**Title:** Conservative Dilemmas in the Face of Value Change?

Exploring the Relationship Between Conservative Values and Right-Wing Populist Voting in Increasingly Progressive Political Landscapes


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**Reader's Note:** This manuscript is a draft. Parts of the theoretical argumentation have not yet been finalised. Results are preliminary. Figures included are rudimentary yet.

# Conservative Dilemmas in the Face of Value Change?

# Exploring the Relationship Between Conservative Values and Right-Wing Populist Voting in Increasingly Progressive Political Landscapes

**Maximilian Etzel**

### Abstract

The rise of right-wing populist actors in Western democracies has sparked interest among political scholars in the relationship between personal values and electoral support for right-wing populist parties. Studies have found a complex relationship between conservative values and right-wing populist voter turnout, mostly indicating a positive effect of conservative values on electoral support for populist actors. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between conservative values, captured by the higher-order value *conservation* in Schwartz's theory of basic human values, and voting for right-wing populist parties by examining the role of the liberal versus authoritarian composition of the party landscape as a moderating factor. This paper contributes to the literature by examining this effect over time and investigating evidence that the influence of the political context on the relationship between values and voting has become stronger over the last two decades as a result of value change. Based on data from the European Social Survey Rounds 1-9 and the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 1999-2019, the study uses multilevel regression models to analyse this hypothesis. The results support the assumption that voting for right-wing populists increases of individuals with a higher priority for conservative values in more liberal party landscapes. Moreover, evidence indicates that this moderation effect increased over time.

**Introduction**

One of the most significant developments in the previously relatively stable pattern of voting behaviour in recent decades is undoubtedly the emergence and strengthening of right-wing populist parties in European democracies. Investigating the reasons for the success of these populist parties, left-right or authoritarian-libertarian divides have been identified as cleavages that can explain voting patterns associated with right-wing populist votes - alongside numerous other predictors. Research has shown that personal values - among other factors, especially socio-economic ones - play a significant role in shaping political orientations such as 'left' and 'right' (Piurko et al., 2011). Regarding the choice of right-wing populist actors, individuals with more conservative, traditional values are more likely to vote for them (Marcos-Marne, 2021; Ozdemir and Jacob, 2022; Baro, 2022). However, theoretical assumptions and empirical results indicate that conservation values, which involve a desire for social order, certainty, and hierarchy, are negatively associated with support for right-wing populism (Hawkins, 2009; Marcos-Marne, 2019).

The present study addresses this unclear relationship and focuses on the question of why conservative individuals should vote for right-wing populist parties. Concentrating on conservative values, we aim to investigate whether and under which contextual conditions individuals with more conservative values vote for right-wing populist parties instead of conservative ones. We hypothesize that, at the contextual level of the national party landscape, a moderator is in place that makes it unattractive for some of these conservative individuals to vote for conservative parties, leading them to choose a right-wing populist alternative instead. In line with the cultural backlash thesis proposed by Inglehart and Norris (2017, 2019), we theorize that societal value changes in the last decades have led to a predominance of more progressive or 'left'[ii] values also at the party-political level. We assume that the ideological composition of the respective party landscape exerts a mediating effect on the relationship between conservative values and electoral support for right-wing populist parties. In more progressive party landscapes (on average), conservatives are more likely to vote for right-wing populist actors. We also assume that this mediation effect has become stronger over the past decades, aligning with the growing 'progressiveness' of the party landscape and can therefore explain the rise of right-wing populist forces.

To examine these assumptions, we rely on data from the European Social Survey Round 1-9 (ESS) for measuring the relationship between personal values and voting behaviour on an individual level. Additionally, we use Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999-2019 (CHES) data (Jolly et al, 2022) to estimate the liberal vs. authoritarian orientation of the party landscape at a contextual level. Employing time series analysis for the years 2002-2020 based on multilevel multinomial regression models, our results indicate that (1) the content of party politics has indeed become more progressive (on average) over the analysed period and (2) the likelihood of right-wing populist voting increases for individuals prioritizing conservative values, particularly in more progressive party landscapes.

## From personal values to voting behaviour

Putting the analysis on a solid theoretical framework, we first elaborate the relationship between personal values and voting behaviour. From there, we contextualise right-wing populist voting and political trust (as an appromiximation whenever populist voting could not be measured) and link this with arguments from classical value change theory to develop hypotheses.

Values are universal and relatively stable beliefs that shape personal preferences and influence individual worldviews (Feldmann, 2003; Schwartz et al., 2014). For Schwartz (1992, p. 4), values are "cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, transsituational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life." They determine what individuals consider desirable, motivate actions and serve as standards for evaluating or justifying behaviour and social phenomena (Leimgruber 2011; Miles, 2015). Moreover, value patterns as regulators of social interactions and group dynamics may differ between countries or cultures; nevertheless, a common structure of shared values can be assumed (Schwartz, 1994). One essential characteristic of values is their hierarchical order in terms of relative importance, implying that certain values are more important and relevant to an individual than others (ibd.). Their underlying function as a framework for worldview and actions constitutes the values-attitudes-behaviour model, which states that values fundamentally drive attitudes, which in turn guide (political) actions (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz et al., 2010).

Research indicates a close relationship between personal and political values, albeit both are not congruent (Goren, 2005). Thus, personal values translate into political ones by underpinning the structuring and organisation of core political values ((Baro, 2022; Schwartz et al, 2010). Personal values shape political values, leading to political attitudes, which in turn influence political behaviour, especially in form of voting intentions (Schwartz, 1977; Homer & Kahle, 1988; Schwartz et al, 2010). Following this assumption, we assume that personal values constitute a significant determinant of electoral behaviour based on this derivation of the value-attitudes-behaviour pyramid. This assumption is supported by various studies that have found associations between values and party preferences (Schwartz, 1994; Caprara et al, 2006) and predicted voting behaviour despite cultural differences and differences in political systems (Barnea, 2003; Caprara et al, 2006). Personal values are also found to influence political attitudes (Piurko et al., 2011; Kulin & Svallfors, 2013; Araujo et al., 2020) and political behaviour in general (Caprara et al., 2006; Leimgruber, 2011; Barnea & Schwartz, 1998) and significantly between voters of different parties (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Barnea, 2003).

