, which has the highest concentration of Mazahuas. An estimated one-third of the entire group is thought to live here (Gonzales Ortiz, Vizcarra Bordi 2006). In the San Felipe municipality they make up 63% of population, for 31% Mazahua is their primary language. In **Ranchería La Soledad** only several dozen people speak it fluently, but all think of themselves as **pueblo Mazahua**.8 The whole area is

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8 Estimated based on interviews.
fraught with progressing environmental degradation, high rates of social exclusion, illiteracy, poverty (including feminisation of poverty) and malnourishment, long-term structural unemployment, and, consequently, rising migration, both seasonal and long-time — to the Federal District (which has been the destination for migrants women for a long time [Cf. Arizpe 1975; Oehmichen Bazán 2005]), and to the United States and in recent decades to Canada (Skoczek 2011).

Socio-economic changes that have adversely affected the Mazahua community in recent decades are attributable primarily to the neglect of agriculture, the state’s withdrawal from programmes supporting small farms coupled with the liberalisation of trade as a consequence of Mexico entering into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the USA and Canada. All these factors, along with diminishing soil fertility due to erosion and degradation of land have lead to the crisis of local agriculture, significant reduction in economic activity across multiple Indian communities, and, consequently — high unemployment rates in the region. Supposedly in order to alleviate the problem, the state introduced, among others, programmes promoting the so-called sustainable agriculture, organic production of vegetables, husbandry, food processing for the emerging large-city markets, targeting niche markets. The actual result was accelerated privatisation and neoliberalisation of agriculture, leading to further marginalisation of small farmers and deterioration of indigenous communities (Skoczek 2013).

In recent years, the Mazahua Region, including the San Felipe del Progreso municipality considered “the most indigenous” has been colonised by the activities of various state agencies and non-governmental organisations. The area has become saturated with projects to alleviate poverty and activate local communities to engage in new agricultural activities, build human capital, change behaviour patterns, including gender relations (with the latter programmes addressed primarily to women), etc. As a result, the survival and wellbeing of households, the condition of local communities, investments in infrastructure, etc. depend on two factors: first and foremost money transfers, both from local migrants (with Mexico City as the main destination) and from abroad, and, increasingly, funding and other forms of support (apoyos) available through development and social assistance programmes. In recent decades, they have become the basis for the survival strategy of the Indian families and communities in the Mazahua Region (Cf. Appendini, De Luca 2008; Vizcarra Bordi, Romero 2008; Vizcarra Bordi 2014).

Other factors significantly affecting the condition of local communities include gradual urbanisation and the emergence of new, urban lifestyles, introduced mostly by returning migrant men and women (social remittances; Cf. Levitt 1998). In Ranchería La Soledad, as well as in most other nearby villages, the cultural landscape is changing rapidly. New facilities include a bakery, flower shop, patisserie, hairdresser’s, a poolroom, etc., as well as several new buildings, though not as impressive as the “Californian villas” (casas californianas) constructed in neighbouring villages. The community here has stopped depending on farming for sustenance, it is no longer agriculture that determines the life or families and households. Their roles are increasingly transformed from production to social reproduction and consumption. Agriculture is no longer the key factor determining individual identity (Appendini, De Luca 2008). The nature of the socio-cultural changes in the region is accurately captured by the phrase “rurality without agriculture” (ruralidad sin agricul-
tura) proposed by the Mexican researchers of rural areas, Kirsten Appendini and Gabriela Torres-Mazuera (2008).

The above account of socio-economic changes of the recent decades, especially the increased intra- and extra-regional mobility of the population, school enrollment ratio, the impact of the mass media and development programmes lead to the blending of traditional Mazahua cultural elements with (post)modern ones, and, consequently, intensified the processes of local culture’s hybridisation (Garcia Canclini 1989). In Ranche-ría La Soledad the older generation still speaks the Mazahua language on a daily basis, women wear plaits, traditional clothes (mainly quesquemetl) and jewellery, use traditional Indian sweat baths (temazcal), consult healers (curanderos), families erect shrines (oratorios) associated with a syncretic cult of crosses (Cf. Gonzales Martínez 2011), spend a lot of time and resources on community work, primarily by participating in the cargos system and preparing religious festivals. At the same time, the use of mobile phones is ubiquitous, processed food is consumed, schoolchildren are learning English (rather than Mazahua), while their mothers, at various, often mandatory talks, courses and training sessions are indoctrinated with new models of behaviour, instructed about contraception, women’s rights, healthy nutrition of children etc. Thus, individualistic attitudes, including the ideas of capital accumulation, saving and individual success are promoted. These elements of the Weberian work ethic are also present in the activities of Protestant churches and non-governmental organisations proselytising intensely in the region.

The Pjoxte Cooperative

The cultural landscape of the Mazahua Region is deeply marked by traces of development initiatives conducted by state agencies, NGOs, as well as those undertaken by inhabitants of individual municipalities. During field research, our attention was drawn by the “thankful” murals dotting the countryside, praising the benefits of the state government’s activities or “Mr. Governor” himself, obvious signs of the political clientelism prevalent in the area. Local development initiatives were presented to our research team at a seminar organized by the administration of the Intercultural University of the State of Mexico (Universidad Intercultural del Estado del México, UIEM) of San Felipe del Progreso. That was when we first came across Pjoxte—the Indian Cooperative whose activity was guided by the Agency for Sustainable Development and the Entrepreneurship Incubator. The next day we went to Ranchería La Soledad to meet members of Pjoxte and visit their headquarters (meeting hall, processing centre, garden, composting toilets, etc.). The facilities were constructed using environmentally-friendly technology, while the processing centre itself looked like a small factory: white tiles and workers wearing protective clothing, with drawings on the walls presenting hygienic procedures.

9 The murals were paying tribute to Enrique Peña Nieto, the governor of the State of Mexico in the years 2005–2011 from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the current President of Mexico (2012–2018).
10 The names of the cooperative and its members are authentic: my interlocutors asked me to retain the actual names of the village, organisation, and their own.
The history of the small cooperative, counting, at the time of research, only 16 members, dates back to the year 2000, when the NGO called GRUPEDSAC (Grupo para Promover la Educación y el Desarrollo Sustentable) started “activating” indigenous villages in the San Felipe del Progreso municipality. GRUPEDSAC, whose main goal is to support the social and economic development of local communities, operates directly in indigenous pueblos through Training Centres that promote the use of organic technologies and eco-farming as sustainable alternatives for rural areas and as means of combating poverty. One such centre established at Ranchería La Soledad started organising training for women and men, in subjects such as construction of composting toilets, water silos, and handicrafts. This was followed by programs promoting gardening, raising chickens and rabbits, production of eggs, etc.

In 2003, when GRUPEDSAC was operating in around a dozen native communities in the region, the decision was made to turn the emerging groups into independent and self-governing entities (autogestivos), so that they would organize themselves and seek funding independently. Using resources made available by the Merced Foundation (which supports pro-equality and anti-poverty efforts, as well as the development of civil society), eight communities established a cooperative. The new organisation called itself Pjoxte (a name invented by an anthropologist teaching the Mazahua language at UIEM); a logo was designed, as well as a slogan capturing the cooperative’s mission (placed both on the main building, and the packaging of foods produced by Pjoxte): “Somos mujeres y hombres campesin@s mazahuas que trabajamos por un mejor nivel de vida, cuidando la naturaleza para nuestra@s niñas y niños.”11 Reflecting gender equality, emphasising the identity of Pjoxte’s members (peasants and Mazahua Indians), highlighting sustainable growth and individual responsibility for the future, the slogan faithfully expresses the agenda of the organisations that sponsor the cooperative.

In 2006, the buildings of the Pjoxte headquarters at Ranchería la Soledad were erected at the land donated by one of the families, paid for by funding from a variety of sources (e.g. Merced Foundation, the French and Canadian embassies). Members of the cooperative worked at the construction. However, the organisation’s independence proved elusive: that same year it started working closely with UIEM. The centre provided location for work experience training for MA students (majoring in sustainable development), who are also taking part in the construction of new additions to the centre.

Two years later a formal cooperation agreement was signed by Pjoxte, UIEM, and GRUPEDSAC. The original idea was for Pjoxte to be an independent, self-governing, and agriculturally self-sustaining organisation (selling its surplus produce), with the other two institutions in supporting roles. Four areas of operation were specified:

- agricultural production (eco-friendly farming, greenhouses, sheep farming, chicken farms, orchards, construction of farming terraces and fish farms, etc.)
- fruit, vegetable and herb processing (multiple training courses organised)
- eco-friendly construction (toilets, water silos, kitchens, etc.)