The two (arguably) most recognised value concepts for measuring value orientations are Inglehart's post-materialism index (Inglehart, 1977, 1981) and Schwartz's theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992, 2021). As we focus on individual values in the analytical part of this paper, we use the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) to measure Schartz' basic human values, even though we also base our argumentation on Inglehart's theory of value change.

**Value change, political trust and populist vote**

In order to work out the link from personal values to populist vote, this study builds on the classic definition of populism by Mudde (2004, p.543), who describes populism as "thin ideology that divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, namely 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite". This concept is extended by the ideational approach of Hawkins et al. (2018) and Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2022), who argue that political discourse from a populist perspective is always located within the conflict between the will of the people and the (perceived) conspiratorial elites. Moreover, this is also expressed in the three core characteristics of populism: anti-elitism, people-centrism, and a

Manichean world view (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). At this point, we refrain from discussing the rich body of literature analysing the success of populist actors, as this is beyond the scope of this analysis. In the following, we limit the discussion to the relationship between conservative values and populist vote (and political trust) at the individual level and between value change and electoral support for populists in a societal context.

Focusing on the macro-level, the cultural backlash hypothesis by Inglehart and Norris (2019) offers a useful approach to explaining the success of populist forces in terms of society (the associated political sphere) as a whole. In their widely recognised publication under the same title, they argue that changing values have led to a predominantly progressive society and politics, resulting in traditionally minded people no longer feeling adequately represented socially and politically. By linking economic factors, they are able to explain populist phenomena such as Brexit, Trump's US presidency and the rise of right-wing populist forces in Europe. The present study is based on the core thesis of cultural backlash hypothesis and its foundation in classical value change theory (Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1981, Inglehart and Abramson, 1999). Following this approach, the cleavage between conservative (materialistic) and progressive (post-materialistic) values is essential in explaining phenomena such as the rise of right-wing populism and the election of right-wing populist parties on macro level. According to the core thesis of value change theory, older cohorts with materialistic values due to the post-war period were followed by younger generations who were characterised by more post-materialistic values due to the lack of existential (primarily economic) threats (Inglehart, 1971, Inglehart and Abramson, 1999). At a social level, this also led to a change in the predominant values and resulted in a shift towards more liberal, progressive ones, replacing traditional, more conservative values. At a social level, this also led to a change in the predominant values and resulted in a shift towards more liberal, progressive ones, replacing traditional, more conservative values (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, 2017). Thus, the predominance of progressive liberal values leads to a perception of political alienation and lack of responsiveness of the political system among individuals with a traditional value orientation. This mechanism forms the basis of the concept of the "cultural backlash" (Inglehart and Norris, 2016), understood as a counter-reaction to this emergence of post-materialistic ideals, which in turn manifests

itself in (among other political behaviour) electoral support for right-wing populist parties (Inglehart and Norris, 2017).

As already mentioned, we use Schwartz's (1992, 2021) value concept to capture individual values in this study. An extensive body of literature deals with the relationship between personal values and populism at the individual level (e.g. Marcos-Marne, 2019, 2021; Baro 2022; Ozdemir and Jacob, 2022). Even though the concept of personal values covers more values (such as openness to change or self-transcendence), we will limit ourselves to the value conservation at this point due to the focus of our study (Schwartz 2021). It is widely assumed that conservative values have a positive effect on voting for right-wing populist parties, due to overlaps in the ideological basis of both world views. Thus, both share a sense of nostalgia on the one hand (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018) and an antipathy towards progressive ideas on the other (Canovan, 2004). Populism as an ideology idealises a (mostly non-existent) past of economic and cultural security as well as a traditional understanding of family and community. This past has supposedly been replaced by a dysfunctional political system that is described as corrupt and decadent (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018; Elçi, 2022) and where individuals are under constant threat from globalisation and migration (Kenny, 2018). Several studies provide empirical evidence for the deduced assumption that conservative values are more likely to lead to voting for right-wing populist parties (e.g. Marcos-Marne, 2019; Baro, 2022; Etzel forthcoming). However, there are also contrary arguments that assume a certain resilience of conservatives towards populism. Accordingly, conservatism prioritises the preservation of the given order and thus also the stability of the prevailing political system. This also applies to the hierarchical structure of the political sphere in particular, which is headed by elites (Marcos-Marne, 2019). However, this conflicts with the aforementioned revolutionary element of populism and its desire to abolish the existing structures (Hawkins, 2009). Nevertheless, the argumentation of this study follows the assumption of a positive relationship and sees the macro-level moderation effect postulated here as an influencing factor that increases the probability of right-wing populist voting by conservative individuals rather than seeking to preserve existing political realities (Etzel, forthcoming).

Since this study aims to investigate the relationship between feelings of nonrepresentation of conservative individuals in predominantly progressive societies in the form of party landscape and the resulting electoral support for populist parties in its over time development (according to the assumption of value change as a long-term process), it faces the problem that the relevance of populists is a rather recent phenomenon of the last years. The political behaviour that is currently expressed in populist support is difficult to measure empirically for the 2000s and 2010s by means of voting for populist parties. As the rise of populist parties and their anchoring in European party systems only took place over this period, there are insufficient case numbers available on individual level. Therefore, political trust is used as an approximation for the measurement points before the satisfactory measurability of support for populists. Political trust is a concept that is closely linked to populist attitudes. The relationship of populists to political, media and legal institutions is strongly influenced by their two key features of anti-elitism and people-centrism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012, Fawzi 2019). These institutions represent the political order, which populist forces are antagonistic towards due to their oppositional stance to the given political order (Huber et al, 2022). As an expression of their often revolutionary character, populists want to abolish and replace the social and political structures on which (political) institutions are based (Hawking 2009). Prior cross-national research supports the assumption that populist attitudes and institutional trust, such as confidence in the government (Tranter and Both, 2015) and in political parties, parliaments as well as politicians (Fairbrother et al, 2019), are closely linked. Based on these theoretical arguments and prior findings, we assume that political trust and populist attitudes are closely interlinked. In line with this assumption, we use institutional trust as an approximation in the analytical part of this study where right-wing populist vote cannot be operationalised.