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11 We are the Mazahua women and men, farmers working to improve our standard of living, caring for nature, for the benefit of our daughters and sons.
• cultural and institutional reinforcement (many workshops on gender equality, obtaining funding from multiple sources that were meant to identify a group of promoters and future leaders of the organisation)

To further stimulate development and take advantage of funding opportunities, in 2010 Pjoxte established two social enterprises (empresas sociales) meant to employ mostly women, who at that time constituted 85% of cooperative’s members. One company was to produce organic eggs, the other process food. The former excelled from the very beginning; the communities involved were better organized, and the enterprise quickly started making profit. The other one, despite having infrastructure for jam and marinade production no avanzaba (failed to thrive), as the people I spoke to often said. This resulted in tensions within the cooperative, but also spurred into action a group of women who obtained a grant from Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas (CDI) to develop production by indigenous women. This show of independence by the Indian women who have been trained for many years to “take matters in their own hands” lead to open conflict with the remainder of Pjoxte and the project coordinator at GRUPEDSAC. There was a split in the cooperative. Despite pressure, the group producing preserves refused to comply with GRUPEDSAC’s “recommendations,” resisted threats, e.g. that “troublemakers” who obtained funding on their own and the family that donated land for the centre would be removed from the organisation. The result was that the centre was closed for several months.

In July 2011, when we arrived in Ranchería la Soledad, the centre was again in business, and the food processing group (counting only about a dozen women and one man) retained the centre, name and logo of the organization. Pjoxte was selling its products (various fruit preserves, marinated chili, salsas, sweets, fruit liqueurs, etc.) at the organic food market held monthly by UIEM or at “native” product stands sponsored by CDI in the Valle de Bravo tourist resort. The cooperative received institutional support from UIEM and was included in the university’s new initiative, La Incubadora de Empresas, which provided it with bookkeeping and legal services; students from the university assisted in the development of marketing strategies. With the help of UIEM employee as its head, Pjoxte made an effort to register the trademark, develop a table of products’ nutritional values, obtain organic farming certificates and find new markets, mostly niche ones associated with the changing models of consumption in the urban middle class. In February 2012, through the intermediary of UIEM’s vice-chancellor, they negotiated with the Chamber of Commerce (Cámara de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo, CANACO] to have those products displayed in special showcases at restaurants. Members of the cooperative were dreaming up plans to expand the centre, for example by adding a small kindergarten so that women could be free to work, and to expand their scope of operations by organising workshops on vegetable and fruit processing for schools and other institutions.

The Social Assistance Industry: Grassroot Perspective

In the years 2011–2012, the Pjoxte cooperative counted fifteen female and one male member, but it was the one man that presented the organisation at the seminar organised by
UIEM. He read a description of the cooperative’s operations, distributed leaflets and advertised products he had brought for sale. When I asked why a cooperative of Mazahua women was represented by a man, I was informed that during the seminar the women had to take part in mandatory lectures delivered as part of the *Oportunidades* programme. Later it turned out that Angel indeed frequently represented the cooperative before the University and local administration, which not only reflected the local cultural model according to which a native cooperative or organisation in the public sphere is usually represented by a man, but also resulted from the limited availability of women, whose time was carefully managed by various aid organisations.

The degree to which the Mazahua women were involved in the local social assistance industry (the term *industria de asistencia social* appeared frequently in my interviews) became apparent to me as soon as I started my fieldwork at *Pjoxté*. Arranging face-to-face interviews with individuals proved to be very difficult; we usually talked why making preserves together or during training for women from other communities organised at the centre. The women explained their lack of free time by various responsibilities, a significant proportion of which involved participation in a variety of projects aimed at improving their families’ quality of life (Lutz 2014). Over the past several years my interviewees on average took part in 3–4 programmes simultaneously, some of them for many years. To illustrate the scale of the social assistance industry in the San Felipe del Progreso municipality, let me briefly describe programmes, activities and types of support (*apoyos*) that the female members of *Pjoxté* have been part of:

A variety of production programmes (constructing greenhouses, husbandry, egg production, handcrafts, food processing, etc.) administered by GRUPEDSAC, funded in recent years by the Ministry of Agriculture, Husbandry, Rural Development, Fishing and Food (*Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca i Alimentación* SAGARPA). All women who make up *Pjoxté* today participated in 1 to 3 projects.

The aforementioned *Oportunidades* programme (renamed *Prospera* in 2014) run by the Ministry of Social Development (*Secretaría de Desarrollo Social*, SEDESOL) aimed at “creating equal opportunities for economic and social growth” and building human capital by combating poverty. The program transfers cash to poor families. The three areas covered by the programme are education, health, and nutrition, which is why financial aid is conditioned on children attending school, visits at healthcare centres and improvements in nutrition levels. The persons managing the cash and responsible for meeting the conditions are mothers. All women with whom I worked at *Pjoxté* were beneficiaries of *Oportunidades*, some of them as long as 8 years.12

The *Visión Mundial* (niñ@s) programme of the local branch of the international organisation World Vision International that works with children, families and communities in areas with high levels of social exclusion. With its Protestant origins, the organisation is also active in Catholic communities, and the integral part of its work is evangeliza-

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12 It should be emphasised that not all mothers of school children at *Ranchería La Soledad* participated in the programme; the qualifying criteria were unclear and highly controversial, which often led to conflicts (Cf. Vizcarra Bordi, Guardarrama Romero 2008).
Children receive allowances paid for by foreigners. Several children of the women I interviewed were taking part in *Visión Mundial*. Programmes of the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (*Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, CDI*), in particular the one addressed to women. Its purpose, as stated at the CDI website, is to constantly improve the living conditions and social status of indigenous women living in regions characterised by high and extreme social exclusion, by initiating and strengthening women’s participation in production programmes. At the time of my research all members of *Pjoxte* were involved in a CDI project.

*70 y más*—a nationwide programme of the Ministry of Social Development (*Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, SEDESOL*), a kind of state pension for all Mexicans over the age of 70. The annuity in the amount of 500 peso (in 2012) is paid every 2 months; participants in the programme must attend various seminars and training courses related to health care etc. Two female members of *Pjoxte* and the parents and in-laws of several others are in the programme, which means that the women have additional responsibilities, helping family members who are illiterate and often speak very little Spanish with formalities, as well as bringing them to meetings.

“One kilogram of aid” (*Un Kilo de Ayuda*)—a federal government programme to combat malnutrition of children, operating in four states: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Yucatán and the State of Mexico; in the latter it works together with the state administration and The National System for Integral Family Development (*Desarrollo Integral de la Familia, DiF*), providing additional food to 6 thousand malnourished children, mostly native, in 114 communities. All women in *Pjoxte* who have school-age children benefit from the programme.

“Warm breakfast at school” [*Desayunos Escolares Calientes*]—a state government (a regional branch of The National System for Integral Family Development) programme operating at the local school in which the administration provides products for school committees (composed of mothers) to make a balanced (calorically and nutritionally, according to the so-called “Healthy Nutrition” plan) breakfast for preschool and school children. Two members of *Pjoxte* participated in this programme.

*Antorcha Campesina* [El Movimiento Antorchista], an organisation of “Mexico’s poor,” affiliated with the Institutional Revolutionary Party whose task is to obtain funding from governmental institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Social Development, *Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, SEDESOL*) for the construction or modernisation of infrastructure in communities (e.g. building schools, sewage systems, houses, electrification etc.). Over the past few years, the families of several of my interviewees took part in *Antorcha* actions.

Training in marketing, management, developing a “managerial attitude” (*la actitud empresarial*) organised as part of *Incubadora de Empresas*, a development programme conducted at UIEM since 2009 aimed at preventing unemployment by promoting entrepreneurship.

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13 Programme targeting areas with high levels of social exclusion, in various Mexican states (State of Mexico, Puebla, Hidalgo, Guerrero).
Programmes by other state institutions, non-governmental organisations (including the Protestant Misión Mazahua or Fundación Mazahua, but also the National Women’s Institute INMUJER) offering courses, training in reproductive health, gender equality, domestic violence, child nutrition, etc.

To sum up, programmes in which my interviewees participated were designed to meet the needs of communities with high levels of social exclusion, including extreme poverty. These are essentially safety-net programmes to moderate the consequences of progressive neoliberalisation of increasingly more domains of social and economic life, which is the true cause of said exclusion. The State of Mexico is a telling example of such phenomena. Here, the long-term neoliberal policies have resulted in ongoing marginalization of native communities, among them the Mazahuas. The local development industry focuses on the so-called “activation of women” by offering them several profiled programmes that fall into two categories: educational (new skills, knowledge regarding reproductive health, gender equality and empowerment of women) or supporting education (mostly of children) and promoting the entry of women into the public sphere of production. In either case, the main strategy of encouraging women to take part in the projects is to invoke their traditional roles as mothers and nurturers, to appeal to female altruism and stress responsibility for the well-being of the community (Cf. McClenaghan 1997; Craske 1999; Kunz 2011; Chant, Seetman 2012). The politicisation of motherhood is a way to introduce and reinforce free-market policy within native communities; it contributes to the production of new neo-liberal subjectivities, including the transformation of motherhood and, more generally, the shape of the local gender contract.

Mothers, Nurturers, Producers

Intense promotion, in the above described development projects as well as in the mass media (e.g. TV commercials and social campaigns, soap operas, etc.), of a new set of behaviours and attitudes to be encouraged in a “good, responsible native mother” succeeded in changing the local model of motherhood. It has become a cultural hybrid, a dynamic collage of traditional roles mixed with elements derived from the dominant Mexican discourse.