**Progressive party landscapes and the conservative dilemma**

This study aims to link the macro-level, in the form of the mechanism postulated by the cultural backlash hypothesis, and the micro-level, the individual relationship between right-wing populist voting. Therefore, we argue that the liberalisation of the party landscape (as a macro level) acts as a moderator, which affects individuals with traditional value orientations and increases their likelihood to vote for

right-wing populists instead of conservative parties. Assuming that the degree of liberalisation in the party landscape as such moderation effect, we still need to clarify how the societal shift from conservative to progressive values has influenced political parties and translated these changes to the political sphere.

Following the concept of value change, the result is a society with predominantly progressive and liberal values (Inglehart, 1977, 1997). More conservative (mostly economically orientated) values, on the other hand, lost relevance. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the value change has taken place in society as a whole. Etzel (2023), for example, argues that the public (and political) discourse is primarily shaped by the actors with the most power resources and influence of society and politics: namely the elites (Hoffmann-Lange, 2008). In terms of their socio-demographic characteristics, they are fundamentally characterised by a high level of education, high economic wealth and a secure social status (Helbling and Teney, 2015). These are exactly those socio-economic conditions which, according to value change theory, lead to a post-materialistic progressive value set (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, 2019). It can therefore be assumed that the influence on sectors of society of people with a more progressive orientation is higher and especially the party landscape, shaped by predominantly progressive political elites, also underlies this influence mechanism (Etzel, 2023). Furthermore, this hypothesis is reinforced by the assumption that politicians, regardless of their individual values, advocate more progressive policies for purely opportunistic reasons in order to increase their share of the vote among the electorate with the highest political participation, post-materialistic oriented citizens (Etzel, forthcoming). Beyond the elite argument, research also indicates that the political participation of materialists and post-materialists differs (Inglehart and Abramson, 1999). For example, post-materialists have a higher voter turnout (Dalton, 2018; Norris, 2002), while materialists are characterised by lower participation rates and less political interest (Inglehart, 1981). Taken together, it can therefore be argued that political issues and topics in modern societies are primarily characterised by more progressive, liberal influences (Inglehart and Norris, 2017).

Assuming a society in the sense of this argumentation raises a question: what about conservative parties as a natural representation of conservative minded citizens? In line with findings showing that

individuals with trait values in more progressive societies have lower scores in external political efficacy (Etzel 2023) and a higher propensity to vote right-wing populist (Etzel, forthcoming), we assume that (to some extent) conservatives in such contexts face a dilemma. We theorise that conservatives no longer feel adequately represented, not even by conservative parties, and therefore no longer vote for them. Instead, they switch to voting for right-wing populist parties (ibid.). We also assume that this moderation effect of more liberal party landscapes has developed over time, that party landscapes (and thus also conservative parties) have tended to become more progressive and that increasingly larger segments of the conservative electorate have therefore fallen out of congruence with conservative parties in terms of political issues. An alternative for those who participate politically was increasingly represented by right-wing populist parties, which for the previously mentioned reasons represented an ideologically meaningful alternative for people with conservative values.

The argumentation of this study can be summarised as follows: 1) In Western countries, value change has led to an increase in more liberal, progressive values, which have taken on a predominantly more prominent position than conservative values. As these liberal values - through more social influence and higher political participation of people with progressive values - have a higher potential to be translated into the political sphere, it can be assumed that this process has also led to a predominance of progressive and liberal politics. In its consequence, this leads to feelings of political alienation or exclusion of conservative materialistic individuals and thus to a higher susceptibility to populism (respectively to a lack of political trust). Building on this theoretical base, we hypothesise:

> *Hypothesis 1a (H1): More liberal party landscapes will amplify the positive effect of conservation on voting for right-wing populist parties (for ESS Rounds 7-9).*

As value change in the classical sense is an intergenerational process (Inglehart, 1977; 1997) the emergence of predominantly progressive party landscapes has a temporal dimension. Even if we do not consider a process over generations for the mechanism postulated here, we do assume 2) that it is affected by temporal change. In the core thesis of this study, we therefore assume that the moderating effect of party landscapes on the relationship between conservative values and right-wing populist votes

(or political trust) has first become effective and then stronger over time. We therefore hypothesise as the centrepiece of our analysis:

*Hypothesis 2 (H2): The moderation effect postulated in H1 becomes stronger throughout the measurement points (ESS Rounds 1-9).*

## Data and Methods

For individual level, this study uses data from the European Social Survey. All available data points are used to capture the trend of the analysed moderation effect over time. This includes ESS Round 1 (collected from September 2002 to December 2003), Round 2 (August 2004 to July 2006), Round 3 (August 2006 - September 2007), Round 4 (August 2010 - October 2013), Round 5 (August 2012 - December 2013), Round 6 (August 2014 - December 2015), Round 7 (August 2014 - December 2015), Round 8 (August 2016 - December 2017), and Round 9 (August 2018 - January 2020)[ii]. To operationalise the degree of 'progressiveness' of every country's party landscape at the context level, we use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey CHES. Here, the years 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2019 are available as measurement points. Due to the lack of congruence between the survey dates at individual and context level, we have linked the data as shown in Table 1. Generally, the measurement date of the CHES data should be prior to that of the ESS, as we also work with the recall of the voting decisions. However, as the CHES 2014 survey was a long time ago in the case of ESS Round 9, we switched to the closer source CHES 2019. In addition, ESS 2006 was linked to CHES 2002, as otherwise the CHES 2006 data would have been linked to a total of three ESS rounds.

*[Table 1 near here]*

### *Voting Decision and Political Trust*

Since, as already mentioned, it is not possible to capture voting for right-wing populist parties via all ESS rounds, political trust is also used as a dependent variable. This is possible with all ESS rounds. Using this approach, we can cover a much longer period of time and find solid indications of whether any effect found is a short-term variation or a longer-lasting trend. The analysis is therefore divided into

two different parts. Part 1 forms the 'core' of the analysis and includes all measurement points for which right-wing populist votes can be recorded. These are ESS rounds 7, 8 and 9. Part 2 includes all ESS rounds and uses political trust as the dependent variable. As ESS Round 1 contains fewer countries than the other rounds, the analyses for Part 2 were also carried out again with ESS Round 2-9 for robustness check.