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14 Established in 1997, it operates in the Mazahua Region, running production and education programmes, including those concerning health and nutrition, many of them addressed to women, www.fundacionmazahua.org.mx
15 In 2014 the government of Mexico launched a new nationwide social development campaign The National Crusade Against Hunger (Cruzada Nacional Contra el Hambre) to be implemented by the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL). The campaign targets urban and rural areas of the country with the highest rates of social exclusion, poverty and malnutrition, especially among children and adolescents, including the Mazahua Region in the State of Mexico. Among other things, community dinners (comedores comunitarios) have been established. The purpose of the programme is to improve the nutrition status of children up to 11 years of age, teenagers continuing education, pregnant women, nursing mothers, people with disabilities or over 65 years of age, and others “in need.” The operation of community dinners is theoretically managed by the local authorities but in fact it is mostly based on unpaid work of local women who, on a daily basis, prepare meals from products provided by the government. In addition, women receive instruction on proper nutrition, growth and development of children. http://www.gob.mx/sedesol/acciones-y-programas/comedores-comunitarios
on motherhood, as well as (post)modern social models that emphasize women’s rights and individualism.

The core element of the emerging, vernacular pattern of mothering is the model of relations still deeply ingrained in native communities such as Ranchería La Soledad, which assumes complementarity of gender roles, with different tasks and spheres of activity for men and women (Hryciuk 2009a). Within that model, the main responsibility of Mazahua women is to reproduce the ethnic group in the biological, as well as cultural and social sense. Women are supposed to ensure physical survival of family and community while facilitating the transmission and preservation of cultural values (language, religion, traditional lifestyles, etc.). In addition, Indian women, especially those still wearing traditional clothes, jewellery and hairstyles, are still viewed as embodied symbols of local, indigenous and sometimes national tradition (Cf. Yuval-Davis 1997; Vizcarra Bordi 2002; Zarate Vidal 2004; Hryciuk 2005).

This is why the development programmes that strongly emphasise the responsibility of Indian women for the family’s physical survival, as well as its quality of life, prove to be successful at motivating them to maximize their efforts. Consequently, the increased labour load on women buffers the impact of growing pauperisation of communities which results from deepening crisis, dwindling state support and neo-liberalisation of subsequent spheres of life (Craske 2003; Hryciuk 2004). The daily life of my interviewees at Ranchería La Soledad is filled with household chores (including gardening and raising animals), looking after children and elders, participation in several development programmes, as well as looking for new subsidies and forms of support (Vizcarra Bordi 2002; González Ortiz, Vizcarra Bordi 2006). Promoted by development discourse this triple burden (la triple jornada) is meant to ensure success in projects undertaken individually as well as collectively and to bring tangible benefits to families and communities. Instead, it adds to the women’s workload, extending its hours, regulating their everyday activity, mobility and time management, making women solely responsible for the fate of their families and the future of their children. Moreover, when women become the heads of poor households they suffer from overwork and lack of time to satisfy their own needs. It results in the deterioration of their health, poor nutrition, and, ultimately, unfavourable changes in the situation of the women themselves (Cf. Vizcarra Bordi 2009; Chant, Sweetman 2012; Lutz 2014).

During interviews, the educators from UIEM working in San Felipe del Progreso said openly that it was now the women who supported, mostly from social assistance programmes, the majority of households in the municipality. In these same conversations, however, they expressed their concern that all those efforts undertaken by the Indian women were still insufficient, and, worse than that, the support and money transfers they received were making them indolent, numb and passive (se vuelven flojas). As those responsible for the condition of their families, they should now ponerse las pilas, which literally means put in new batteries, find motivation to engage in new activities, use the available opportunities (mainly take part in training), with the view to change their attitudes to more “business-oriented” ones (to catch feeling empresarial was the Span-English expression used by the head of UIEM’s Incubadora de Empresas).

As dictated by the again fashionable development strategy that focuses on increasing women’s productivity, they are expected to generar recursos económicos—to start making
money. Women’s unpaid labour (reproductive, in the household or for the community) is thus invalidated. Unlike their male counterparts earning “hard cold cash” as migrant heroes, women are explicitly seen as unproductive (Kunz 2011).

Thus, the programmes that the women of Pjoxte participate in burden them with new tasks. Besides earning money, they are expected to drive the grassroots modernisation of the Indian communities. Following the model borrowed from the dominant, Mestizo ideal of intensive motherhood (Hryciuk 2009b, 2010), the Mazahua women are to become new expert mothers watching over the health (including reproductive health), nutrition, and proper behaviour of their families. They are charged with reversing gender relations in relationships and families despite the lack of educational programmes on gender equality, health or contraception for men. They are also expected to adopt and start promoting the pro-managerial mind-set and, more generally, individualistic attitudes. This, in the still predominantly traditional, Catholic Indian community, where cooperation and social reproduction is reinforced by the system of religious obligations (cargos), is a near-impossible task.

The operations of the social assistance industry may also bring about a wide range of risks. The new social roles of Mazahua women threaten the traditional model of gender complementarity, which may (and often does) lead to increased control and violence on the part of men, especially when the women’s efforts to improve the situation of the family fail to bring the expected benefits. Besides intensifying domestic violence, strengthening patriarchal power, and inciting frequent conflicts within communities (resulting in the disintegration of traditional support networks), the participation of women in development initiatives results in growing dependence on apoyos and, consequently, the reproduction and reinforcement of political clientelism (Vizcarra Bordi, Guardarrama Romero 2008; Vizarra Bordi 2014; Lutz 2014).

The Mazahua women who, according to the state development policy, are supposed to be the agents of local development and promoters of neo-liberal modernisation, are still seen within their communities as the depositaries of traditional community values. Attempting to meet these conflicting demands is very problematic and often provokes resistance. Contention comes in a variety of forms, since women who express their dissatisfaction and opposition to the expectations forced upon them “make creative use” of their social roles. I shall revisit this issue later.

The Empowered Poor

The agenda and implementation of profiled projects in the Mazahua Region faithfully reflect the currently dominant trends in development policies, in particular the approach of smart economics that treats women as “development resource.” According to the guidelines of international organisations, e.g. the World Bank, it economically pays off to invest

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16 For that reason money received under the Opportunidades programme are referred to as apoyos—support, and not pagos—payments for reproductive work rendered within the household.
17 Since the mid-1990s, or, more specifically, since the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), gender equality and empowerment of women became the basis for development agenda. Policy guidelines are contained in the UN initiative called Millennium Development Goals and the publications of the World Bank, e.g. the Gender Action Plan: Gender Equality as Smart Politics 2007–2010.
in women, primarily by educating them so that their activities can lead to improved health of their families and communities, higher standard of living, and economic growth. For this reason, the key feature of women activation projects has been to promote their empowerment, enhance agency and independence (Craske 2003; Momsen 2010; Kunz 2011; Chant, Sweetman 2012). This element is always present, if not dominant in the curricula of most training courses and workshops attended over the years by my interviewees at Ranchería La Soledad.

During my research in the Mazahua Region I was interested in the ways in which Indian women evaluate the effects and benefits of training on gender equality and the empowerment of women. How do the members of Pjoxte see their participation in the social assistance industry with its countless workshops and seminars? Their opinions and comments proved to be highly ambivalent. The women I interviewed, poorly educated Indians (none of the women had completed primary education), often approached the trainings as supplementary education and opportunity for personal growth.18

They pointed out its positive aspects, such as a chance to learn and gain knowledge on various topics (including information about women’s rights), as well as new, practical skills (handicrafts, food processing, etc.). In our conversations they stressed that participation in courses and work at the centre provided them with opportunities to “get out of the house,” work and socialise with other women, establish new social relationships and support networks, and that it could also be a kind of hobby (pasatiempo), which is consistent with the newly emerging lifestyle of the Mazahua community described as “rurality without agriculture” (Appendini, Torres-Mazuera 2008). Some openly stated that they have gained a new perspective on their social reality, “knew more about the world,” had more personal freedom and felt empoderadas.

At the same time, they insisted in the interviews that participation in projects saddled them with additional responsibilities and work, consumed their time for very little economic benefit, failed to significantly improve their households’ financial standing; they noted the increasing dependence of native communities on social assistance programmes, as well as the mechanisms of resource re-distribution associated with the states withdrawal from financing healthcare and education. My interviewees used money received from different programmes (primarily Oportunidades) to pay for healthcare (usually visits with one of the doctors on call at the headquarters of one of the NGO’s) or to support the existence of the local primary school (by paying for infrastructure renovations and supplementing teachers’ salaries). The awareness of their situation was accurately summed up by one of Mazahua women in Pjoxte. When during our interview I mentioned the term empoderamiento, I heard in response that in the local community of women it was at best empoderamiento a medias, that is a “half-baked” women’s empowerment.

A different perspective was offered by women belonging to the group of “promoters,” established by the social assistance industry pursuant to the smart economics principles that emphasize the development of women’s leadership (liderazgo femenino). In the Mazahua

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18 By contrast, their daughters who resided and worked in the state capital (Toluca) or in Mexico City and only sporadically helped at the centre had secondary education, and one of them was even an extramural student. The women attributed the rising level of education in the community to the availability of scholarships within the Oportunidades programme.
Region, promoters are mostly the Indian women who have completed a required amount of training and courses. Their task is to work with development organisations and serve as intermediaries between the social assistance industry and local communities. These women rip the most benefits from participation in the social assistance industry, including higher social status, prestige, and slight improvement in financial standing. These are individual success stories (*apoderamiento*): as long as there is no significant improvement in the situation of the community, the power relations and structural determinants of poverty remain unchanged etc. (Appendini, de Luca 2008).