In order to operationalise voting for right-wing populist parties, the voting decision in the last national election (before the respective ESS round) was applied. The PopuList dataset (Rooduijn *et al*, 2019) was used to identify right-wing populist parties. This contains the categorisation of the relevant European parties in terms of populist (and also far-right and far-left) based on Mudde's (2004) populism definition and is peer-reviewed by over 80 scholars (Rooduijn *et al*, 2019). Based on this categorisation and the voting decision, a dichotomous variable was created indicating whether the respondents voted for a right-wing populist party (1) or did not (0)[iii]. For an overview of the right-wing populist parties by country see table 2.

*[Table 2 near here]*

Political trust was measured using four items that are part of the ESS questionnaires. Respondents were asked about their trust in the national parliament, politicians, political parties and the European Parliament on a scale from 0-10. Given that the focus of this study is on political trust, trust in other institutions such as the police or universities was not taken into account. All four variables were aggregated by mean, resulting in a variable that indicates high levels of political trust for high values and low levels for low values.

### *Country Samples and Analysis Models*

As the countries surveyed were not identical for all ESS rounds and some countries do not have any relevant right-wing populist parties, the country samples differ between the two analysis parts. However, the same countries and respondent samples were used within the analysis parts. All countries with at least one operationalisable right-wing populist party were selected for part 1 of the analysis. Moreover,

all countries that were not part of all three linked CHES surveys in 2010, 2014 and 2019 were excluded. This results in a sample covering a total of 16 countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, Switzerland and Norway.[iv]

For Part 2 of the analysis, without the restriction of the existence of right-wing populist parties, a sample from a total of 12 countries was obtained: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Due to the relatively small samples, the model was run again with ESS rounds 2-9 as described, which extends the sample by Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia to a total of 19 countries.

To test the hypotheses of this paper and account for the multilevel structure of the data due to the contextual level of the different country samples, this study used a series of multilevel logistic regression models (for explanation of right-wing populist vote) as well as multilevel linear regressions (to examine effects on political trust). This approach enabled the analysis of direct effects at the individual level (H1a and H1b) and the modelling of cross-level interactions between variables at the individual and context levels (H2; Aguinis *et al*, 2013).

*Individual level*

The aforementioned Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), which was used in all ESS rounds, is used to record value orientations at an individual level. The PVQ measures personal values using a total of 10 values, with each value comprising three to six items. Each item contains a character description for which the respondent provides information on how similar this person is to them on a scale from 'very much like me' to 'not like me at all'. These 10 values can be grouped into four superordinate values, which are conservation (comprising tradition, security, and conformity); self-enhancement (comprising power and achievement); self-transcendence (comprising benevolence and universalism); and openness to change (comprising self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism). These values constitute a conflict compatibility structure and ought to be included in the analysis as predictors in their entirety (Schwartz, 2006). Further, higher order values should be used to minimise multicollinearity (Davidov *et al*, 2014).

Consequently, the other three values self-enhancement, self-transcendence, and openness to change were also included in the model, although only conservation was relevant for our study. In accordance with the recommendations of the ESS, the items were first recoded to establish that a high score is associated with a high expression of that value type and then aggregated by mean. Since studies confirmed the structure of human values and cross-cultural measurement invariance (Schwartz and Cieciuch, 2021; Schwartz *et al*, 2014; Davidov *et al*, 2008), the focus here is limited to testing internal consistency, which was considered sufficient for all higher-order values. The reliability values for all higher order values across all ESS rounds can be taken from Table 3.

*[Table 3 near here]*

### *Context level*

For the purpose of operationalising the degree of liberalisation of the party landscape at context level, the ratings on the political issues with a cultural focus were selected from the CHES data sets. Issues with an economic reference were omitted, as the theoretical foundation of this analysis is mainly based on cultural issues. Moreover, issues on urban–rural divide, cosmopolitanism, decentralisation, international security, and position towards the United States from the "policy dimensions" of the CHES were also excluded, as these could not be clearly categorised within the liberal-conservative continuum. In addition to the overall position of the parties in the materialism-post-materialism cleavage (GALTAN), the resulting selection includes parties' position on nationalism (NATIONALISM), law and order (CIVLIB_LAWORDER), multiculturalism (MULTICULTURALISM), social lifestyle (SOCIALLIFESTYLE), immigration (IMMIGRATE_ POLICY), and ethnic minorities (ETHNIC_MINORITIES). All selected ratings were aggregated for all non-populist parties to an overall mean value. In order to control for the relevance of every party in the associated party system, the issue variables were weighted with the share of vote of this party in the last national election. The result is a variable that contains a weighted value for each country and each CHES survey date, which indicates the average position of all relevant parties together in the spectrum between liberal and conservative[v]. Table 4 displays the descriptives for the dependent and all independent variables.

*[Table 4 near here]*

## Control Variables

As controls, variables related to right-wing populist vote are used. Specifically, these are self-placement on the left-right scale, attitudes towards immigration, satisfaction with national government and economic situation in respective country as well as gender, education – following the ISCED classification representing lower education levels (ISCED 1–5, primary up to short-cycle tertiary education) and higher education (ISCED 6–7, from bachelor's degrees up to doctoral degrees) as reference category, unemployment, insecurity about household's income and whether respondent is born in respective country. Since we rely on arguments from the value change theory, we use birth cohorts composed as follows to control for age: interwar (1926-1945), baby boomers (1946-1964), generation X (1958-1968), and Millennials (1980-1996). Those born after 1996 were included as Post-Millennials (Etzel 2023).

At the context level, we control for the gross domestic product (GDP) of the respective country in the respective survey year, based on data from the European Commission (Eurostat, 2022). To control for possible different political cultures and political developments, a variable differentiating between Eastern and Western Europe was also included in the models.

## Results

Even if it cannot be conclusively examined here, it is worth taking a look at the development of APPs per country over time in order to ascertain how reasonable an assumption of an increasingly progressive party landscape is. Figure 1 shows the development of APPs in all countries over the period from 1999 to 2019. A dashed trend line is shown for each curve. High APP values indicate conservative positions, while low values tend to reflect liberal positions. As can be seen from the graphs, almost all plots fall over time, indicating a liberalisation of the APP in nearly all countries. The trend line only rises for three countries (the Czech Republic, Lithuania and the Netherlands).