One of the local promoters is the head of *Pjoxte*, Graciela, who, despite her young age, is already a true veteran of development programmes. In our interviews she kept emphasizing the decisive role of equality-oriented education in the improvement of her own and her family’s well-being. Most importantly, she credited it with putting an end to domestic violence, transforming her marital relations towards a partnership model, re-educating her husband (who today is not only working with the women at *Pjoxte*, but is quite fluent in the equality discourse), as well as her own perseverance in following her plans and seeking self-development despite strong opposition to Indian women’s presence in the public sphere.\(^{19}\) She not only declared feeling empowered as a person and a woman, but she also proved it by successfully applying for a grant for the Indian producers to CDI and then defending her position under pressure from GRUPEDSAC, which I have already discussed.

Graciela likes attending training courses, she treats them as her own “university,” soaking up the information to perform her duties as promoter adequately, including stimulating women to undertake new activities, sharing with them her knowledge and skills. Besides introducing new food processing technologies and recipes, her main task today is to maintain commitment among the women engaged in the project, and to pursue a change in the mentality and attitudes of the women in *Pjoxte* to more market-oriented, managerial, and individualistic. Using equality and emancipation discourse based on the empowerment claim, she promotes self-employment and improved productivity of Indian women; acting in good faith, she has become the agent of advancing economic liberalisation of increasingly more aspects of social life.

Thus, the empowerment of women within the framework of smart economics does not lead to gaining control over their own lives in order to make claims for social change and demands for state support. Neither does it enhance cooperation between project participants. It brings about only negligible improvements in the social position, autonomy and agency of women (Young 1995). They are not expected to be more independent (which Graciela found out during her conflict with GRUPEDSAC), but only to change their mindsets and be more reachable. As such, the promoters are contributing to the creation and reproduction of neoliberal governmentality and, by extension, formation of neoliberal subjectivity. As noted by the American anthropologist Aiwa Ong: “the neoliberal subject is therefore not a citizen which claims on the state but a self-enterprising citizen-subject who is obliged to become an entrepreneur of himself or herself” (2006: 14).

\(^{19}\) The effects of development efforts on gender relations is exemplified by the marital history of the leaders of *Pjoxte*, Graciela and Ángel, presented in the documentary titled “Ángel,” directed by Lilly Wolfensberger Scherz (2008).
The Mazahua women subjected to this type of indoctrination are in fact becoming “the empowered (by the equality discourse) poor” (pobres empoderadas), self-enterprising managers of poverty whose intense efforts fail to improve their own circumstances and those of their community. In addition, structural discrimination (including profiled assistance programmes) they experience as poor, native women, puts significant limitations on their agency, creating obstacles they are often unable to overcome in order to act in their best interest and satisfy their needs (Cf. Chant, Sweetman 2012), although it does not necessarily eradicate all means of resistance.

The majority of recently published analyses of agendas, implementation and effects of projects addressed to women fails to devote sufficient attention or completely ignores the collective agency of women leading to group actions, mobilisations or social movements criticising the neoliberal model of development, confronting structural discrimination and offering their own critical reading of social transformation (Wilson 2012). There are also few ethnographic studies of grassroot experiences of women participating in development programs. Researchers are instead predominantly focusing on quantitative indicators, education methods, employment and the leadership of individual women (Eisenstein 2009; Chant, Sweetman 2012). Therefore, in the following part of my analysis I briefly trace the vernacular forms of resistance employed by the Mazahua women against the extrinsically imposed models of emancipation and local development.

**On the (Im)possibility of Resistance**

The ability to act independently, potential for agency and resistance of Indian women may be seen differently, depending on the perspective of the person evaluating them and the purposes of such evaluation. In Mexico, the dominant cultural discourse on women from traditional indigenous groups, usually poor and marginalised, is reflected in the ways they are presented in the public sphere and mass media. They are situated either in the context of the current light version of multiculturalism, with images of women in traditional clothes illustrating the efforts of state agencies within the politics of cultural diversity. (Cf. Textiles Mazahua 2011), or their photographs adorn folders and websites of social assistance programmes of which poor Indian women are the main beneficiaries. This manoeuvre paves the way for the fetishization of the social and economic conditions of the Indian communities and leads to exoticization of poverty, recasting it as the problem of “internal others,” i.e. backwards native communities. The dominant discourse usually presents the Indian women as the “passive others.”

On the other hand, as the present analysis demonstrates, from the perspective of the transnational discourse of development, women of the Global South are no longer seen as passive victims of their circumstances. Nowadays the emphasis is on their ability to make decisions and choices in their particular social environments. This approach radically shifts attention away from the material and ideological power structures, even though it was originally intended to undermine them. Women are expected to become entrepreneurial subjects with boundless coping abilities within the strict confines of the neoliberal model of development (Wilson 2012).
In the Mazahua Region, the most spectacular example of social resistance against the developmental agenda and a manifestation of the empowerment of women was *El Movimiento Mazahua por la Defensa del Agua* (the Mazahua Movement for the Defence of Water) active in the Villa de Allende municipality in the years 2003–2007. This grassroots social movement of the Indian women demanded access to water in the amount and of the quality that would satisfy the needs of local communities (agriculture, potable water), as well as working out a sustainable development plan for the region in collaboration with the Mazahua communities. Despite wide social support, strategic self-representation (the Indian women acted as mothers responsible for the survival of the community, but also as neo-Zapatista soldiers), fluency in the discourse of sustainable development and indigenous rights, as well as cooperation with other social movements, within several years the local administration succeeded in demobilizing the movement fulfilling only a small portion of demands for improvements in local communities (Hryciuk 2005; Martínez Treviño 2007). Unsuccessful mobilization of the Mazahua women can be explained by the political weakness of the indigenous/Mazahua identity in the region, the sway of political clientelism, and, most importantly, the programme of the movement, based on explicit critique of the neoliberal model as the organising principle of the Mexican economy in recent decades. In such circumstances the proposed vision of economic and social transformation of the region failed to garner broad support, especially that it had been put forward by a movement lead by the most marginalized group: poor Indian women from rural areas, the “passive others” entering the public sphere outside the legitimised spaces of women’s activity: the household and the local indigenous community.

My interviewees at *Pjoxte* were not participating in mass mobilisations or actions in the public sphere (with the exception of a handful of *Antorcha Campesina* pickets), instead resorting to less spectacular but also safer everyday forms of resistance, often very subtle and concealed in everyday life (Scott 1985). The women were not willing to passively submit to the regimes imposed by the development industry, instead they negotiated to some extent or even sabotaged its operation, e.g. by being late or avoiding participation in seminars they felt were a waste of time, during training they exchanged comments and gossip, often in the Mazahua language, so that the Mestizo educator could not understand them, or used the time for handicraft making. They were trying to get the most out of their participation in projects, investing only so much time and effort to maximise benefits for themselves and their families. There have been cases where women refused to take part in a project or withdrew at some stage. They were also quite adept at taking advantage of their traditional social roles, as well as the popular stereotypes regarding the “passiveness and conservatism” of Mazahua women. They demanded support for their families as responsible mothers while resisting pressure to change their approach to life to a more “managerial” one. By strategically using the stereotype of traditional, passive Indian women, they resisted being involved in new projects (that were unlikely to succeed but required a lot of time and effort), citing their supposed ignorance, lack of skill and unfamiliarity with the workings of the “business world.”

Another area of resistance for Mazahua women was participating actively in the system of religious obligations (*cargos*). At Ranchería La Soledad, as in many other Catholic communities, it serves to reinforce relationships based on support and reciprocity by repro-
ducing the system of extended kinship (*parentesco*). Taking up *cargos* builds the prestige of individuals and families; by performing them people (predominantly men) gain the right to participate in the community’s political leadership. Sponsoring *fiestas* for holy patrons is a significant expense for the household budget, financed both from remittances and funding received from social assistance programmes.

NGO employees experienced in working with both Catholic and Protestant communities often complained that Catholic women devoted too much time, effort and money to organizing numerous lavish ceremonies (religious *fiestas* and family gatherings). Protestants who were more easily persuaded to use the same funds as inputs in production projects were, according to the NGO employees, much better disciplined and willing to internalize individualistic and pro-market attitudes. Paradoxically, these perceived as more “modern” and developmentally viable Indian women are also seen as quite passive and malleable, subject to strong patriarchal power nowadays represented not by their usually absent husband, but by the pastor. By contrast, the same activists described women from *pueblos católicos* as more independent, resourceful (capable of acting on behalf of other family members, speaking in public, at community gatherings), more difficult to control within projects aimed at making them “productive” and quite resistant to the new culture of neoliberal entrepreneurship.

At Ranchería La Soledad the traditional spheres of women’s activity, especially the ritual space within folk Catholicism (*religiosidad popular*) and the ability to juggle gender stereotypes provide Mazahua women with the basic sense of agency, allowing them to skillfully navigate the projects in which they participate, accepting their beneficial aspects while resisting those they consider harmful or useless. Only in this limited way can they influence the rate and nature of progressing processes of neo-liberalisation and individualisation of community life.

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The flagship federal programme of human development called *Opportunidades* in which all the women of Pjoxte were taking part, was replaced in 2014 by the social inclusion programme (*programa de inclusión social*) named *Prospera* [Prosper]. In its new guise, besides emphasis on the education of children, family health and proper nutrition, poor mothers are expected to become economically self-sufficient. The programme promotes job creation through self-employment, entrepreneurship and further inclusion of women in production work and economic development. This means that the social assistance programme has been expanded with elements of smart economics, which places additional burdens on poor mothers. In addition, *Prospera* contains elements of old demographic policies of the 1970s meant to discipline poor native women, especially in rural areas, and to reduce reproduction rates. They are reflected in the statements by Mexican politicians, such as the Secretary of Social Development Rosario Robles, mentioned in the opening paragraph of this paper. In recent years these have not been isolated voices. The response of Mexican feminists to Robles speech was also symptomatic. In 2014, the feminist public intellectuals were typically finding excuses for Robles in the media, emphasising her “good intentions,” including her concern with the wellbeing of poor chil-
dren and their families, thus exposing their own deeply rooted class and cultural prejudices.

In Mexico, feminist demands have been systematically hijacked by the state social and developmental policies since mid 1900s. Despite extensive critical literature within the framework of social sciences, including intersectional research in sociology, anthropology and economics documenting the effects of governmental programmes, such as Oportunidades (Zapata at al. 2003; Vizcarra Bordi, Guadarama Romero 2008; Vizcarra Bordi 2009; Lutz 2014), as well as more broadly examination of the relationship between feminist agenda and economic globalisation (Cf. Eistenstein 2009; Frazer 2009), the nature and scale of co-optation of feminist claims and discourse in the neoliberal version of political maternalism in recent decades has not been extensively discussed or analysed within the Mexican feminist movement.

Here it behoves us to remember the conclusions from the analysis of the government’s family planning programmes in Peru in 1990s conducted by the American researcher Christina Ewig (2006). She points out the ways in which the Peruvian government appropriated and used the global feminist discourse and women’s rights agenda for clearly eugenic and anti-women activities (e.g. the programme of illegal sterilization of Indian women), and demonstrates the collusion on the part of sections of the local women’s movement in the development of these policies. Ewig emphasises the need to constantly monitor state action, even if the proposed policies on the surface appear to benefit women. She urges us to examine the relations between state and feminism, including state-feminism institutions, the relationship between urban middle class feminists and poor Indian women in rural areas, as well as the consequences of feminist and women’s rights discourse being exploited by state and international institutions.

Ewig concludes her analysis stressing the need for multiple feminist locations:

...both pragmatic feminist groups that are willing to interact with the state and autonomous radical feminist groups able to strongly criticize state actions are essential to the success of feminist policy positions” since “for feminists appropriation of feminist discourse requires a continual effort to be precise about their own definitions, to critically observe the usages of these discourses, and to be willing to hold those who use these discourses accountable to their political intentions. Feminists must be on the leading edge of either defending or redefining particular concepts before others redefine them in undesirable ways (2006: 655).

In the context of progressing neo-liberalisation of social life on a global scale, the call for multiple feminist locations is becoming increasingly fundamental for women’s movements in Mexico and elsewhere in the world.

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“Authentic Experience” and Manufactured Entertainment: Holy Land Experience Religious Theme Park

Abstract: Holy Land Experience is a religious theme park in Orlando, Florida. The city is home to some of the main theme parks in the United States, however, Holy Land Experience is not a typical one, and in official flyers it claims not to be a theme park at all, its role being, instead, educational. Holy Land Experience is a plaster replica of Jerusalem from the times of Christ, spread on 15 acres of land.

At the same time, it is an interesting example of promoting spirituality using tools attributed to entertainment. Inside the theme park Christianity is shown offering a direct, emotional experience using imitations of Biblical places and events. Indeed, according to the visitors, the overwhelming artificiality of the place does not thwart religious feeling. At Holy Land Experience spiritual experience is merged with entertainment and a sense of America’s uniqueness.

Keywords: authenticity, Christianity, Holy Land Experience, spirituality, theme park, United States

Introduction

Holy Land Experience, a theme park in Orlando, Florida dubs itself a “living, Biblical history museum” (Branham 2009). It was originally created in 2001 by Marvin Rosenthal, a Jew who turned to Christian religion, and became a Baptist minister. According to the founder, the place was intended as a space for Christian education, (Goodheart 2007) but, a newborn Christian critical of Judaism, he was accused of including anti-Semitic allusions in the park. Their message could be boiled down to “murderers of Jesus” or, in a more subtle version, “those who do not realize the Messiah has come.” As Rosenthal’s proselytizing idea for the park did not bring enough revenue, Holy Land Experience was sold in 2007 to Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN). It is the largest American Christian media corporation and owner of numerous preacher television channels, as well as to other media outlets and real estate. TBN not only quickly got rid of the anti-Semitic features, but refocused the stated educational role of the park to include more pro-Israeli features.

I decided to visit Holy Land Experience—an unusual mix of theme-park entertainment and religious zeal—to explore how today Christianity can be reinterpreted to fit a commercial, entertainment-focused enterprise. After all, strong ties between the state and Christianity, Protestantism in particular, have always been a significant social glue in the United States. Already Alexis de Tocqueville argued in Democracy in America (2000) that in the US religion and democratic principles mutually support each other. Indeed, on the one hand, religiosity has remained prominent in American public life, and at present, too, open
references to God are a common feature in US politics. On the other hand, since Protestantism in the United States is not regulated by any single religious institution, it opens space for more diversity and the privatization of religious experience. Furthermore, as Max Weber (2003) famously argued Protestantism, with its focus on individual effort, is sympathetic towards consumption, since it is considered evidence of the success in one’s hard work, and, more importantly, a visible sign of Divine Grace. In the United States, material expressions of personal achievement interpreted as signs of God, have been, and still are, considered by many as symbols of ties between religion and the capitalist nation state.

Holy Land Experience religious theme park is a prime example of linking consumption, religion, and the nation. Located in a city famous for Disneyland and other amusement parks, it is seemingly just another commercial entertainment space. Its makers, however, emphasize its role as a space for education on the sources of Christianity. In this sense, the location of Holy Land Experience makes it look like a lone missionary in the center of an entertainment-focused jungle, and in order to attract visitors the park adopts methods similar to those found at the neighboring theme parks. Thus, the use of entertainment to present Christianity makes Holy Land Experience a place where religion can compete with nearby theme parks. At Holy Land Experience it is reformulated to fit the familiar reality of consumption and entertainment. Yet it goes further: by employing well-known contexts from American pop culture it presents a vision of unique ties between the American nation and God, which lie at the foundation of American Christianity (see e.g.: Stevenson 2013).

**The Schedule**

Holy Land Experience is located not far away from Universal Orlando Resort theme park and a huge 1.2 million-square-foot shopping center, The Millenia Mall. Like other theme parks in Orlando, Holy Land Experience is situated next to a highway and the best way to get there is by car. Located on fifteen acres of land, roughly half the size of the mall, the park welcomes visitors with a ten-feet-tall golden plaster lion and silver horse in front of the entrance to the parking lot. A guard standing in front of the gate hands out leaflets with information on proper behavior inside the park (shirts and shoes should be worn at all times, no outside food, no smoking) and directs visitors toward the parking space. It is decorated with palm trees and plastic animals, bringing to mind a Disneyland version of “Jungle Book.” The park itself is surrounded by a plaster wall, which resembles an ancient fortress. The name “Holy Land Experience” written in a font which reminds one of “Aladdin,” another Disney animated movie, hangs over the faux-rock entrance gate, inspired by the Damascus, Jaffa, and Lion’s Gates in Jerusalem (Beal 2005; Wharton 2006). The entrance gives the impression of a merge between old and new: Holy Land Experience employees dressed up in a sequined adaptation of 1st century Middle-Eastern clothing hold ticket barcode scanners, standing in front of shiny metal turnstiles under a faux-stone arch. They greet visitors with a respectful “shalom” and hand out stylized maps of the space with a schedule of the “performances” on the back. After entering the park one finds oneself in
the middle of an ancient Middle-Eastern little town carved in plastic and plaster imitating stone, decorated with Roman moldings and vases, fake grass, and plants on the concrete ground. Small posters informing that the place is under camera surveillance are scattered all over the park.

The day at Holy Land Experience is arranged according to “performances,” which are stagings of events based on The New Testament and contemporary adaptations of Biblical parables. These shows seamlessly blend old stories and period-like props with contemporary contexts. The space includes other tourist attractions as well, including the Scriptorium where, according to the flyer, one can find the world’s fourth largest collection of Bibles (Feldman 2002; Radosh 2008); a replica of the cave where Christ was born, which opens to the Last Supper room on the other side; two big gift shops, a cafeteria, in addition to a coffee shop with packaged goods imported from Israel.