*[Figure 1 near here]*

Starting with analysis part 1, testing the hypothesised relationship between personal values, voting for right-wing populist parties and the influence of the degree of progressiveness of the party landscape, we estimate a multilevel multinomial regression model. In accordance with the recommendations of the ESS, the analysis was weighted with the poststratification and design weighting. Cross-level interactions were considered for testing hypothesis H2. The results are shown in Table 5, and robust standard errors are given in brackets. In the first step, a separate model was calculated for each of the ESS Rounds 7, 8, and 9. Models 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1 show all individual effects, Model 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2 include context effects, and Model 1.3, 2.3, and 3.3 cover the interaction effects. Visualisations of the interactions between are APP and conservation for every ESS Round is provided in figures 2-4 for better understanding.

*[Table 5 and figures 2-5 near here]*

The results support the assumption of a positive effect of conservation on right-wing populist voting. A highly significant ($p < .001$) effect is found for Round 7 (1.29) and Round 9 (1.17). However, this could not be demonstrated for Round 8. The hypothesised moderation effect of APP, though, is only significant ($p < .05$) for Round 9 (0.89). As can be seen from Figure 4, it turns out to be in the assumed direction. These findings support the thesis that the progressiveness of the party landscape serves as a moderator that increase the likelihood of conservative people to opt for right-wing populist parties. As figures 1-3 show, this effect becomes stronger over the three rounds analysed. Hypothesis H1 (Hypothesis 1a (H1): *More liberal party landscapes will amplify the positive effect of conservation on voting for right-wing populist parties (for ESS Rounds 7-9)* can therefore be partially confirmed.

Model 4.3 tests this assumption empirically. Here, the interaction effect between conservation, APP and time (0.80) is significant ($p < .05$). Figure 5 shows the development of the moderation effect over time only for more liberal APPs and illustrates that the slope of this effect has increased over the three rounds analysed. Therefore, these results support hypothesis H2 (*The moderation effect postulated in H1 becomes stronger throughout the measurement points*) for the direct operationalisation of right-wing populist parties in ESS Round 7-9.

Table 6 displays the models with political trust as an approximation to right-populist vote. Models 5.1-5.3 are based on all available ESS Rounds 1-9, models 6.1-6.3 on ESS Rounds 2-9 with a larger country sample. The interaction effect between conservation and APP is significant ($p < .05$) in both models, in model 4.3 with 1.05, in model 5.3 with 1.03. A glance at Figures 6 and 7 shows that the interaction effect also follows the assumed direction here. In more progressive party landscapes, the political trust of conservation falls across the ESS rounds analysed in both models. This provides further support for hypothesis H2. Assuming that political trust is a valid substitute for right-wing populist vote, conservative individuals' trust within progressive party landscapes declines over time. This is particularly remarkable considering that conservative individuals are actually characterised by a high level of trust in political institutions.

The findings of this study thus confirm 1) the results of Etzel (forthcoming) that a moderation effect of the degree of liberalisation of the party landscape on the relationship between conservation and right-wing populist voting seems to exist. Taking the results of models 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3 together, there is also 2) strong evidence for the assumption tested here that this moderation effect has become stronger over time has possibly even emerged over the last two decades.

**Discussion**

Preliminary, it should be emphasised again that this study does not claim to explain right-wing populist voting by conservative individuals in its entirety. Instead, it seeks to add another mosaic piece to the complex picture of multifactorial phenomena of populist voting. With regard to the relationship between conservation and right-wing populist voting on individual level, the results of this study are largely (with the exception of ESS Round 8) in line with the line of empirical research that found a positive influence of this value orientation on this voting behaviour. The main contribution of the study, the linking of the social macro and individual micro levels by assuming a moderating effect of a more progressive party landscape due to changes in values and analysing its development over the last two decades, has proved to be quite fruitful. Solid evidence was found that the effect assumed here, whereby conservative

individuals feel disconnected from the political system as such (in the form of political trust) and from conservative parties (in the form of electoral support for right-wing populist parties) and no longer feel represented, has emerged and intensified over time.

However, it is worth noting that the underlying mechanisms that lead these people to turn to right-wing populist voting were only theorised here, but not empirically examined. This was beyond the scope of this study. However, due to the complexity of the phenomenon of right-wing populism, it can be assumed that this is by no means solely due to the moderation effect found here. These findings only form a further basis for connection to other assumptions that explain success of right-wing populists, such as the activation hypothesis, which states that populist attitudes are inherent in (some) people and can be activated and mobilised by populists (Hawkins *et al*, 2018, 2020). It is also conceivable that the 'progressiveness' of society and the political system is 'over-stylised' or exaggeratedly criticised by populist actors in order to mobilise conservative voters. These are just two examples of other explanations for right-wing populist voting that could conceivably be facilitated by the moderation effect analysed here.

A further restriction of this study relates to the fact that the temporal development of the moderation effect can only be shown empirically here as a tendency trend, as causal confirmation is not possible based on the cross-sectional data used here, which only allow a trend analysis. Lastly, it should be noted that the correlations found here are not necessarily causal and the direction of their relationship is not empirically clear. Even if we assume that values are stable over time, it can still be assumed, particularly in the context of political trust, that individuals develop more conservative convictions as their trust in a predominantly progressive society declines. It is also feasible that people vote right-wing populist for other reasons and in these circumstances their conservative views become reinforced.

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i The terms "liberal", "progressive" and "left" are not (yet) clearly defined and differentiated in this paper and are provisionally understood as synonyms in the following.

ii Unfortunately, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ESS round 10 has been switched to a self-administered questionnaire in 8 out of 23 countries, which did not include the human values scale used in this study. Therefore, only the ESS rounds up to 9 were used in this study (so far).

iii This operationalisation results in the reference category 0 including both far-left populist parties and non-populist far-right parties. As the study theoretically places a strict focus on right-wing populist parties and we differentiate the choice of right-wing populist actors from moderate and extreme parties on both the right and the left and further not assume the mechanism analysed here for left-wing populism, we do not see the heterogeneity of the reference category as problematic.

iv Although Spain, Ireland and Portugal were part of all ESS rounds and CHES surveys used, they were excluded from analyses as no relevant right-wing populist party could be operationalised here.

v Apart from the concerns about overspecification and multicollinearity problems, we also decided in favour of an index and against including all topics as individual variables for methodological reasons, as this makes it easier to form cross-level interactions.