The stagings are performed both in the open air and inside buildings, on stages with state-of-the-art sound and lighting. The same actors who take part in the performances can be seen walking around the park throughout the day. They also greet the visitors in the morning when the park opens, and they mingle with them listening about the experience of visiting the park after the last show in the evening. The space is open to be freely explored; it is filled with various period-like amenities, such as a replica of Christ’s tomb, a garden with plants from Israel, and an animated “hall of fame,” with life-size paintings of individuals who played a major part in propagating the Bible throughout history, from Moses to Saint Augustine. To a certain extent the space of Holy Land Experience is a Christian fantasyland. Timothy Beal, a scholar in religious studies, calls it “Christian edutainment” (Beal 2005: 63), which requires both faith in God and a suspension of disbelief to “experience” the Holy Land, instead of a strolling inside plastic mockup.

A number of scholars have tried to uncover the different layers of Holy Land Experience in order to understand what “Holy Land,” “experience,” and “authenticity” signify in such an openly manufactured space. As such, Holy Land Experience neatly falls into the theoretical framework concerning consumer culture, such as Boorstin’s (1992) famous concept of pseudo-event—which included tourism, an imitation of travel—deliberately manufactured, often for the purpose of media attention, or Baudrillard’s (1983, 1994) hyperreality, augmented yet lacking proper meaning. Both these ideas contextualize Holy Land Experience as a simulation oversaturated with symbols, which promises religious “authentic experience.” Interestingly, according to some of the visitors, it succeeds in doing so, as scholars of contemporary tourism point out (Mintz 2010; Urry and Larsen 2011). This is also noted by authors who have visited the park, including Beal (2005), Wharton (2006), Radosh (2008), Dykins Callahan (2010), and Stevenson (2013), albeit they often do so in an ironic manner, mocking the artificiality of the place.

Unlike the actors dressed in period clothing, staff members who wear everyday clothes perform maintenance tasks, which include painting marble-like veins on concrete stairs that lead to a replica of the Jerusalem Temple. This helps sustain the notion of a hyperreal authenticity (Baudrillard 1983, 1994; Wharton 2006): the space is clearly artificial yet the overload of fabricated details (e.g. painted marble veins and fake camel footprints) nonetheless creates convincing shortcuts for the visitors to immerse themselves in what they themselves describe as a spiritual experience. (“It’s very moving,” is a comment I heard from
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several visitors.) This fakeness is not just merely inferior to the original located in the Middle East. Umberto Eco in his descriptions of art and entertainment spaces in the United States, which fit the context of Holy Land Experience particularly well, argues that an excess of hyperrealistic reproductions overflowed with meanings and set in a single place, may eliminate “any need for the original” itself (Eco 1986: 19). This idea is echoed in scholarship on tourism in general. For example, Boorstin claimed that “[t]he tourist looks for caricature (...). The tourist seldom likes the authentic (to him often unintelligible) product of the foreign culture; he prefers his own provincial expectations.” (Boorstin 1992: 106) Thanks to its familiarity and accessibility, the fake replaces the original. Yet it is also real in its consequences, as the classic sociologists Thomas and Thomas (1928: 572) would put it. As can be observed at Holy Land Experience, this process is effective. The visitors are given the opportunity to share a religious experience within the artificial setting of Holy Land Experience, and when asked they gladly confirm this. Thus, based on their reactions, the simulated space acts as a deliberate set of props for entertainment-style yet nonetheless spiritual emotion. The remaining question is whether at Holy Land Experience entertainment is a tool for spirituality, or whether spirituality becomes yet another feature of entertainment?

The First Performances: Jesus and the US Army

Boorstin described pseudo-events as happenings that are carefully choreographed, lack spontaneity, and lead to subsequent pseudo-events. According to the historian, this self-sufficient cycle leads to a feeling of timelessness, a perpetual present. At Holy Land Experience, the “choreography” of the theme park, which controls how visitors move around the place within a given timeframe, plays together with the constant repetition of Christ’s death and resurrection—a significantly abridged version of the Christian calendar. At the park, the day begins at 10 am with a 10-minute long fountain show titled “Crystal Waters.” It is held at a small pond close to the fence through which one can see the road and the cars passing outside. After the show is over, the visitors can meet the actors who walk by dressed in glittery cloaks. The performances at Holy Land Experience are about 30-minutes long, and the first one, titled “Woman at the Well,” is presented on a small open-air stage made to look as if it were carved in stone. The audience, about forty people of all ages, is predominantly white, and according to Kristin Dombek’s (2007) study on Evangelical theme parks, they are mostly conservative Protestant Christians. They sit down on faux-stone benches in front of the stage; as the show progresses, late visitors fill the remaining seats. The same stone-like benches can be found all around the park. On the stage, a woman dressed in period clothes sits next to a well, to give an account of her errors and wrong judgments, and her failed search for “the true messiah.” After a while, she recognizes that the man who joined her by the well and has been listening to her story is, in fact, the messiah. Later, when she recounts the story to her two female friends, they joke, “Jesus told us he liked us better!” The audience reacts with loud laughter and clapping. Despite the stylized 1st century setting, the story sounds relatable. At the same time, it is a playful comedy, in which Christian faith meets mundane mischief.
While the first performance takes the audience into first century Middle East, the subsequent show brings them back to a stylized version of today’s small-town United States. “Celebrate America” is presented inside the Shofar Auditorium nearby, a theater building named after the Old Testament horn, with seats for around three hundred people. The performance is a musical-style comedy of errors about preparations for a small-town celebration. The actors are dressed in white, blue and red, and the American flag motif dominates the stage. Interestingly, this is the only show which lacks direct references to religion, save for the song “God Bless America.” Instead, the entire finale of the performance is dedicated to the US Army. In the culmination of the show, a long-gone son returns home from Iraq, just in time for the town celebration. In an attempt to undermine the fictitiousness of the staging—and what Stevenson (2013) in his book on contemporary Evangelicals in the US calls “re-experience”—the actors on the stage ask the audience to stand up from their seats if they have family members who have served in the army. Some of the viewers rise, and the actors step down from the stage to shake their hands and congratulate them. At the same time, two flat television screens on either sides of the stage show old black-and-white recordings of air bombings, possibly made during World War II. Through this mix of fiction and reality, acting and earnestness, the audience members—and their individual experiences—become part of the performance. The conversations between them and the actors continue also once the show is over; people share their experiences from the army, thanking each other “for their service to the nation,” as I heard many times. This essentially patriotic performance is the only show at Holy Land Experience that does not directly relate to Christ. Instead, it emphasizes the role of America as the “blessed nation” and its exceptional role in the world, although the way this uniqueness is presented boils down to military force. However, given the noticeable number of visitors who claim to have members of the military in their families, this approach makes sense in shaping a notion of community between the viewers and the actors. Furthermore, this intertwining of Christian context, Americanness, and power reinforces the idea of the vital ties between the American nation and God.

Witnessing pt. 1: The Passion of Jesus Christ

“Passion of Jesus Christ” is staged at noon. In a 2008 documentary titled “Religulous” its author, Bill Maher, a comedian and television host, used the performance to mock the supposed mindlessness of American religiosity. After numerous criticisms concerning the brutality of the Passion at Holy Land Experience—the beatings of Christ were disturbingly realistic—(see e.g. Radosh 2008), at the end of the aughts it was transformed into a less gory version, more suitable for families with young children who visit Holy Land Experience. In its present form, the show’s main focus is laid on the tortures of Christ during the Stations of the Cross. During the performance one can understand the criticism of violence, because even now the actor performing the part is beaten with the sound of the whip so realistic it makes one wonder whether his pain is staged. As this is happening, another actor who plays Satan hovers over the stage in a black-and-red cape, laughing devilishly as if in an act of self-mockery. The performance, the first of the two Passion shows staged during the day, ends with the discovery of Christ’s empty tomb. After the performance is finished the
audience, which had filled all the available seats, leaves the building in grim silence, visibly moved by the images of torture.¹

After the first “Passion of Jesus Christ” is finished around 1 pm, the visitors head towards the cafeteria for lunch. Called The Oasis Palms Café, a sunny, cheerful space—a striking contrast to the dark performance—offers typical fast-food fare, including hamburgers, tacos and fried chicken. The coffee shop nearby, small and cozy, sells coffee and cakes, as well as packaged snacks imported from Israel. The waiter there assures me and other people standing in line that they are “real, because they are from The Holy Land.” Her comment seems to emphasize that the experience of flavors from Israel is as important as the visual attractions. When asked how these modern snacks relate to the food that was available two thousand years ago, she responds sternly, “this is the closest you can get,” and adds that the same snacks can be bought in Israel, too.

Collections pt. 1: The Scriptorium

No more than ten people are allowed to enter the Scriptorium at the same time. According to a video playing on the screen above the entrance of the temple-like structure, it houses the fourth biggest collection of the Bibles in the world. One of the recorded donors explains that the idea behind the Scriptorium was to make a space that would not be “intellectual” but broadly available to diverse audiences.² The Scriptorium is something of a Bible-filled cave of wonders. The exhibition is divided into rooms which present the almost two-millennia-long story of writing and translating the Bible, from the times of the Old Testament to the present of preacher television channels. The collection includes hand-written and embroidered objects from the early Middle Ages, rare first printed editions (including a fragment of the Gutenberg Bible from 1455 and King James Bible from 1611; see also: Radosh 2008: 35), as well as modern translations. In each of the rooms a male voice-over recounts the history of the Bible, and his story is accompanied by different light and sound effects. In the rooms, automated life-size figures, which depict Bible copyists from different eras, move in synch with the voice-over, bringing to mind robots found in old-style toy stores. Doors to adjacent rooms open only after the voice-over finishes his monologue in the given room, which prevents the viewers from freely wandering around the place. The “grand finale” takes place in a round room, which is designed in the fashion of a Bible-writers’ hall of fame: heavy red velvet curtains move sideways to reveal life-size paintings of the Holy Book’s writers and interpreters hanging on the wall, while the narrator presents them in a tone resembling introductions of competitors in a television contest. A heavy-looking huge cross, nearly the size of the ceiling, hangs from above, and is accentuated by the loud, perhaps God-like, sounds of lightning and thunder coming from above. As Baudrillard would probably appreciate, inside the Scriptorium spiritual emotion is strengthened by mixing historical artefacts, the

¹ The “Passion” performances are usually presented outside but since it rained during my visit the show was moved to the Shofar Auditorium.
² Before being moved to Holy Land Experience, the collection was kept in Michigan, in the private residence of Robert Van Kampen, a stockbroker who had gathered the manuscripts (see e.g.: Feldman 2002: 18–19).
use of advanced light and sound technology, and easily understood pop cultural references.

Collections pt. 2: Christus Gardens

Life-size cardboard figures invite people inside the Christus Gardens located close by. The paper figures are photographed images of actors who perform at Holy Land Experience and, perhaps surprisingly, Tammy Faye, a hugely popular television preacher who died in 2007. The name “Christus Gardens” is misleading, since the space is in fact a building with rooms, which exhibit scenes from the life of Christ. The tour begins with a random collection of contemporary yet baroque-looking paintings and Bibles in old, intricate covers. The subsequent rooms present life-size silicone figures depicting well-known images from the New Testament, including the nativity scene, Christ’s teachings, and his death. All the scenes are bathed in blue and pink light, while short written descriptions of the scenes, set in a stylized Arabic font, are screened on the back walls from hanging projectors. The final scene in the exhibition, the resurrection, includes a life-size plaster white horse clad in a sparkly silver blanket and bridle, more a fairy tale than the New Testament. Still, what is particularly striking is that instead of the typical suffering long face of Christ found in most religious depictions, at Holy Land Experience the images of the Son of God bear strong masculine features, based on those of the actor who performs the part. The suffering Jesus is thus outshined by the image of a powerful superhero on a white horse, which alludes to an American-type brave cowboy rather than the Christian Good Shepard.

Witnessing pt. 2 and 3: The Last Supper and the Women Who Loved Jesus

According to the Holy Land Experience map, the Qumran Caves are a copy of the caves where the Dead Sea Scrolls, including Old Testament manuscripts, were found. Inside the replica at Holy Land Experience, one can take part in a ten-minute long participatory show, titled “Holy Communion with Jesus.” A poster outside the structure informs that the performance is a “real Mass”—again attempting to transcend fact and fiction, spirituality and entertainment—and only believers in God (presumably Christian) are allowed to participate. The performance is held in a small cave-like room with a big wooden table and stools around it. The actors gathered in the room bear solemn looks on their faces, making the visitors who come inside quickly fall silent. The table, the main feature in the otherwise bare space, is covered with fabric with a Middle-Eastern motif, and a bowl with plastic fruit is placed on top. Around a dozen people sit down at the table on the available seats, a clear allusion to the Last Supper.

The participants are given wooden cups the size of a thimble, and the actors pour dark grape juice into them; alcohol is not allowed on the premises. Next, they hand out bite-sized

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3 Faye was also famous for supporting gays, her love of heavy makeup, and Heritage USA, a now defunct Christian theme park which was one of the most popular vacation destinations in the United States in the 1980s (see: Martz, and Smith 1987).
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pieces of matzo bread. A bearded man dressed in a stylized beige-and-brown cloak enters the room, and stands in front of the table. He then begins a monologue, during which he talks about the difficulty of doing the right things in life, and about being forced to choose between lesser evils. His talk—like that of the woman by the well in the first performance of the day—is easy to fill with one’s own particular stories, whether in the first or in the twenty-first century. After a couple of minutes another bearded man enters the room, embraces the first one, and begins his part of the performance. It turns out to be the ritual of the Eucharist, and the man’s appearance and gestures suggest he is playing the role of Christ. He picks up the matzo bread and recites, “This is my body which is for you. Do this in remembrance of me.” He continues, “This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me,” and drinks the juice from the wooden cup. People at the table follow, nodding at each other in silence and as if in a suspension of disbelief allowing them to confirm that they are witnessing an extraordinary spiritual event. After the staging of the Eucharist is over, another door opens for the people to leave. The staff tells them to keep the wooden cups, stressing that they are made of wood from Israel. As in the café, the physical closeness of objects to the real Holy Land makes them special, and closer to God, while people become “attendants” to a spiritual event, as Stevenson (2013: 55) put it, rather than merely visitors or even passive witnesses of happenings at an entertainment theme park.

The second-to-last performance in the day’s schedule, “The Four Women Who Loved Jesus” centers on four Biblical women, Mary Magdalene among others, who “confess” to the audience how they learned to love Christ. Their stories emphasize “unconditional acceptance” and “love,” saving oneself from the “false morality” of peers, and giving up “the sinful life.” The women’s accounts, well known to anyone familiar with the New Testament, are, again, presented in a personal and emotional manner. People in the audience cry and enthusiastically applaud the moral transformation of the characters, which was made possible thanks to God. In fact, it seems that what makes the performance relatable is the audience’s passionate reaction to the contemporary adaptation of Biblical stories. What’s more, the viewers’ excitement is crucial to make the performance a communal experience, and not “just” a show to be watched. The actors in the performance emphasize that faith in God provides answers to all possible questions; reality is fundamentally black and white. Conversely, without faith one is hopelessly lost in desires, unable to make moral decisions. Thus, divine grace is presented as a choice not only obvious but almost pragmatic: why would one not choose clear answers to life? At Holy Land Experience the offered spirituality is saved from ambiguity, even if the space itself is overflowing with paradoxes.

Stores, Karaoke, and Playgrounds

When not attending a performance or exploring the space, the visitors spend their time browsing in the park’s souvenir shops. One is located close to the entrance, another is attached to the Scriptorium, while the biggest store is directly accessible from the Shofar Auditorium. In addition to the large number of religious publications, from Bibles to celebrity preacher self-help books, the stores offer a wide range of trinkets including mugs, plastic
and silver jewelry, t-shirts, bags with cross details, colorful travel water coolers, as well as organic cosmetics from the Dead Sea, the latter another sign of the assumed physical closeness to the original Holy Land. While the first two shops are styled to look like bookstores, the shop next to the Shofar Auditorium looks like a merge of fairy tale and Christmas. The space is flooded in blue and pink light, and the glow is reflected on mirror panels hanging on walls and crystal adornments scattered all over the place, creating an unreal, magical atmosphere. A white seven-foot tall plastic silver tree lit with small lights, a clear allusion to Christmas, adds a feeling of holiday celebration. Yet in stark contrast to the dreamy store, a huge three-dimensional model of first century Jerusalem, similar to those found in museums, fills an entire room directly connected both to the Shofar Auditorium and the souvenir shop. People walk around the structure, while a voice-over gives an imaginary tour of the city several times during the day.

Outside, Smile of a Child Adventure Land, an area created specifically for children, loosely based on Biblical motifs and fairy tales, is located close to the park’s entrance. Save for the cafes, it is the most leisure-focused area in the park. The small space includes a playground—part jungle, part ocean—with plastic animals scattered around. The playground acts as an adaptation of Noah’s Ark, but with the addition of life-size figures of Christ placed in random places, including one on a tree. In addition, a nativity scene with plastic figures in the size of the children is on display. The visitors can also stick their heads on top of headless Disney-like carton figures, often found in amusement parks. At Holy Land Experience it is a princess in a blue long dress, holding a red rose in her hands, and a knight in red armor, bearing a sword and shield, a gold lion standing on his hind legs drawn on his armed chest. Although the space is intended for small children, during my visit it was primarily occupied by adults. Furthermore, there, too, the mix of Biblical and fairy-tale motifs seems to merge faith and fable into one.

Witnessing pt. 4: The Passion with a Happy Ending

“We Shall Behold Him!” is the final show of the day; it is an extended version of the Passion performed at noon. The performance repeats the violent beatings shown in the morning, but continues with Christ’s resurrection. At Holy Land Experience it is a white, gold and glitter musical-style grand finale with angels, musical-like dance routines and confetti falling from the ceiling. Christ is reborn with a million-dollar smile and a huge byzantine-looking glittery crown. The performance is loud and moving, and by the end of the show nearly half of the audience has tears pouring down their cheeks. It is spectacular as shows on Broadway and Las Vegas, but the spiritual theme makes the one at Holy Land Experience feel more profound: it is not merely about the viewers’ excitement, but about the resurrection of Jesus, the pivotal moment of the New Testament. Interestingly, at the theme park it is presented mostly as a sensory experience. The audience appears to be seized by the loudness, the rapidly flashing lights, the dance, and the music. The performance concludes with “Miracles,” which turn out to be four themes of open-group prayers: “Salvation,” “Children,” “Holy Spirit,” and “Health.” People gather under one of the four banners to pray, while the actor playing the resurrected Christ greets and embraces them. This act looks like one
last attempt to merge fiction with reality, the audience with the actors—all witnesses to the “re-experience” of the Bible, not just tourists inside a theme park. Finally, the manager of Holy Land Experience, a grey-haired man dressed in plain clothes, walks up the stage to thank the visitors for their participation, another personal touch to the performance of the Biblical resurrection. At six in the afternoon the show is over. The actors and visitors thank each other for coming and shake hands; people begin to leave the park. The same set of performances takes place at Holy Land Experience every day of the week except Sundays.