**Appendix – Tables**

*Table 1: Linking of ESS and CHES data*

| ESS-Round | ESS Year | CHES-Wave |
|-----------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | 2002 | 1999 |
| 2 | 2004 | 2002 |
| 3 | 2006 | 2002 |
| 4 | 2008 | 2006 |
| 5 | 2010 | 2006 |
| 6 | 2012 | 2010 |
| 7 | 2014 | 2010 |
| 8 | 2016 | 2014 |
| 9 | 2018 | 2019 |

*Table 2: List of right-wing populist parties by country*

| Country | Party name in national language | Party name in English | Abbreviation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) | Freedom Party of Austria | FPÖ |
| Belgium | Vlaams Belang | Flemish Interest (Flemish) | VB |
| | Front National | Front National | FN |
| Bulgaria | Obedineni patrioti - NFSB, ATAKA i VMRO | United Patriots, Attack,National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria | - |
| Czech Republic | Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Tomio Okamura) | Svoboda a přímá demokracie | SPD |
| Germany | Alternative für Deutschland - AfD | Alternative for Germany (AFD) | AfD |
| | Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands - NPD | National Democratic Party (NPD) | NPD |
| Estonia | Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond | Conseravative People's Party of Estonia | EKRE |
| Spain | n.a. | n.a. | |
| Finland | Perussuomalaiset | True Finns | PS |
| France | Rassemblement National (ex. FN (Front National)) | National Gathering (ex. National Front) | RN/FN |
| United Kingdom | UK Independence Party | UK Independence Party | UKIP |
| Croatia | Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ) | Croatian democratic union | HDZ |
| | Most nezavisnih lista | Bridge of Independent Lists | Most |
| | Koalicija HDSSB-HKS | Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja | HDSSB |
| Hungary | Fidesz (Fidesz Magyar Polgári Párt) - Fidesz | Hungarian Civic Alliance | Fidesz-M Fidesz-KNDP |
| | Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) | Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary | JOBBIK |
| Ireland | - | - | |
| Italy | Lega/Lega Nord | Northern Lega | LN |
| | Fratelli d'Italia | Brothers of Italy | FDL |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lithuania | Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas | Party Order and Justice | TT |
| Latvia | Nacionālā apvienība 'Visu Latvijai!' - 'Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK' | National Alliance "All For Latvia!" – "For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK" | TB-LNNK |
| Netherlands | Partij voor de Vrijheid | Party for Freedom | PVV |
| Poland | Prawo i Sprawiedliwość | Law and Justice | PiS |
| | Kukiz' 15 | Kukiz' 15 | Kukiz |
| Portugal | - | - | |
| Cyprus | National Popular Front | National Popular Front (ELAM) | ELAM |
| | KINIMA ALLILEGII | Solidarity Movement | Kinhma |
| Sweden | Sverigedemokraterna | Sweden Democrats | SDSS |
| Slovenia | SDS - Slovenska demokratska stranka | Slovenian Democratic Party | SDSS |
| | Slovenska nacionalna stranka (SNS) | Slovene National Party | SNS |
| | Nova Slovenija – Krščanski demokrati (NSI) | New Slovenia – People's Christian Party | NSI |
| Slovakia | Slovenská národná strana - SNS | Slovak National Party | SNS |
| Switzerland | Schweizerische Volkspartei | Swiss People's Party | SVP/UDC |
| Norway | Fremskrittspartiet | n.a. | FkP |

Table 3: Reliability Measures of higher value variables and political trust

| | Conservation | Openness | Self-Transcendence | Self-Enhancement | Political Trust |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESS-Round 1 | ,743 | ,762 | ,714 | ,730 | ,799 |
| ESS-Round 2 | ,746 | ,769 | ,733 | ,725 | ,869 |
| ESS-Round 3 | ,723 | ,773 | ,716 | ,726 | ,873 |
| ESS-Round 4 | ,755 | ,794 | ,757 | ,749 | ,874 |
| ESS-Round 5 | ,741 | ,776 | ,748 | ,729 | ,899 |
| ESS-Round 6 | ,731 | ,774 | ,747 | ,742 | ,887 |
| ESS-Round 7 | ,710 | ,752 | ,725 | ,731 | ,891 |
| ESS-Round 8 | ,715 | ,755 | ,746 | ,738 | ,890 |
| ESS-Round 9 | ,699 | ,760 | ,746 | ,705 | ,894 |

Note: Cronbach's alpha coefficients displayed

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

| | ESS-Round 1 | | | | ESS-Round 2 | | | | ESS-Round 3 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M | SD | Minimum | Maximum | M | SD | Minimum | Maximum | M | SD | Minimum | Maximum |
| Conservation | 4.32 | 0.86 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.36 | 0.85 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.32 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Openness | 4.11 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.04 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.04 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Self-Transcendence | 4.83 | 0.69 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.82 | 0.70 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.80 | 0.68 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Self-Enhancement | 3.73 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 3.71 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 3.74 | 0.89 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Right-Wing Populist Vote | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Political Trust | 4.45 | 2.24 | 0.00 | 10.00 | 4.23 | 2.11 | 0.00 | 10.00 | 4.08 | 2.17 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| APP | 4.99 | 0.45 | 4.48 | 5.92 | 5.17 | 0.51 | 4.48 | 6.09 | 5.24 | 0.56 | 4.48 | 6.41 |

*Table 4 (continued)*

| | ESS-Round 6 | | | | ESS-Round 4 | | | | ESS-Round 5 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **M** | **SD** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** | **M** | **SD** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** | **M** | **SD** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** |
| Conservation | 4.45 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.41 | 0.85 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.42 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Openness | 4.12 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.07 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.08 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Self-Transcendence | 4.88 | 0.72 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.81 | 0.74 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.86 | 0.72 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Self-Enhancement | 3.84 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 3.82 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 3.82 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Right-Wing Populist Vote | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Political Trust | 3.78 | 2.30 | 0.00 | 10.00 | 3.87 | 2.24 | 0.00 | 10.00 | 3.73 | 2.23 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| APP | 4.92 | 0.62 | 3.71 | 6.30 | 5.04 | 0.47 | 4.48 | 5.85 | 5.07 | 0.44 | 4.48 | 5.80 |

| | ESS-Round 7 | | | | ESS-Round 8 | | | | ESS-Round 9 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **M** | **SD** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** | **M** | **SD** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** | **M** | **SD** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** |
| Conservation | 4.37 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.33 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.34 | 0.80 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Openness | 4.11 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.10 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.01 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Self-Transcendence | 4.90 | 0.70 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.83 | 0.73 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 4.87 | 0.72 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Self-Enhancement | 3.75 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 3.74 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 3.66 | 0.86 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
| Right-Wing Populist Vote | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.18 | 0.38 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Political Trust | 4.24 | 2.20 | 0.00 | 10.00 | 4.32 | 2.17 | 0.00 | 10.00 | 4.28 | 2.28 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| APP | 4.92 | 0.54 | 3.71 | 5.96 | 4.67 | 0.68 | 2.62 | 5.65 | 4.64 | 0.72 | 3.10 | 6.72 |

Table 5: Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting Right-Wing Populist Vote

| | ESS Round 7 | | | | | | | | | ESS Round 8 | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 1.1 | | | Model 1.2 | | | Model 1.3 | | | Model 2.1 | | | Model 2.2 | | | Model 2.3 | | |
| *Individual Level* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Conservation | 1.29 | 0.09 | *** | 1.30 | 0.09 | *** | 0.38 | 0.45 | | 1.00 | 0.13 | | 1.00 | 0.13 | | 1.18 | 0.32 | |
| Openness | 1.14 | 0.06 | ** | 1.14 | 0.06 | ** | 1.13 | 0.06 | * | 1.09 | 0.04 | * | 1.09 | 0.04 | * | 1.09 | 0.04 | * |
| Self-Transcendence | 0.86 | 0.06 | * | 0.83 | 0.06 | * | 0.83 | 0.07 | * | 0.87 | 0.10 | | 0.87 | 0.10 | | 0.86 | 0.10 | |
| Self-Enhancement | 0.94 | 0.04 | | 0.95 | 0.04 | | 0.95 | 0.04 | | 1.03 | 0.12 | | 1.03 | 0.12 | | 1.03 | 0.12 | |
| *Context Level* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| APP (weighted Mean) | | | | 0.13 | 0.06 | *** | 0.04 | 0.04 | ** | | | | 0.29 | 0.07 | *** | 0.34 | 0.11 | *** |
| GDP | | | | 0.36 | 0.21 | + | 0.34 | 0.20 | + | | | | 0.59 | 0.43 | | 0.60 | 0.43 | |
| East-West | | | | 0.94 | 0.03 | + | 0.94 | 0.03 | * | | | | 0.98 | 0.02 | | 0.98 | 0.02 | |
| *Cross-Level Interactions* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| APP X Conservation | | | | | | | 1.29 | 0.30 | | | | | | | | 0.96 | 0.05 | |
| APP X Conservation X ESS Round | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| [ESS Round] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| [APP X ESS Round] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| [Conservation X ESS Round] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.03 | 0.02 | *** | 0.73 | 0.19 | *** | 2.46 | .01 | ** | 0.07 | 0.07 | ** | 4.94 | .84 | * | 2.40 | .47 | |
| N (level 1) | 18 853 | | | 18 853 | | | 18 853 | | | 18 534 | | | 18 534 | | | 18 534 | | |
| N (level 2) | 16.0 | | | 16.0 | | | 16.0 | | | 16.00 | | | 16.00 | | | 16.00 | | |
| Log-Likelihood | -4522.79 | | | -4135.152 | | | -4133.591 | | | -4563.46 | | | -4557.79 | | | -4557.62 | | |
| AIC | 9075.58 | | | 8296.304 | | | 8293.182 | | | 9156.91 | | | 9145.59 | | | 9145.24 | | |
| BIC | 9193.25 | | | 8396.385 | | | 8393.262 | | | 9274.32 | | | 9263.00 | | | 9262.65 | | |

*Table 5 (continued)*

| | ESS Round 9 | | | | | | | | | ESS Rounds 7-9 | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 3.1 | | | Model 32 | | | Model 3.3 | | | Model 4.1 | | | Model 4.2 | | | Model 4.3 | | |
| *Individual Level* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Conservation | 1.24 | 0.08 | *** | 1.24 | 0.08 | *** | 2.06 | 0.51 | ** | 1.166 | 0.06 | ** | 1.17 | 0.06 | ** | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| Openness | 1.20 | 0.13 | + | 1.20 | 0.13 | + | 1.2 | 0.13 | | 1.132 | 0.06 | * | 1.13 | 0.06 | * | 1.13 | 0.06 | * |
| Self-Transcendence | 0.92 | 0.15 | | 0.92 | 0.15 | | 0.92 | 0.15 | | 0.887 | 0.05 | * | 0.88 | 0.05 | * | 0.88 | 0.05 | * |
| Self-Enhancement | 0.80 | 0.06 | *** | 0.80 | 0.06 | *** | 0.8 | 0.05 | *** | 0.916 | 0.04 | + | 0.92 | 0.04 | + | 0.92 | 0.04 | |
| *Context Level* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| APP (weighted Mean) | | | | 0.13 | 0.06 | *** | 0.04 | 0.04 | ** | | | | 0.29 | 0.07 | *** | 0.34 | 0.11 | *** |
| GDP | | | | 0.36 | 0.21 | + | 0.34 | 0.20 | + | | | | 0.59 | 0.43 | | 0.60 | 0.43 | |
| East-West | | | | 0.94 | 0.03 | + | 0.94 | 0.03 | * | | | | 0.98 | 0.02 | | 0.98 | 0.02 | |
| *Cross-Level Interactions* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| APP X Conservation | | | | | | | 0.89 | 0.05 | * | | | | | | | 6.00 | 5.29 | * |
| APP X Conservation X ESS Round | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.80 | 0.08 | * |
| [ESS Round] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.01 | 0.02 | * |
| [APP X ESS Round] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2.84 | 1.39 | * |
| [Conservation X ESS Round] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2.76 | 1.40 | * |
| Constant | .03 | .02 | *** | .71 | .70 | * | 0.21 | 1.52 | | .04 | .03 | *** | .08 | .05 | *** | .03 | .08 | * |
| N (level 1) | 17 837 | | | 17 837 | | | 17 837 | | | 52 664 | | | 52 664 | | | 52 664 | | |
| N (level 2) | 16.0 | | | 16.0 | | | 16.0 | | | 16.0 | | | 16.0 | | | 16.0 | | |
| Log-Likelihood | -4222.97 | | | -4214.89 | | | -4213.94 | | | -13247.14 | | | -13027.79 | | | -13021.73 | | |
| AIC | 8477.94 | | | 8459.78 | | | 8457.87 | | | 26524.28 | | | 26085.58 | | | 26075.47 | | |
| BIC | 8602.56 | | | 8576.62 | | | 8574.71 | | | 26657.91 | | | 26218.65 | | | 26217.42 | | |