**Inventing Spiritual “Authenticity”**

After the final performance is finished, one can feel a sense of emotional community and spiritual elation among the audience. People’s impassioned reactions to the show suggest that there may be something cathartic about the experience of witnessing, “re-experiencing” Biblical events, even if they are staged. In the name of faith, Holy Land Experience attempts to transcend the boundaries of time, space, and materiality, disregarding historical contexts, opting for a fundamentally contemporary, eclectic, pop-cultural, and entertainment-laced mix. In the performances, and at Holy Land Experience in general, despite the aim to provide the “real” experience, as the park’s leaflet claims, the interpretation of the New Testament appears to escape time and space. It is a blend of physical (replicas of places, products from Israel), Biblical (staging stories from the New Testament), historical (the collection of Bibles at the Scriptorium), fable (the white horse at Christus Gardens, the fairy-tale characters on the playground), and contemporary entertainment (musical-like performances, Christ’s portrayal as superhero). Faith in the Christian God is to be strengthened by a strong sensory experience, which is supposed to lead to an emotional one, rather than intellectual deliberation. Yet, at the same time, Holy Land Experience is a site which not only creates a substitute for the Holy Land, but also for theme-park entertainment. It is replica of both, since it offers neither the actual space, nor the carefree fun.

What appears particularly interesting at Holy Land Experience is that it offers a notion of a direct experience of spiritual presence in a space that looks more secular than sacred, and is located in the middle of America’s most popular entertainment theme park strip. This is achieved in a place without any official religious affiliation—there are no pastors or priests at Holy Land Experience, although the actors are claimed to be ministers (see: Eckholm 2012).

At the same time, locating a place that claims to offer a spiritual Christian experience inside a major theme park area, all while applying the usual colorful, plastic theme-park “look,” is a deliberate choice. This can be seen as an intentional adaptation of spiritual experience into a reality where entertainment is key. The visual appearance of Holy Land Experience is not only useful in attracting potential visitors, it also makes interpretations of the Bible and Christianity in general more familiar, by using the tools offered by the rules of entertainment: enchantment, surprise, spiritual emotionality, sensory experience, and grandeur. Holy Land Experience is visually arresting, yet probably not as recreational as other theme parks focused solely on providing entertainment. Yet this manufactured, and paradoxically more familiar, space may turn the spiritual experience into a more direct one,
in line with Boorstin’s (1992) argument that the tourist does not understand and is scared of the complexities of foreign places.

The assumption made by the Holy Land Experience staff I talked to is that visitors—mostly white and, to a lesser extent, Latino and black, Americans—are religious. While they might go to have fun at Sea World tomorrow, they come to Holy Land Experience to learn about Jerusalem in the times of Christ, and to practice faith in an entertaining, leisurely setting. However fabricated the space, it provides aesthetic and intellectual shortcuts which, as the viewers gladly emphasize, lead to a spiritual experience they find authentic.

“Authentic Experiences”

Given the explicit artificiality of Holy Land Experience, the shows bring to mind the Aristotelian notion of theater mimesis where, unlike simple representations, conventional settings and gestures are able to create a direct, authentic experience (Aristotle 2008; see also: Stevenson 2013). The performances shown at Holy Land Experience are clearly inspired by popular American musicals and films, hence the sequins, dance choreography and a handsome, hyper-masculine version of Christ that could appear on the cover of “GQ” magazine. Holy Land Experience attempts to fit practically the entire space of Biblical Jerusalem on fifteen acres. In an interview, Rosenthal, the founder of the park stated, “all we’ve done is condense everything that’s in the real Holy Land (...). You’d have to go about 30 miles to get from the Western Wall of the Great Temple to the Qumran Caves, but we’ve got it just about 75 yards away” (see: Goodheart 2001). In this excess, the increasing lack of space for reflection does not seem accidental. It is, rather, a deliberate choice made to attract people to spaces of religion while veiling much of religion’s contemplative quality. Dan Hayden, the park’s executive director argues in a somewhat Baudrillardian manner, “The Holy Land Experience is like a historical novel, where the novel is not authentic but the history is.” (Radosh 2008: 31) Within these reductions, Christian religion is boiled down to loud, gaudy aesthetics and emotional thrill, which the visitors appreciate.

The emotional aspect of Christian spirituality encouraged at Holy Land Experience resonates with Thomas Luhmann’s (2005) and Peter Berger’s (1999) arguments about the exceptionality of contemporary American Christianity, with its privatized and impassioned approach. On a general level, it includes shortcuts of an imagined—or invented, using Anderson’s (1983) term—history of religion, which is linked to the nation-state, in order to make strong claims about the present. The show, “Celebrate America,” is the most vivid example of this approach. The reinvented history is presented as self-evident, and modernity, too, is interpreted using this particular logic, familiar and easily understandable to those acquainted with Christianity, particularly its Evangelical version (see: Beal 2005). Within this religious realm, non-religious elements such as theme-park-style entertainment are used as visual cues to impose new, invented meanings of the religious past. An example of this is the mixing of replicas of Old Testament sites with contemporary snacks from Israel. They reinforce the idea of the importance of history and geographic
space, even if it is a fabricated one. The idea is much in line with the argument of the social thinker, Maurice Halbwachs, according to whom “the past does not recur as such, (...) everything seems to indicate that the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present” (Halbwachs 1980: 39–40). If the invented past gains an independent value as a central point of reference for the present, creating a yesteryear to fit today’s needs becomes particularly significant. In a way, Holy Land Experience points both at the ambiguity and at the power of the past in the present. While it is centered on the historical evidence of spiritual presence, what is shown are material artifacts and replicas, since the past, as the historian Pierre Nora claims, “can now be constructed out of virtually anything” (Nora 1998: 12). However, even if in this context Halbwachs’s and Nora’s arguments strike as “simulacral,” the meanings implied in the space of the theme park are carefully constructed. Holy Land Experience uses the concept of theme parks to reformulate it in a spiritually-focused manner, hence the adoption of leisure and imitation as familiar props for religious elation (see: Ritzer and Liska 1997; Baudrillard 1998; Bauman 2005; Urry and Larsen 2011). Simultaneously, while in its flyers the theme park advertises an “authentic experience” of a historical time and place (see: Wharton 2006), at the same time it emphasizes specific connections with the present, including US military actions abroad and the country’s amicable relations with Israel—the latter particularly important for Evangelicals, as Beal (2005) stresses. Although what is to be “authentically experienced” is supposedly the spiritual elation that was felt by the witnesses of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, this form of spirituality is a contemporary concept, deeply imbedded in US history of religious spirituality and contemporary entertainment. Thus, the American theme park uses condensed versions of the past to offer a contemporary religious and national ideology.

Borrowing Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) term culturalism, at Holy Land Experience one can notice that this populist, strategic involvement in history aimed at influencing the present is linked with Christianity and with the nation-state. However, the strong emphasis laid on this connection may be a sign that the present is far more ambiguous than the park’s simplified imagery and black-and-white answers suggest. Interestingly, Victor Turner (1974) emphasizes that stylized rituals become particularly significant in times of uncertainty. At the theme park, the culturalist strategy is a deliberate choice posing as common-sense, everyday certitude. The invented past is mythologized in a controlled environment where other interpretations are cut off by a single, powerful imposed set of meanings. At the same time, however, this environment is sensitive to outside customs and interpretations, which are carefully allowed in as long as they can be made part of the dominant interpretation. Fast food and standard tourist souvenirs are an example of this approach.

Holy Land Experience claims to fight for the power of Christianity in a world of entertainment and consumption. Hence, on the one hand, Christianity’s traditional, established status is used to justify its significance. On the other hand, the theme park serves as an example of attempts made to translate Christianity into present-day customs and lifestyles—beginning with the park’s location. Promising direct access to the “authentic” divinity of the Biblical past raises the question whether contemporary spirituality is merely an emotional, sensory replica, yearning for an imagined “authenticity” of the past. The “authentic
experience” offered at Holy Land Experience is an illustration of this ambiguity: is it entertainment-based spirituality or spiritualized entertainment?  

Acknowledgments

My research at Holy Land Experience was made possible thanks to the Kosciuszko Foundation’s scholarship.

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4 Another example of the tensions between fact and fiction at Holy Land Experience is more recent and much more mundane: the theme park’s financial troubles have led to a major sale of furniture, props, and statues from the park (Brinkmann 2016).


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Polish Sociological Review

Reviewers 2017

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