Note: Odds ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for country variable. Data on individual level are weighted by ESS' post-stratification design weight. Control variables on individual level are not displayed.
Model x.1: Individual effects only. Model x.2: Individual effects and context effects. Model x.3: Individual effects, context effects and cross-level interactions
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 6: Multilevel Linear Regression Predicting Political Trust

| | ESS Round 1-9 | | | | | | | | | ESS Round 2-9 | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 5.1 | | | Model 5.2 | | | Model 5.3 | | | Model 6.1 | | | Model 6.2 | | | Model 6.3 | | |
| *Individual Level* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Conservation | 1.06 | 0.02 | *** | 1.06 | 0.02 | *** | 4.46 | 1.85 | *** | 0.90 | 0.07 | | 1.05 | 0.02 | *** | 3.20 | 1.78 | * |
| Openness | 0.92 | 0.01 | *** | 0.92 | 0.01 | *** | 0.92 | 0.01 | *** | 0.92 | 0.02 | *** | 0.92 | 0.01 | *** | 0.92 | 0.01 | *** |
| Self-Transcendence | 1.01 | 0.02 | | 1.01 | 0.02 | | 1.01 | 0.02 | | 1.11 | 0.07 | + | 1.02 | 0.02 | | 1.02 | 0.02 | |
| Self-Enhancement | 1.03 | 0.01 | *** | 1.03 | 0.01 | *** | 1.03 | 0.01 | *** | 1.03 | 0.02 | | 1.02 | 0.01 | * | 1.02 | 0.01 | * |
| *Context Level* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| APP (weighted Mean) | | | | 0.86 | 0.06 | * | 3.61 | 1.55 | ** | | | | 0.95 | 0.09 | | 2.20 | 1.19 | |
| GDP | | | | 1.28 | 0.31 | | 1.28 | 0.30 | | | | | 0.85 | 0.23 | | 0.85 | 0.23 | |
| East-West | | | | 1.01 | 0.03 | | 1.01 | 0.03 | | | | | 1.02 | 0.02 | | 1.02 | 0.02 | |
| *Cross-Level Interactions* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| APP X Conservation | | | | | | | 0.75 | 0.05 | *** | | | | | | | 0.80 | 0.08 | * |
| APP X Conservation X ESS Round | | | | | | | 1.05 | 0.01 | *** | | | | | | | 1.03 | 0.01 | * |
| [ESS Round] | | | | | | | 2.67 | 0.72 | *** | | | | | | | 1.74 | 0.63 | |
| [APP X ESS Round] | 0.95 | 0.02 | * | 0.92 | 0.03 | * | 0.80 | 0.04 | *** | 0.98 | 0.02 | | 0.96 | 0.03 | | 0.89 | 0.07 | * |
| [Conservation X ESS Round] | | | | | | | 0.80 | 0.04 | *** | | | | | | | 0.86 | 0.06 | |
| Constant | .32 | .40 | *** | .82 | .62 | ** | .01 | .02 | * | .75 | .28 | *** | 0.96 | 0.78 | | .04 | .10 | |
| N (level 1) | 99 314 | | | 99 314 | | | 99 314 | | | 132 609 | | | 132 609 | | | 132 609 | | |
| N (level 2) | 12.00 | | | 12.00 | | | 12.00 | | | 19.00 | | | 19.00 | | | 19.00 | | |
| Log-Likelihood | -237260.90 | | | -237252.60 | | | -237228.50 | | | -280553.90 | | | -274367.40 | | | -274353.90 | | |
| AIC | 474543.80 | | | 474529.10 | | | 474481.00 | | | 561143.80 | | | 548770.80 | | | 548745.80 | | |
| BIC | 474648.40 | | | 474643.20 | | | 474595.10 | | | 561320.10 | | | 548947.10 | | | 548931.90 | | |

Note: Odds ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for country variable. Data on individual level are weighted by ESS' post-stratification design weight. Control variables on individual level are not displayed.

**Appendix– Figures**



**APP over ESS Rounds by COUNTRY**

Country legend: AT, BE, CH, CZ, DE, EE, FI, FR, GB, HU, LT, NL, NO, PL, SE, SI

**1.**



**2.**

**3.**



**4.**



**5.**

**6.**



**7.**

**Captions and notes for figures in the order given above:**

1.  Figure 1: Means of APP by country and ESS Round

2.  Figure 2: Marginal effects for the cross-level interaction 'APP x Conservation' from multilevel logistic regression predicting right-populist vote for ESS Round 7.
    Notes: Calculation based on Models 1.3 as included in Table 5.

3.  Figure 3: Marginal effects for the cross-level interaction 'APP x Conservation' from multilevel logistic regression predicting right-populist vote for ESS Round 8.
    Notes: Calculation based on Models 2.3 as included in Table 5.

4.  Figure 4: Marginal effects for the cross-level interaction 'APP x Conservation' from multilevel logistic regression predicting right-populist vote for ESS Round 9.
    Notes: Calculation based on Models 3.3 as included in Table 5.

5. Figure 5: Marginal effects for the cross-level interaction 'APP x Conservation' from multilevel logistic regression predicting right-populist vote for ESS Rounds 7-9.
Notes: Calculation based on Models 4.3 as included in Table 5; only graphs for APP more left (x̄-2*SD) are displayed.

6. Figure 6: Marginal effects for the cross-level interaction 'APP x Conservation' from multilevel linear regression predicting political trust for ESS Rounds 1-9.
Notes: Calculation based on Models 5.3 as included in Table 6; only graphs for APP more left (x̄-2*SD) are displayed.

7. Figure 7: Marginal effects for the cross-level interaction 'APP x Conservation' from multilevel linear regression predicting political trust for ESS Rounds 2-9.
Notes: Calculation based on Models 6.3 as included in Table 6; only graphs for APP more left (x̄-2*SD) are displayed.